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The study is an analysis of the efficacy of government led Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) processes in the context of ethnic based political and military formations 
that are competing and hostile to each other. It seeks to understand how such a government led 
DDR process impacts upon the peace building process in the aftermath of a conflict. Many 
DDR practitioners, policy makers and academics advocate for government leadership and 
ownership of DDR processes. The justification is that local ownership enables buy-in from 
local actors and that it makes DDR processes effective and sustainable. This thesis questions 
this often-iterated peace building judgement. It is a qualitative study that generates most of the 
data through semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The focus is on the experiences 
of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) in the DDR process in Zimbabwe 
during the periods 1980-1984 and 1997. 
The study is guided by an analytical framework, which draws on Theory of Change reasoning. 
It therefore seeks to provide information that can produce change through transforming 
negative mindsets in behaviour, attitudes, feelings, perceptions, and confrontational 
relationships between and among ex-combatants, their commanders as well as the political 
leadership into positive ones for effective implementation of DDR programs. The central 
argument is that a government led DDR program that is implemented in the context of ethnic-
based political and military formations undermines peace building efforts. In the context of 
Zimbabwe where ethnicity was politicised, the DDR process tended to be partisan, incomplete, 
inadequate, and skewed in favour of the group with political power. The result is the 
marginalisation and persecution of those deemed ‘Other’ in the integration of the armed forces 
as well as in the general socio-economic and political systems of the state. The post-conflict 
environment therefore remains insecure and unstable and the state quickly slides back into 
conflict.  A failed DDR process undermines other elements of the peace building process.  
The thesis recommends that robust and timely intervention processes that promote 
reconciliation and political inclusivity as well as mindest transformation be implemented in the 
political and military spheres to lessen negative attitudes, behaviours, perceptions, feelings, 
and relationships and pave way for mutual respect, co-operation, trust, confidence and unity 
between different political and military formations. A context-specific DDR approach based 
on clear understanding of the background relationships between political and military 
formations should be implemented to enable the depoliticisation and de-ethnicisation of the 
DDR process. The presence of a neutral third party to facilitate, supervise and underwrite the 
DDR process is a critical prerequisite to the successful implementation of government led DDR 
processes in the context of entrenched ethnic-oriented rivalries and hostilities between parties. 
The third party is to avoid the manipulation and abuse of the process by one party (governing 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Overview 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is an integral part of post-conflict 
peace building processes. Inappropriate and/or inadequate DDR programs create restive ex-
combatants who are recidivist and always resort to violent means to achieve their objectives in 
post-conflict environments. However, properly designed and implemented DDR processes and 
programs are pivotal in the achievement of peace, security and stability. The majority of studies 
on DDR concentrate on the interrogation of all the ex-combatants at the country (macro) level.  
This thesis examines the effectiveness and effects of a government led DDR process 
implemented within a context of ethnic based political and military formations, which are 
embroiled in mutual mistrust, fear, suspicion, and hostilities on one group of ex-combatants 
and general peace building. The fundamental question is: Can one of the protagonists-turned-
into a governing party successfully lead in the planning and implementation of a DDR process 
in the context of political and military formations that are competing against each other for 
economic resources, positions, political power and influence as well as legitimacy?  
 Zimbabwe, since independence, is still trying to find an effective resolution to its 
demobilisation and reintegration problems that can bring closure to the grievances raised by 
the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) ex-combatants. In short, the grievance 
was that the DDR process was politicised and manipulated by the victorious party at the 
expense of their rivals who were also part of the DDR process. The Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) that was rivaling the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) during the 
liberation struggle for the leadership of the envisaged independent state, assumed the sensitive 
and delicate task of spearheading the peace building process. This was to occur in an 




little technical and material support from the international community. This thesis argues that 
the security environment negated the implementation of an inclusive, balanced and non-
discriminatory DDR process.  It was in the interest of ZANU to see ZIPRA combatants swiftly 
disarmed, but not viably reintegrated.  It is crucial to mention from the onset that ZIPRA and 
the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) were competitors; jointly 
participating in the DDR process under a ZANU led government. The DDR process turned out 
to be inadequate and incomplete and, it will be argued, served to perpetuate instability and 
insecurity that undermined the peace building process.  
The intriguing issue about the relationship between ZIPRA and ZANLA is that they seemed 
unable to co-exist peacefully before and after independence even though both were fighting 
against the same colonial force. Instead, ZIPRA was able to co-exist with Umkhonto WeSizwe 
(MK) fighters of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. ZIPRA and Umkhonto 
WeSizwe launched a couple of joint operations within Zimbabwe before 1980. ZIPRA was 
able to forge mutual trust and friendship with armed forces from another country but failed to 
do so with ZANLA from the same country. ZIPRA and ZANLA fought each other at the rear 
bases during joint training sessions. MK and ZIPRA launched joint operations in 1967 at 
Hwange areas and at Sipolilo (Guruve) in 1968. However, ZIPRA and ZANLA trainees clashed 
in June 1976 at Morogoro training camp in Tanzania. The fighting led to the death of about 
one hundred and fifty ZIPRA trainees (ZAPU Information Department, 2012; Alexander, 
McGregor and Ranger, 2000).  They fought each other at the front and they competed for 
operational zones: for example, in areas such as Beitbridge, Mberengwa, Mwenezi and 
Chiredzi, among others, ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas fought each other (ZAPU Information 
Department, 2012). The same was true of ZANLA which at various times operated with the 
Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in the eastern highlands of Zimbabwe but 




entrenched exclusive mindsets and polarised positions, bordering on inability to compromise, 
tolerate, accommodate, empathise, unite, and work together. To date, there are undertones of 
ZIPRA ex-combatants’ misgivings against the government as well as an element of mutual 
mistrust and suspicion between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. 
 The fighting spilled into the independence era as they also clashed where they were assembled 
before being merged into a single army or demobilised. Even within the integrated national 
army, their relations were antagonistic. The DDR process in Zimbabwe therefore provides a 
case study where the government that emerged from one of the former liberation movements 
leads the process. The governing party and its military wing had a clear history of antagonistic 
relationships with its rival liberation party and its military wing. The case of Zimbabwe’s DDR 
process was an interesting one where rival political and military formations were left on their 
own to unite and integrate one another respectively.  
1.2 Background 
 Zimbabwe attained independence on 18 April 1980 and immediately implemented DDR 
processes that were aimed at achieving security and stability within the new post-colonial state. 
There were high hopes for peace, unity and security among the general population and even 
amongst the ex-combatants. However, the DDR process proved to be problematic. There were 
clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants within a short period after the attainment 
of independence. Their clashes had serious security repercussions that undermined peace 
building efforts.  
Challenges in the implementation of DDR adversely affected peace building in Zimbabwe.  
Other peace building processes like the elections, the coalition government, the national policy 




country’s single national defence force were undermined by the protracted antagonistic 
relationships between the two nationalist parties and their armed wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA. 
 DDR in Zimbabwe was directed at three armies: ZIPRA aligned to PF-ZAPU, ZANLA aligned 
to ZANU-PF, and the Rhodesia Security Forces (RSFs). After the Lancaster Conference in 
1979, ZANU decided to run for elections without ZAPU. It had to use a different name to 
seperate itself from the ZANU of Ndabaningi Sithole. It suffixed its name with PF which was 
an acronym for the Patriotic Front. ZAPU prefixed its name with PF. ZANU’s decision to 
collapse the PF and contest the elections alone compounded competition and friction with 
ZAPU. Such competition and friction did not lay a sound foundation for post-independence 
unity and stability. The RSFs had been fighting to uphold the hegemonic interests of the 
Rhodesian Front (RF) of the white minority regime, whilst ZANLA and ZIPRA fought to 
achieve socio-political and economic emancipation. As pointed out before, the DDR process 
failed to ensure sustainable peace and unity as former rivals started to fight and undermine each 
other again during the process of creating a single national army. The post-independence 
conflict was exclusively Black on Black. 
 The Lancaster House Constitutional talks of 1979 did not help the situation. It skirted 
fundamental technical details on how the post-independence DDR process was to be handled. 
In fact, issues to do with DDR processes were left to the new incoming government (Rupiya 
and Chitiyo, 2005).  It is crucial to note that ZIPRA and ZANLA had coalesced around ethnic 
identities during the liberation war. ZIPRA was predominantly made up of Ndebele speaking 
guerrillas, whilst ZANLA was chiefly made up of the Shona speaking people from the north-
east (Brickhill, 1995). 
 Like their military wings, the parent political parties were more or less constituted along ethnic 




agreement without outright military victory from any of the parties. This impacted on the 
enforcement of disarmament and the roll out of demobilisation and reintegration programs. The 
new post-colonial government was decided on the basis of the outcome of a national election 
that was held in the first quarter of 1980. The results of the national election were again disputed 
as PF-ZAPU alleged that ZANU-PF used its guerrilla forces to influence the election in its 
favour. 
The 1980 election was overwhelmingly won by ZANU-PF whilst PF-ZAPU came a distant 
second. Rather than diminish the level of ethnic bifurcation in the nationalist movement along 
Ndebele and Shona fault lines, the 1980 election results accentuated it. The two parties were 
thus reduced into regional organisations as the majority of people who voted for PF-ZAPU 
mainly came from Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands inhabited by Ndebele speaking 
people, while ZANU-PF garnered its support from Mashonaland and other areas inhabited by 
the Shona speaking people (Sithole, 1999). The wedge between the nationalist parties along 
regional and ethnic lines did not augur well for DDR processes that were put in place by a 
government largely formed on an ethnic and regional basis. 
Even though ZANU-PF invited PF-ZAPU and the RF into a Government of National Unity 
(GNU), in 1980, and pronounced a national policy of reconciliation, the military situation 
remained cumbersome as rivalries and hostilities escalated during the integration process 
amidst accusations of favouritism towards ZANLA ex-combatants and discrimination against 
ZIPRA. A key source of the critical peace building challenges therefore emanated from the 
military sectors and spilled over to other sectors. First and foremost, thousands of combatants 
from ZIPRA and ZANLA did not heed the call to get into APs so as to kick start the DDR 




The guerrilla armies had also held back some of their best weapons and best military personnel 
in neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique. These were to serve as a security guarantee should 
there be a break-up of the peace agreement or a renewal of hostilities between former arch-
rivals and adversaries (Alexander et al, 2000). Although the retention of weapons and military 
personnel by both ZIPRA and ZANLA in their rear bases during the transition period was 
mainly for security reasons, the strategy further fuelled mistrust and suspicion between the two. 
The third development that adversely affected relations between ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-
combatants were clashes between them at APs. These clashes led to loss of lives and were 
reminiscent of the wartime clashes between the two guerrilla armies which were to a large 
extent couched in ethnic terms. There were arms caches on ZIPRA properties which were 
purportedly earmarked for use to topple the ZANU-PF government. The situation became 
worse after the alleged unearthing of weapons on ZIPRA-owned farms, in 1982, as ZANU-PF 
and PF-ZAPU could not see eye to eye. More over, ZIPRA-ZANLA relationships, both at APs 
and within the newly constituted security arms of the state, especially in the army, deteriorated 
to the lowest ebbs (Alao, 2012; Kriger, 2003; Musemwa, 1995; Nkomo, 1984). 
 As a result of the arms cache ‘discoveries,’ ZANU-PF arrested senior ZIPRA commanders on 
charges of treason. The arrest of senior ZIPRA officers triggered a chain of events that 
exacerbated the already fragile security situation. A significant number of ZIPRA cadres at 
APs as well as some of those who had integrated into the ZNA deserted into dissidence, whilst 
others crossed into neighbouring South Africa and Botswana for safety (Alexander et al 2000; 
Kriger, 2003; Dzinesa, 2005; Musemwa, 1994). On the political front, senior PF-ZAPU 
politicians who were part of the GNU were dismissed from the government in 1982 and some 




In response to the problem of dissidence, ZANU-PF deployed a Brigade known as the 5th 
Brigade into Matabeleland in early 1983 to hunt down ZIPRA ex-combatants who had deserted 
into the bush with their weapons. In the course of its operations, the 5th Brigade committed 
heinous acts of brutality against civilians leading to about 20 000 casualties in Matabeleland 
and the Midlands in a conflict that engulfed the two regions up until ZANU-PF  merged with 
PF-ZAPU into one party on 22 December 1987 (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
and the Legal Resource Foundation, CCJP/LRF, 1997). The operations of the 5th Brigade were 
eventful. Within a very short period, it had caused serious loss of human life amongst the 
Ndebele speaking people thereby sharpening the feelings of ethnic differences between the 
Ndebele and the Shona. Those feelings further divided the nation and militated against effective 
DDR. Although the signing of the Unity Accord ended acts of dissidence as well as the conflict 
in Matabeleland, simmering ethnic tensions persisted as the 5th Brigade was not only seen by 
the Ndebele people as a military unit bent on containing dissidence but as a Shona army that 
was targeting the Ndebele people for ethnic cleansing (Mashingaidze, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2009). What is clear is that there was a serious problem of division, mistrust, and hostility 
between key stakeholders to the DDR process in Zimbabwe. 
Since the first demobilisation and reintegration process was problematic, it was repeated later. 
The first process was between 1980 and 1984 and the second one was launched in 1997 and it 
involved all the ex-combatants throughout the country (United Nations Office of the Special 
Adviser on Africa, 2005). Three years after the signing of the Unity Accord, ZANLA and 
ZIPRA ex-combatants formed the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association 
(ZNLWVA). The major aim of the association was to articulate the grievances of the ex-
combatants. The ZNLWVA successfully got the government to award its members a lump sum 




receiving the reintegration assistance, in 1997, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants also worked 
together in leading the land occupations of the early 2000s. 
What is to be noted is that both processes were led by the government. Although ethnic tensions 
between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants had significantly subsided in 1997, the 
government did not take cognisance of early challenges that had afflicted ZIPRA ex-
combatants in its second reintegration program. The period of collaboration between ZANLA 
and ZIPRA ex-combatants was short-lived. When ZAPU was revived by Dumiso Dabengwa, 
Cyril Ndebele and Thenjiwe Lesabe among others, in 2009, many ZIPRA ex-combatants broke 
ranks with the united ZANU-PF party and became active members of the revived ZAPU 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Being involved in opposition politics per se is not a problem. 
However, it appears the ZIPRA ex-combatants took with them the grievances they had over 
problematic DDR experiences and hoped that ZAPU would provide a platform for them to 
articulate those grievances.  
Furthermore, some ZIPRA ex-combatants severed ties with the ZNLWVA in 2016 and formed 
an exclusively ZIPRA ex-combatants constituted association which they called the ZIPRA War 
Veterans Association (ZWVA). To date, members of the ZWVA always call for and attend 
meetings which articulate ZIPRA grievances in the DDR process, chief among them being the 
call for the government to return ZIPRA ex-combatants’ properties that were confiscated in 
1982 at the height of the political and military wrath that ZANU-PF/ZANLA directed against 
PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA. ZIPRA ex-combatants had bought a variety of movable and immovable 
properties during the period they were at APs to facilitate smooth economic reintegration of 
their members.  
Zimbabwe has remained divided along Ndebele and Shona ethnic lines and there is residual 




process as led and put into effect by the Zimbabwean government in a situation where there 
were ethnic-linked animosities between political and military entities. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The United Nations (UN), through its Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Standards (IDDRS, 2006), observes that DDR programs that are significantly 
led and controlled by externals usually fail to effectively link up and coordinate successfully 
with local leaders. As a result, such DDR programs fail to be relevant to local contexts, and in 
most cases, leave local stakeholders to the DDR process disatisfied (IDDRS, 2006). 
However, the case of DDR in Zimbabwe contradicted the expectations of many in the policy 
community as the government led and locally-owned DDR process was characterised more by 
rivalries and hostilities than by harmony and peaceful co-existence and left some stakeholders 
disgruntled. The DDR processes were far from being transparent and inclusive and therefore 
undermined the foundational pillars of the peace building process. The ethnic and regional fault 
lines that fragmented political parties during the struggle for independence and which were 
again exhibited in the 1980 general elections did not vanish. Instead, they continued with much 
intensity within the military circles because the two former guerrilla armies were now expected 
to work and live together in creating the new security sectors of the post-colonial state. Due to 
ethnic animosities, the DDR process was largely partial, incomplete, and marginalised the 
ZIPRA ex-combatants.  
The results of this DDR process were the continuation of disunity, conflict and the emergence 
of ‘dissidents’ affecting peace and stability in Zimbabwe. The other crucial elements of the 
peace process such as the GNU, implementing the policy of national reconciliation and 
economic recovery and reconstruction efforts, especially in Matabeleland and the Midlands 




ex-combatants and the people of Matabeleland in general complain that the government has 
not instituted programs aimed at deliberately bringing them into the mainstream economy. As 
noted by the IDDRS (2006), one of the fundamental aims of putting in place DDR programs 
after a conflict is to obviate the recurrence of conflict and to make sure that peace and stability 
thrives for other peace building processes to succeed. In Zimbabwe, this was not the case as 
DDR produced negative results. Put differently, DDR achieved the opposite of what it was 
expected to do. It perpetuated instability and insecurity. 
First and foremost, the results of the 1980 elections which were a foundation of the post-
independence government were disputed. As alluded to earlier, mistrust and outright hostility 
continued between ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants at APs before the disarmament process 
could be fully completed. Political rivalry and clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA within the 
Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) undermined the creation of an impartial, united and non-
political army. All these developments led to the disintegration of the national unity 
government which was a cornerstone of an inclusive state.  
Efforts to eradicate dissidence brought conflict to Matabeleland and Midlands regions thereby 
threatening development projects that were at their embryonic stages as the two regions were 
characterised by fear and insecurity. In fact, economic recovery and reconstruction activities 
in Matabeleland, where most of the ZIPRA ex-combatants hailed from, were stalled between 
1982 and 1987 due to security concerns associated with banditry and the 5th Brigade. The DDR 
process was therefore implemented in an environment characterised by competition for power, 
economic resources and legitimacy.  
 The fundamental issue that is brought to the fore by the Zimbabwean case is that it is not only 
the question of who leads and owns the DDR process which contributes to its success or failure. 




towards the successful planning and implementation of DDR processes, for example, the issue 
of mindsets of, and relationships between political parties and military factions that are key 
stakeholders to the process. 
Thirty-eight years after the start of the implementation of the DDR programs, ZIPRA ex-
combatants are still at loggerheads with government as they argue that their economic woes 
are government-induced as a result of a partisan and ethnically-oriented reintegration process 
which disempowered them through the confiscation of the properties that were meant to 
guarantee them economic security. Despite the unity agreement of 1987 and the formation of 
the ZNLWVA, there are still some pronouncements by the ZIPRA ex-combatants that depict a 
fair level of polarisation, mistrust and hostility between them and the government and to some 
extent with the ZANLA ex-combatants. The above developments, the thesis argues, are a 
manifestation of an incomplete, politicised and ethnically oriented DDR process. The 
reintegration program of 1997 did not totally solve the challenges of the ZIPRA ex-combatants. 
Continued lack of positive peace forced some ZIPRA former fighters who experienced physical 
abuse in the 1980s to become perpetrators of physical violence and/or acts of intimidation 
against civilians in the post-2000 period.  
 ZIPRA ex-combatants complain that discrimination between them and their ZANLA 
counterparts with regards to access to economic opportunities and resources persist to date. For 
example, they point out that once ZIPRA ex-combatants retire from the army, they sink into 
poverty whereas ZANLA ex-combatants are seconded to head government departments 
(Southern Eye, 2016). The other complaint by the ZIPRA ex-combatants is that the 1997 
reintegration assistance was insensitive to their earlier reintegration challenges. They say that 
the reintegration support was universalised and treated unequal ex-combatants equally. Whilst 
most ZANLA ex-guerrillas successfully reintegrated in the 1980s, many ZIPRAs could not 




Their co-operative schemes and business ventures were disrupted when they were at their 
embryonic stages (Kriger, 2003; Todd, 2007). By 1997, many ZIPRA ex-combatants were in 
a weaker economic position compared to their ZANLA counterparts. The 1997 reintegration 
program, like the 1980-1984 DDR process before it, was also led and owned by the 
government. 
It is pivotal to note that, in general, the demobilisation and reintegration process in Zimbabwe, 
and that of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in particular, is an interesting one because it continues to 
significantly influence current political trends in the country. The DDR process in Zimbabwe 
is a case which appears to defy international policy pronouncements and expectations because 
it did not facilitate effective peace building. Local ownership of DDR processes may be 
necessary but that is not a sufficient guarantee of successful DDR and larger peace-building 
and if unchecked may enable opportunities for discrimination against former rivals. In short, 
there were serious negative perceptions, attitudes, feelings, behaviour, and relationship 
problems which adversely affected DDR programs in Zimbabwe and these divided PF-
ZAPU/ZIPRA from ZANU-PF/ZANLA and made unity and peace difficult to achieve. These 
problems resulted in, or deepened the levels of division, intolerance, hostility, and violence 
between the two and negatively affected the whole DDR process and peace building in general. 
ZANU and ZAPU adopted and maintained hardline positions during the liberation struggle. 
They were unwilling to compromise, unite, share, assist and accommodate each other. These 
hardline positions were also adopted and maintained by their respective military wings. 
However, after their defeat in the 1980 elections, PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA seemed to be amenable 
to compromise and co-operation, whilst ZANU-PF and ZANLA ex-combatants, having been 
emboldened by their emphatic victory in the elections, maintained their hardline stance. This 
scenario presented and continues to present challenges to the peace building efforts because 




one bent on pursuing exclusive strategies that alienated PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants. 
To date, many ZIPRA ex-combatants are bitter because of the government’s approach to the 
issue of their properties which they lost in the DDR process. The government appears to be 
adamant to have frank and inclusive dialogue over the issue (ZIPRA ex-combatants’ 
properties) that would, according to ZIPRA ex-combatants, bring lasting solutions to their 
economic challenges and heal their broken hearts.  
1.4 Research Objectives  
The aim of this thesis is to articulate the impact of the Zimbabwe government led DDR process 
on the ZIPRA ex-combatants and its consequences for peace building in the country in general.  
The study is guided by the following objectives: 
 To contextualise Zimbabwe’s DDR processes in 1980-1984 and in 1997; 
 To highlight the impact of ethnic rivalries and hostilities in the planning and 
implementation of Zimbabwe’s government led DDR processes; 
 To identify the nature of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in the DDR processes; 
 To evaluate the impact of the DDR process on peace building in Zimbabwe; 
 To make recommendations for more sustainable DDR processes that can be 
implemented in the context of rival and ethnic based political and military formations 
like in Zimbabwe. 
 In pursuit of the above objectives, the study seeks to answer the following research question: 
 What challenges are associated with a government led DDR process that is taking place 
in the context of rival ethnic based political and military formations still suspicious and 




1.5 Research Methodology 
This is a qualitative study. The qualitative approach facilitated a protracted interrogation of the 
experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR processes using different data collection 
methods. Specifically, interviews, focus group discussions, desk study and observations were 
the instruments that were used to generate data. This research primarily tries to capture 
experiences and this is more effectively done through the use of qualitiative data collection 
methods that facilitate discussions, explanations and some probing. Opinions, feelings, 
motives, perceptions, explanations and causes of certain actions and behaviour can best be 
expressed in qualitative terms not statistically.  It is Creswell’s (2007) view that rich data in 
qualitative research is usually gathered through scrutinising relevant documents, observing 
action and behaviour of crucial participants as well as interacting orally with them.  
Sources were validated through triangulation. This entailed the use of different sources on the 
same object of study to check on the authenticity of the research participants’ responses. A 
qualitative approach also provides procedures of accessing detailed unquantifiable facts which 
can be collected through observations and conversations with participants (Berg, 2001; 
Mouton, 1998; Leedy and Ormrod, 2013).  The detailed data was generated through talking 
directly with ZIPRA ex-combatants and that was achieved through visiting their residential 
areas, their work places and allowing them to narrate their stories and provide insiders’ 
perspectives. 
1.5.1 Research Design  
A case study was used. A case study illuminates the general by looking at the particular 
(Denscombe, 2003). By interrogating the experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants in greater 
detail, generalisations can be made to similar cases. The case of ZIPRA ex-combatants was 




peace-building processes. The thesis argues that ZIPRA ex-combatants were marginalised 
through the DDR process that was government led and locally owned. The case study enabled 
protracted engagement with few participants thereby leading to rigorous treatment of the 
subject under study. It also allowed the researcher to probe deeply and to analyse intensively.  
Magwa and Magwa (2015) state that a case study enables the researcher to go into the bottom 
of real-life situations and experiences of the participants using multiple sources of evidence. 
Creswell (2007) indicates that the utility of employing a case study is that the researcher 
becomes unobstrusive. He draws meaning from and interpretes what the participants tell him 
and does not allow his personal experiences or what he reads from the literature to obscure the 
particapants’ views, opinions or feelings. 
1.5.2 Sampling 
The researcher conducted interviews with thirty-seven male participants, all of who were active 
in the war of independence, either from a political or military side. On the battle fronts, ZIPRA 
was exclusively a male fighting force. Although women made up at least 10% of ZIPRA (in 
the ZIPRA Women’s Brigade), all of them remained in the rear bases throughout the duration 
of the liberation struggle (Brickhill, 1995:66). It was only male ex-combatants that went 
through APs, disarmament and demobilisation processes. A few women were integrated into 
the ZNA when they eventually came back home in 1980 and some partook in reintegration 
processes. However, it was difficult to locate them hence the rationale to interview male ex-
combatants who were readily available.  
All the participants were aged between 57 years to 75 years during the period of the study. The 
eldest were in the command structures during the liberation struggle and had a brief stint in the 
ZNA whilst some of them did not become part of the military establishment after independence. 




were those who demobilised in 1980, who were in the ZNA until retirement; former 
‘dissidents’; victims of 5th Brigade and ‘dissident’ abuse; former PF-ZAPU political leaders as 
well as those who furthered their education after the war and later worked in the public service. 
The wide cross section of the population provided a wealth of experience which made a holistic 
analysis and balanced conclusions possible. 
Through purposive sampling, the researcher got access to the first group of participants. The 
purposive sampling technique was used because the researcher identified certain participants 
who were potentially able to provide significant data relevant to the research question and the 
objectives of the study. The Mafela and ZIPRA Veterans Trusts provided vital information on 
the key participants and on how they could be approached. The two Trusts have some important 
information on the history of PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants. 
 Basically, purposive sampling enables the researcher to handpick participants that are directly 
useful to the study (Magwa and Magwa, 2015). Prominent former commanders of ZIPRA and 
a few rank and file ex-combatants in the vicinity were interviewed first because they were well 
known by the researcher. As the research unfolded, the snowballing technique was used to 
access other participants. Rapport was quickly developed between the researcher and other 
participants because he was introduced to them by people whom they knew. The first group of 
participants who were identified purposively were asked for the names of other participants 
who could be rich sources of evidence.  
1.5.3 Data Collection Instruments 
Four methods of collecting data were used. These were interviews with key participants, focus 






Semi-structured interviews with thirty-seven participants were used to achieve a holistic 
understanding of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ point of views, feelings and experiences about the 
DDR processes. Through interviews, questions were asked about facts, beliefs, perspectives, 
feelings, and motives, as well as past and present behaviours of ZIPRA ex-combatants in 
relation to the DDR process. Face-to-face interviews enabled the interpretation of non-verbal 
bodily and facial cues that enriched the researcher’s understanding of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ 
experiences. Dawson’s (2002) view on interviewing is that it facilitates a holistic 
comprehension of the participants’ point of views or situation. One-to-one interviews were 
conducted in venues chosen by the participants and the language of interaction was vernacular 
in most cases to facilitate maximum understanding of the questions by the ex-combatants. The 
English language was not used in most cases due to low formal educational levels of most of 
the ex-combatants. 
 As observed by Kothari (2004), interviewing has a multiplicity of merits over other data 
collection instruments. There is greater flexibility in the structuring of questions; personal and 
sensitive information can be collected through face-to-face interactions, and misinterpretations 
of the questions which are always the case in a questionnaire method can be avoided. It is for 
these merits, coupled with the calibre of most of the participants that the study heavily utilised 
interviews. Most of the discussions centred on sensitive issues like conflict and violence and 
the interrogation of these issues needed face-to-face interactions in order to get to the bottom 
of the case. Results of interviews were tape-recorded. Key arguments were also written down 






1.5.3.2 Focus Groups 
The improved security situation in the country made it possible for the researcher to 
successfully conduct two focus group discussions.  Ever since the unity agreement of 1987 and 
more specifically after the second reintegration exercise of 1997, ZIPRA ex-combatants are at 
liberty to openly discuss challenges that they experienced in the DDR programs and they are 
free to discuss these challenges even in groups. 
 Focus groups yielded insightful information from ZIPRA ex-combatants.  There were five 
participants per focus group.  The participants in focus groups came from among the group of 
thirty-seven male participants who were initially interviewed on an individual face-to-face 
basis. Besides generating a wide range of responses in a single meeting, focus groups were 
utilised because they afforded participants a chance to ask questions and remind each other on 
issues they would have forgotten as the study was carried out thirty-seven years after the 
inception of DDR processes. Some timid participants were able to overcome fear and insecurity 
and air out their views in the presence of their colleagues. According to Gumbo and Maphalala 
(2015), when participants discuss among themselves in groups, they improve the quality of 
data being sought. 
 As with all group interviews, some ex-combatants were unwilling to reveal their thoughts on 
sensitive, personal, political, and emotional issues in the company of others. Individual face-
to-face interviews were arranged to cater for such ex-combatants. The researcher took 
advantage of the ex-combatants’ Burial Society meetings to conduct focus group discussions. 
Many ZIPRA ex-combatants convene their Burial Society meetings on Sundays where they 
reside. The researcher waited for the end of their meetings and conducted the discussions 




combatants wanted to provide a lot of details on.  Results of focus group discussions were also 
tape-recorded. 
1.5.3.3 Observation 
ZIPRA ex-combatants’ behaviour, thoughts and actions were observed directly in two meetings 
they convened under the auspices of the ZWVA at Castle Arms Motel, in Richmond middle 
income residential suburb.  
Permission to attend the meetings was sought from the organisers. The advantage of an 
observation is that one can obtain an unadulterated account of the true nature of the phenomena 
under observation (Chitiyo, Taukeni and Chitiyo, 2015). Participants responding to surveys or 
interview questions tend to give socially desirable responses, whereas through observation, 
every aspect of the phenomena can be observed in its natural setting through unobstrusive 
means. 
1.5.3.4 Desk Study 
Relevant and more recent literature on DDR and peace building concepts was reviewed and 
analysed in depth to corroborate evidence from other sources. The literature included books, 
journal and book articles, reports, policy documents on DDR in general and in Zimbabwe in 
particular. Literature relevant to DDR issues in Zimbabwe include the War Victims 
Compensation Act (1980) and the War Veterans Act (1992 and the 1996 Amendment), as well 
as theses related to the study, memoirs and autobiographies of prominent political figures who 
participated in liberating Zimbabwe as well as in DDR processes. United Nations reports, and 
newspaper articles on the phenomenon of DDR and peace building were also analysed. 




of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the African Union Compendium on DDR also constituted some 
of the key data gathering methods. Included in the list of literature that assisted in gathering 
data was the analysis of two peace settlements that were relevant to the DDR process in 
Zimbabwe. These were the Lancaster House Constitutional agreement of 21 December 1979 
and the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987. 
1.6 Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework for this study is underpinned by the logic of Theory of Change 
(TOC). TOC asks that we identify initiatives that seek to induce positive change, i.e., those 
things that need to be done that will lead to the desired change that is sought. It seeks to explain 
why and how we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context. In its 
simplest form, a TOC can be expressed in the following form: ‘If we do X, Y and Z, it will 
lead to W or if we do X, it will lead to Y, which will lead to Z which might possibly lead to 
W’ (Woodrow and Oatley, 2013:8). 
Put differently, a TOC can be stated as: ‘If we conduct A activities, to produce B outputs, in C 
settings/contexts, then we will produce D outcomes, which will ultimately contribute to E 
impacts’ (Parsons, Gokey and Thornton, 2013:8). In other words, a TOC is an articulation of 
our assumptions and how and why we believe that certain actions/activities will result in 
specific results or developments. An example of a TOC is: ‘If we provide employment to ex-
combatants, then we will reduce incidences of criminality and inter-communal fighting because 
unemployed ex-combatants are likely to embark on violent activities as a means of livelihood’ 
(Woodrow and Oatley, 2013:8). In the peacebuilding fraternity, a TOC is about how 
interventions contribute to peace, justice, and stabilty. 
A TOC is not new per se but became prominent in the post-2000 period. It originated in the 




peace building arena because there are many untested approaches, propositions and programs 
that donors and implementing partners roll out.  A TOC oriented analytical framework is 
appropriate for this study on DDR because it is context-specific and change-oriented.  
A TOC is a tool that is intended to strengthen the quality of design and implementation of a 
program. As such, it is intended to be practical and helpful. Ideally, a TOC should help a 
program to be relevant and effective. According to Woodrow and Oatly (2013), a TOC is 
context-specific and not universal. How change can be delivered in one context does not 
necessarily mean that it can be directly transferred to another setting.  An advantage of a TOC 
in DDR is that it helps to build an evidence-based, clear, and practical theory that focuses on 
identifiable pathways. It is in this regard that Rogers (2014) states that a TOC should begin 
with a sound situation analysis. Research findings are the crucial evidence that guide a TOC.  
 A TOC also helps in the building of an intervention strategy that is testable since it is specific 
and based on assumptions. Stein and Valters (2012) view assumptions as prerequisites for the 
desired change. A thorough mapping of underlying assumptions would enable better and more 
efficient DDR programs to be drawn up. Vogel (2012) states that infact; assumptions are 
‘theories’ within TOC thinking as they encompass values, beliefs, norms and ideological 
perspectives about a program.  
Parsons et al (2013) indicate that a TOC operates through a Results Chain that provides a 
theoretical model with pathways to the envisaged change. The interrelated components of a 
TOC are grouped into inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts. Parsons et al (2013) 
clarify that inputs are raw materials that lead to project success; activities lead to the realisation 
of a project’s objectives; outputs are the expected positive results of an intervention process 




to a particular context. Impacts are ultimate critical changes one hopes his or her project will 
contribute (Parsons et al, 2013:8).  
As indicated in figure 1 below, a TOC results chain is linked together by causal pathways which 
indicate how desired change is to be achieved. Though a TOC map or pathways is represented 
diagramatically, descriptive details are always added to clarify some issues and make readers 
understand some linkages and relationships. This is done in detail in chapter seven. 
Figure 1: Theory of Change Results Chain 
  




Source: Parsons, Gokey and Thornton, 2013:8 
The study focuses on ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in DDR processes. As indicated 
earlier, the DDR programs were implemented within a context of mutual hostility, fear, 
mistrust, and suspicion between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. Intolerance and fear 
persisted at the expense of tolerance, mutual understanding and peaceful co-existence. The 
argument is that the government led DDR process in Zimbabwe was partisan and incomplete 
and that this impacted negatively on peace building efforts. The analytical framework for the 
study is schematically represented on page 24. The study mainly deals with unquantifiable 
issues like attitudes, perceptions, feelings, relationships, and experiences. As a result, the 
pathways that lead to the desired change are not rigid.  
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In other words, any of the inputs and activities on the left-hand side of the diagram overleaf 
can contribute in one way or the other to any of the outputs on the right side depending on how 
they are applied and on how stakeholders to the DDR process react to them. There is no one 
activity which is directly connected to a specific output. All the inputs and activities can be 
applied in a flexible manner, provided they suit the context and can bring about the desired 
mindset transformation and change that ultimately leads to peace, security, unity and stability. 
Although TOC reasoning is part of liberal peace building methodology as is also the case with 
DDR which is essentially constructed in terms of liberal peace building theory, this thesis adds 
another dimension by emphasizing on the importance of peculiar contextual factors that are 
relevant in DDR programs, that is, the nature of relationships between political and military 
formations before and during DDR processes. Whilst liberal peace building applies a 
standardised and prescriptive (one-size-fits-all) model across different post-conflict scenarios 
predicated on liberal democracy and market economics, a TOC embedded analytical 
framework facilitates the interrogation of DDR processes in a specific context. It works through 
flexible methods and mechanisms which involve concerned stakeholders in a program at the 
local level in activities that shape their future and relationships. It is not top-down and 












Figure 2: TOC embedded Analytical Framework  
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The analytical framework employed in this study enables one to analyse fully the development 
and effects of a ‘Security Dilemma’ which may take place during the roll out of DDR processes 
in a context like that of Zimbabwe. In short, a ‘Security Dilemma’ develops when the intentions 
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of one party are misinterpreted. Activities that are meant to increase one party’s security may 
be misinterpreted by another party as being meant to be offensive (Xu, 2012). The 
misintepretations of intentions and activities of party A may raise security fears in party B. In 
response, party B may prematurely resort to the use of violence in the belief that it is enhancing 
its own security. By doing so, party B’s actions may perpetuate cycles of hatred, hostility, fear 
and mistrust (Babbit et al, 2013). In the end, physical fighting may take place, further straining 
relationships.  
1.7 Conceptual Clarification 
Different DDR programs take place within specific political processes. As such, it should be 
understood that there is no specific blueprint or theory that can universally apply to all contexts 
(Defence and Security Division (DSD) of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the 
African Union Commission (AUC), 2014). Besides that, the concept of DDR is relatively new 
as it gained currency in the late 1980s. It is also a more practical than theoretical process. The 
thesis deals with ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in DDR processes and uses the 
definitions, principles and clarifications of the DDR concept as enunciated by policy makers, 
practitioners and academics to have a clear treatment of the subject.  
The thesis does not attempt to develop a new conceptual framework of the DDR process, but 
will note gaps and overlaps with regard to the DDR process in Zimbabwe and offer 
recommendations on some better alternatives where possible. Key concepts are defined and 
clarified so that readers have a common understanding of the issues under discussion. The 
concepts are Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration as well as Peace building. For the 
conceptualisation of the last concept, the thesis taps from Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s ground 
breaking definition of peace building in his, An Agenda for Peace (1992) and the Peace building 




building activities. For DDR, the study will use UN policy documents, especially the IDDRS 
and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) as well as the DSD of the 
PSD of the African Union Commission (AUC), 2014). 
1.7.1 Defining Peace building 
The concept of peace building was comprehensively defined in 1992 by the then UN Secretary-
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. According to Ghali (1992), peace building refers to any action 
meant to develop and support structures and institutions that would obviate the resumption of 
violence after parties have stopped fighting. Ghali made it clear that military victory on its own 
does not guarantee sustainable peace. He opined that more activities that are non-military in 
nature are critical in developing consensual peace. The peace building thrust as enunciated by 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali speaks more to development-oriented interventions that support and 
solidify peace.  
Some of the interventions that were specified by Ghali involve the creation and strengthening 
of national institutions, providing for the disarmament and reintegration of previously warring 
parties, monitoring elections, and advancing reconciliation processes, and creating conditions 
for the resumption of long-term development among others (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This 
definition is important because it refers broadly to three critical dimensions of peace building. 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC, 2005) identifies these dimensions as security, 
socio-economic development and the governance and political dimensions. The IDDRS (2006) 
proposes that these post-conflict processes that are meant to build peace should be implemented 
in an integrated not isolated and haphazard manner for them to be effective. 
 The UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee of 2007 also played a critical role in explaining 
how sustainable peace can be realised. It added more voice on the clarification of peace 




building should aim at capacitating national institutions and responding directly and effectively 
to the needs of different constituencies concerned (2007). One has to hasten to say that in order 
for the peace building strategies to be effective, they should be integrated, well-sequenced and 
speak directly to the root causes of the preceding conflict.  
Since Boutros-Ghali’s conceptualisation of peace building in 1992, a lot of scholars, policy 
makers and institutions have dedicated their attention to the peace building discourse. The 
expansion in peace building activities has increased our conceptualisation of peace. There are 
two versions of peace according to Galtung (1989). These are negative and positive peace. For 
negative peace to prevail, people should not engage in physical fighting using whatever 
methods and weapons. Positive peace entails the absence of systemic violence or that violence 
that is non-physical and is usually hidden within socio-political and economic structures of 
society but can cause death in the long term (Curtis, 2013). Cockell (2010) noted that negative 
peace alone is not sufficient in building a fully functioning state. He observed that it is not only 
bombs and bullets that maim and kill people but also such things as hunger, disease, and 
depression among others that cause problems to people which can ultimately lead to death. The 
concept of peace building encompasses both negative peace and positive peace. 
The PBC outlines other crucial peace building strategies that anchor sustainable peace and 
these could also be relevant to post-conflict contexts where both political and military 
formations are divided and hostile to each other. According to Almqvist (2014:10), it is critical 
to ensure security and end hostilities as the first building block towards peace. However, the 
PBC for the United Nations adds some critical dimensions in peace building. It notes the 
significance of promoting reconciliation processes and fostering inclusivity in all peace 
building processes to ensure their sustainability. It also calls for the effective absorption of ex-
combatants and others into civil society so that they do not revert to violent means of earning 




The element of promoting reconciliation and inclusive political institutions is vital in cases of 
lingering divisions, hate, competition, and an eagerness for revenge. It is crucial to note that 
other resources for peace building could be available, but if there is no political unity predicated 
on genuine reconciliation and a spirit of inclusivity, vital resources and efforts could go to 
waste because durable peace prevails if people pull in one direction, speak with one voice and 
support all progressive national programs. 
1.7.2 Defining DDR 
The three elements of DDR will be defined and conceptualised separately since they are key 
for this study. 
Disarmament 
According to the UNDPKO (1999), Ozerdem (2002) and the IDDRS (2006), what is central to 
disarmament is to ensure that weapons are collected from the former warring parties and either 
re-utilised in a legitimate way or destroyed. The process of collection also includes 
documentation whereby the type/make, quantity and even serial numbers of weapons are 
recorded. This ensures safe and transparent management and disposal of weapons. The 
collection of arms takes place in or outside the conflict zones (Knight, 2009). Besides the 
collection of arms, disarmament entails disabling mines (demining) and booby traps (UN 
Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, UNOSAA, 2005). Disarmament is also used as a 
strategy of boosting confidence and trust between rival political and military formations so that 
they could work together in a politically cumbersome post-conflict environment (Gleichmann, 
Odenwald, Steenken, and Wilkinson, 2004). If carried out successfully, disarmament is 
significant because it helps to create an environment that is secure and stable to an extent that 




Disarmament is basically a military function and is executed immediately after the cessation 
of hostilities. Usually, disarmament takes place when ex-combatants arrive at APs or 
cantonment centres after a ceasefire. Knight (2009) articulates that the collection of weapons 
can be intensified through a couple of strategies. One of them is whereby combatants are given 
food, goods or cash in order for them to surrender in their weapons. The practice of cash for 
weapons was mainly practised in Liberia and Cote d’voire (Knight, 2009). In some cases, 
conflicting parties voluntarily agree to hand in weapons, whilst in cases of outright victory by 
one of the parties, the vanquished party is coerced to surrender its weapons by the victor. This 
was the case in Ethiopia where the former army of the Derg government was disarmed 
forcefully following its defeat in 1991 (Kingma, 2000).  
It is Knight’s (2009) observation that, when conflict ends through a negotiated agreement, 
combatants are generally encouraged to hand in their weapons on a voluntary basis. This was 
the case in Zimbabwe. In case of an externally-supervised disarmament process, peace keepers 
collect weapons from the combatants. On the strategies meant to achieve disarmament, Omach 
(2013) concludes that there are basically two. These are forceful and voluntary. In this study, 
the disarmament process took place in the context of a negotiated peace agreement where there 
was no outright military victory by any party to the conflict. It was voluntary amidst competing 
political and military factions. In a context of mutual mistrust, insecurity and hostility, 
carryingout successful disarmament could be a challenge. 
Demobilisation  
Demobilisation is defined as the renunciation of military status and structures. In simple terms, 
it is the systematic departure of combatants from military duties and structures into civil life 
(IDDRS, 2006). It is the opposite of mobilisation as it means the renunciation of the military 




through either downsizing or completely disbanding as the situation on the ground dictates 
(UNDPKO, 1999). The importance of demobilisation is that it signifies transformation from 
war to peace and helps in freeing some resources from the army into other productive sectors.  
When combatants change their status from a military to a civilian one, they are usually assisted 
materially and financially so that they meet their immediate basic needs. This support is 
referred to as reinsertion. In this study, this process is treated as part and parcel of 
demobilisation and not a stand-alone process which comes in between demobilisation and long-
term reintegration. Reinsertion support is in most cases used to cater for the ex-combatants’ 
short-term needs. These can also encompass those of their families and/or dependants (IDDRS, 
2006). Among other things, reinsertion assistance can include food, clothes, medical services, 
vocational training, and employment/entreprenueral skills development, seeds, building 
equipment and sometimes tools (Kingma, 2000). Although reinsertion is usually standardised, 
there is some room for flexibility to cater for different needs of different interest groups like 
disabled ex-combatants, women, child soldiers or those settling in either rural or urban areas 
(Ozerdem, 2002; Michael, 2006). 
Reintegration 
Ozerdem (2002) and the IDDRS (2006) define reintegration as a process whereby ex-
combatants are assisted in different ways to cope with civilian life.  Ex-combatants can be 
assisted socially, politically, psychologically and economically to make that necessary but 
difficult transition from a soldier to a civilian. The assistance is not permanent but is made in 
such a way that it leaves ex-combatants in a position to sustainably stand on their own. Above 
all, there is no defined time frame for this process. It can take a long time, depending on the 
economic status of the ex-combatants, that is, whether or not they still need support to fully 




and requires a lot of finance and other materials for it to succeed. Unlike reinsertion assistance, 
reintegration facilitates the transformation of military personnel into full-fledged and peaceful 
civilians if ever it is properly done (Knight, 2009). Reintegration has three main dimensions. 
These are the social, economic and political dimensions. Many policy documents on DDR 
emphasize on the first two dimensions at the expense of the last. 
 Political reintegration is implicit in UN literature pertaining to DDR. For example, the IDDRS 
(2006) highlight the usefulness of ex-combatants formally organising themselves using 
channels of representation to voice their concerns. Soderstrom (2013) believes that the policy 
community seems to assume that political reintegration is an automatic by-product of social 
and economic reintegration. By definition, political reintegration means the creation of 
structures and platforms which can be used by ex-fighters together with their families to take 
part in legitimate political processes and activities of the communities that they join or re-join 
after conflict (Nilsson, 2005; Soderstrom, 2013). 
Knight (2009) emphasizes that reintegration is critical because it assists ex-combatants to 
(re)settle and be acceptable in post-conflict environments (social dimension). It also makes it 
possible for them to lawfully engage into political events and processes that take place in their 
communities (political dimension), and to use peaceful means of survival (economic 
dimension). It should be noted that in most instances, reintegration takes place after the 
successful accomplishment of the two processes of weapons surrender and demobilisation. It 
is thus a long-term civilian process which demands a lot of resources for it to succeed. 
1.8 Ethical Considerations 
All the participants were assured of their security, both physically and in psychological terms. 
Since the study deals with a wide cross-section of the ZIPRA ex-combatants some of whom 




and/or raising false hope among the participants. The researcher did not at any time promise to 
make the conditions of those who were negatively affected by the DDR processes better, but 
only assured the participants that the findings would be published in an academic report. 
Informed consent was observed throughout the study. Personal security was also guaranteed. 
It is only those participants who were comfortable with their real names used in the study who 
are referred to using their actual names. Anonymity was observed on all those who did not 
want their real names published. The use of pseudonyms was meant to give security to the 
participants who thought that the nature of their responses could create security problems for 
them. Some of the participants who provided key information in this study personally 
experienced brutal killings of their kith and kin, whilst others experienced maiming of various 
magnitudes, torture and beatings, kidnappings and ‘disappearances’ of friends and relatives, 
hence careful ethical considerations were practised. 
The participants were made aware of the fact that there was no coercion for anyone to be 
involved in the study. Particapation was voluntary and they were free to terminate it at any time 
without any problems. Participants were also told that their views, perceptions, facts, opinions, 
and suggestions were confidential and would be used solely for the purposes of the study. 
Those who were unwilling to divulge information after getting the above security guarantees 
were not compelled to participate in the research. 
1.9 Scope of the Study 
The thesis focuses on two major DDR processes of 1980-1984 and 1997. In the first phase 
there was the implementation of the three processes of DDR, but in 1997 there was only 
reintegration. Intervening periods in between and after the two processes mentioned above are 




investigation. The focus is primarily on ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences, but where 
possible, the experiences of ZANLA are briefly interrogated for comparison purposes. 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is an introductory one. It highlights 
the objectives of the study, discusses the statement of the problem and justifies why a study on 
the experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in the DDR processes is a necessity. There is also 
conceptual clarification, an analytical framework and methodology of the study. 
Chapter 2 is a literature review. It interrogates policy guidelines pertaining to the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of DDR programs. A few cases of 
DDR programs at the international and regional levels would be discussed in order to have an 
understanding of the general trends on different DDR programs, especially with regards to the 
various actors involved, leadership and ownership of DDR programs as well as external 
assistance involved. Crucial literature on DDR in Zimbabwe is also reviewed. 
Chapter 3 gives a brief but very important history of ethnic relations in Zimbabwe. It starts by 
defining and clarifying the concept of ethnicity. The chapter traces the history and dynamics 
of ethnic relations right from the pre-colonial era, through the colonial period and into the time 
of the liberation struggle. It focuses mainly on the ethnic relations between the Shona and the 
Ndebele. The issue of ethnicity saw the liberation movements and their armies fragmenting 
into antagonistic factions whose relations were characterised by mutual suspicion, mistrust, 
rivalry, hostility and violent clashes in some cases. Zimbabwe was led into independence by 
parties and armies that were competing for political space. It is therefore important that readers 
understand the political context under which the government led DDR process was planned 




Chapter 4 focuses on the actual DDR process in Zimbabwe. It explains the immediate 
contextual background under which the DDR process was implemented. The chapter starts 
with the peace agreement that paved the way for independence mainly focussing on how it 
spoke to issues pertaining to DDR. Policy issues with specific reference to Zimbabwe are the 
main focus of this chapter. The key issues that are discussed are the nitty-gritties of the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs. It deals with the actual number of 
forces that constituted the three armies; the numbers earmarked for disarmament and those for 
demobilisation, how they were disarmed in practice, and the modalities for demobilisation and 
reintegration. Reintegration programs that were on offer are also briefly discussed. The 
processes leading to the creation of the ZNA are also interrogated in detail. The chapter ends 
by looking at the 1997 reintegration exercise. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the study. It draws data from interviews, focus group 
discussions, observations and secondary sources to articulate the experiences of the ZIPRA ex-
combatants in the DDR processes. Special focus is on their experiences at APs, in disarmament 
and demobilisation programs, within the ZNA and in civilian life as demobilised ex-
combatants. The chapter unpacks the arms cache ‘discoveries’ and the phenomenon of 
dissidence and analyses how it unfolded in relation to the DDR process. Focus is also on how 
ZIPRA ex-combatants fared in and experienced reintegration programs like co-operative 
schemes, job opportunities, educational advancements, recognition and conferment of hero and 
heroine statuses, how they experienced the 1997 reintegration program as well as their physical 
and human security. Although the study is exclusively on ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences, 
continuous but brief  references would be made pertaining to the experiences of the ZANLA 
ex-combatants and to a minor extent the RSFs in order to develop a solid, unbiased and 
balanced view of the ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in the broader DDR process and in 




of a government led DDR process in the context of ethnic based political and military 
formations that are competing for power, influence and resources. 
An analysis of the consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in DDR processes is 
presented in Chapter 6. The implications of their experiences on the other elements of peace 
building like the elections, the government of national unity, the policy of national 
reconciliation, the creation of a single national army, and on peace and stability in general are 
analysed in greater detail. 
Chapter 7 concludes the entire study. It proffers recommendations on alternative and viable 
ways of planning and implementing DDR processes in the context of a government led DDR 
process in an environment characterised by ethnic rivalries and hostilities between parties to 
the process. It answers the research question on the possible challenges that emanate from a 
government led DDR process in the context of ethnic based political and military formations. 
1.11 Conclusion 
The chapter provided an outline of the thesis. The background of the study and problem 
statement were clarified. Research objectives, methodology and analytical framework that 
underpin the study were also presented, and where necessary, elaborated. The chapter provided 
a perspective on why a study on the effects of a government led DDR process for peace building 
in a context of ethnic-based political and military formations is compelling. The next chapter 








CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the key literature on DDR generally and in Zimbabwe in particular.  It 
also explores the policy guidelines pertaining to the development and implementation of the 
DDR process. Since DDR is very crucial and a foundational pillar of stability and peace, the 
chapter also analyses some of the determining factors for its success.  The issue of local 
ownership and leadership is focused on as it will help to contextualise government led DDR 
processes such as the Zimbabwe program.  In addition, the chapter also unpacks a few cases of 
the experiences of ex-combatants in DDR processes globally and regionally. 
2.2 International Literature on DDR 
 The dominant literature on DDR is written by policy makers and practitioners and less so by 
academics. The key themes discussed in the literature revolve around the significance of DDR 
in a post-conflict environment, implementation modalities of DDR programs, funding 
procedures and agencies, the place of DDR in peace agreements, as well as the issue of 
ownership and leadershisp of DDR programs and processes. At the international level, the UN 
Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG DDR) and the Stockholm Initiative on 
DDR (SIDDR) contributes towards a coordinated program of development and putting into 
effect DDR programs. The UN IAWG DDR published the IDDRS in 2006 with a set of 
internationally accepted definitions and operational guidelines for DDR processes.  SIDDR 
focuses on other crucial issues of the DDR process like funding, political and peace building 
aspects of DDR (SIDDR, 2005; IDDRS, 2006). 
Drawing from lessons learnt through the implementation of DDR programs, other 
organisations and institutions have added to the literature which assist academics and policy 




Bank, through its Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the 
Great Lakes region (2002); the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2010), the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO, 1999), the European Union Concept for 
the support of DDR, the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA, 2005), and 
the African Development Bank Group (2011), among others, have been instrumental in 
developing DDR literature for policy makers and practitioners.  
In Africa, the African Union Commission (AUC) through its Defence and Security Division 
(DSD) of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) developed the African Union DDR 
capacity Program in 2014 which crafted National DDR Frameworks and operational guidelines 
for the African continent. Although the guidelines specifically speak to DDR processes in 
Africa and advises on strategies of engaging national institutions, mobilising funds and the 
creation of synergies with external partners to operationalize effective DDR programs among 
other things, the guidelines do not run parallel to other DDR policy initiatives. It is 
complementary to other DDR frameworks like the IDDRS, SIDDR, ILO, and the EU Concept 
for the support of DDR among others (AUC, 2014). ILO guidelines provide practitioners on 
DDR with strategies on how sustainable and effective employment can be created for ex-
combatants (http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/). Unlike AUC (2014) frameworks, ILO guidelines 
are not specific to any continent but complement guidelines from other institutions and policy 
makers.  
On the academic front, the leading scholars on DDR at the conceptual level are Lamb and 
Ginifer (2008); Alusala and Dye (2010); Lamb (2012;2013); Colletta, Kostner, and 
Wiederhofer (2004); Knight (2009); Kingma ( 1997, 2000, 2001); Muggah (2010); Ball and 
Goor (2006); Berdal (1996); Baare (2005); Bryden (2007); Nilsson (2005); Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2005); Rufer (2005); Buxton (2008); Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010); 




the DDR frameworks developed by international organisations and institutions to further 
clarify the concept of DDR. They do so by focussing on different scenarios/contexts to analyse 
pre-conditions for successful DDR, its sequencing, design and implementation variations 
which could produce best results. Most of the academics’ attention is on the process of 
reintegration. This could be because of the fact that reintegration is mainly a civilian program 
which takes place in communities where ex-combatants are absorbed whilst disarmament and 
demobilisation are mainly military roles with a short life span. 
2.3 Detailed Discussions of International Literature 
2.3.1 Significance of DDR  
The most important aim of implementing DDR programs after or during a conflict is to ensure 
that post-conflict societies enjoy stability and security in order for them to start focussing on 
developmental issues rather than conflict. Alongside other peace building elements, DDR can 
create a post-conflict environment with adequate safety measures to obviate the recurrence of 
violent conflict. DDR is not the panacea to post-conflict challenges (IDDRS, 2006). However, 
it complements other peace building processes like political power-sharing arrangements and 
efforts that are meant to address the underlying causes of conflicts. More specifically, 
disarmament helps to separate combatants from their weapons and breaks their relationships 
with their command structures. It also helps to build trust and confidence among and between 
different stakeholders to the DDR process. For example, between ex-combatants and civilians. 
It can also facilitate peaceful elections, reconciliation processes, as well laying a foundation 
for long-term development (Ball and Goor, 2006; Knight, 2009). 
For Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010), the importance of DDR lies in the fact that the 
collection and incineration of weapons may push ex-combatants away from war-time mind-




Put differently, DDR helps to mitigate the risk of post-war violence. If DDR is not effectively 
designed and implemented, it can create challenges to the ex-combatants. For Nilsson (2005), 
ineffective DDR incites violence through disgruntled ex-combatants who quickly re-arm 
themselves in order to achieve their objectives. Nilsson (2005) also explains that ineffective 
DDR programs can also give incentives for disbanded guerrilla groups to remobilise and 
embark on acts of criminality and banditry.  Berdal (1996) views the main motive behind DDR 
as the drive to make the government the only authority with a legitimate control over the use 
of force, not any individulas or groups of people.  
Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) see DDR as one of the effective strategies of spoiler 
management. Through DDR, national leaders can legitimately give ex-combatants, their 
families and/or dependents some benefits which can make them lead peaceful lives. These 
benefits can even go a long way in dealing with the major problems that led to physical fighting 
thereby cultivating sustainable peace. The authors also concur that besides that, DDR can be 
used to legitimise warring factions through engaging the leadership of various military factions 
into decision making processes regarding DDR processes.  By so doing, DDR helps to 
neutralise potential spoilers and promotes peace. 
In many cases, ex-combatants do not willy-nilly revert to violence to achieve their objectives. 
There are extenuating circumstances that persuade them to embark on violence or to refuse to 
disarm and demobilise. In Nilsson’s words, “one of the factors influencing whether combatants 
and their commanders choose to disarm and demobilise is what kind of life awaits them as 
civilians” (2005:33). After a conflict, some ex-combatants become so marginalised that they 
lack basic economic, social and psychological support after demobilisation (Nilsson, 2005; 
Banholzer, 2014). Furthermore, many ex-combatants possess low educational qualifications 




Due to their low educational qualifications, many ex-combatants fail to successfully compete 
with civilians for formal jobs hence it is crucial that they receive support from the government 
and other stakeholders in DDR to guarantee their economic security. Buxton (2008) perceives 
reintegration as a form of humanitarian assistance that does not only empower ex-combatants, 
but all other war-affected actors and entire communities as well. Put differently, it is a form of 
thanking them for their roles in defending the state or liberating it from an oppressive and 
exploitative regime. Kingma’s (2001) analysis of the rationale for reintegration resonates with 
Buxton’s. He explains that any support that ex-combatants receive after a conflict can be 
viewed as a form of compensation for foregone education and other opportunities. 
Once ex-combatants are disarmed and demobilised, they do not only lose physical security 
associated with carrying weapons, but also lose political and social prestige, loyalty and respect 
from the local population which they gained by virtue of being armed and in uniform (Lundin, 
1998; Lyons, 2004 cited in Nilsson, 2005). According to Nilsson (2005), ex-combatants who 
are not incorporated into any legitimate military structures after conflict always lose the status 
they had during fighting. In this light, it is important that governments devise other strategies 
that could make ex-combatants feel they are respected in society. That could be done through 
giving them new socio-economic and political roles in society that maintain their status and 
keep them recognised by the people (Spear, 2002 cited in Nilsson, 2005). 
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010) argue that DDR can produce some unintended negative 
effects on peace and security. Their argument is that DDR may lead to macro-insecurity which 
is usually a result of a feeling of vulnerability which ex-combatants experience after 
disarmament and demobilisation.  Ex-combatants would always feel insecure especially if their 
opponents remain armed. It is the view of the two authors that DDR can also cause civilian 
resentment towards ex-combatants if it is targeted exclusively to benefit ex-combatants.  




benefits are a powerful tool that can hasten disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. 
Though DDR has a lot of benefits in the peace building field, it can be undermined by 
competition and hostility between political parties and inter-military faction suspicion and fear 
as the case of Zimbabwe will illustrate. It is pertinent to assess contextual factors before any 
intervention is implemented in order to achieve the desired change that would be effective and 
sustainable. 
2.3.2 Factors that promote DDR success 
Drawing from lessons learnt from past DDR programs, both policy makers and academics have 
made several recommendations which they think can facilitate successful DDR. However, the 
guidelines and recommendations should not be used as a tight blue print. The success or 
otherwise of any DDR program is dependant on different factors. These, according to the AUC 
(2014) and Rufer (2005) include the nature and intensity of the preceding conflict, how it 
ended, the nature and status of the parties to the conflict, national capacities, ownership and 
leadership of DDR programs among other factors that can directly or indirectly affect the peace 
agreement, peace process and DDR in general. The other context is that of ethnic based political 
and military formations which this thesis deals with. IDDRS (2006) explains from the onset 
that its own set of policies, guidelines and procedures are mainly relevant in a peace keeping 
environment. Based on contextual specificities of post-conflict environments, IDDRS can be 
used flexibly by other bodies.  It can be noted that even though the standards were drawn for a 
specific setting, they provide a vital and broad framework to analyse various DDR processes, 




2.3.2.1 Political Will, Trust and DDR-specific Peace Agreements 
The first critical pre-condition for DDR success where the opinions of many academics and 
policy makers converge is the need for the prevalence of political will, trust and commitment 
by parties to the DDR programs and the peace process. Secondly, specific DDR guidelines 
should be made part and parcel of peace negotiations and agreements so as to avoid 
disagreements and conflict later. The implementation of peace processes in relation to DDR 
has always been stifled by mutual mistrust and suspicion between warring factions (Knight, 
2009). The major reason for the mistrust and suspicion is that disarmament and demobilisation 
involve sensitive political and power relations issues. For example, the DDR process was 
delayed in Sierra Leone because one of the stakeholders to the DDR process, the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) was untrustworthy. Knight (2009) also mentions that the RUF breached 
the peace agreement and went to the extent of attacking the UN peace keepers.  In Mozambique, 
both FRELIMO and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) held back about 5 000 and 
2 000 troops respectively as insurance should hostilities start again (Dzinesa, 2013:288).  
In the light of disagreements which later crop up between and among parties to a DDR process, 
SIDDR (2006) recommends that an overall framework for DDR be provided for within the 
peace agreement. In the same vein, Gleichmann et al (2004) stipulate that it is important that 
such issues like the number of forces to be disarmed and demobilised, the nature of the 
envisaged reintegration programs among other things be clarified in the peace accord, but 
should not be written in a way that would stifle innovation and flexibility in the midst of 
unforeseen circumstances. Furthermore, agreements arrived at by all stakeholders should be 
supervised by a neutral party to check on delays and breaches to the agreement. The supervisory 
commission should have representatives from all parties so as to build trust and confidence 




DDR-specific that is no guarantee that political parties and military forces would develop the 
much-needed trust and will that would enable the success of the DDR process. Using a TOC 
framework, it is possible that if trust, political will and confidence are lacking between parties 
to the DDR process for whatever reasons, it can be built and this could be done through a 
number of engagement processes between the parties to the process. 
However, Gleichmann et al (2004) urge flexibility in the framing of DDR within a peace 
agreement. Rufer (2005) urges that DDR procedures and guidelines should be meticulously 
outlined in the peace agreement. Rufer’s reasons for proposing a detailed DDR framework to 
be incorporated in the peace agreement are simple: suspicious and hostile factions tend to 
disagree and undermine each other if they are not guided by specific guidelines. Among other 
things, he states that the peace agreement should give DDR programs some time framework, 
organisation and implementation responsibilities, monitoring mechanisms; stipulations on the 
amount and number of weapons to be handed in and combatants to be demobilised and those 
to be integrated into the national armed forces as well as the eligibility criteria for entry into 
the reintegration process (2005). 
 Rufer (2005) and Nilsson (2005) believe that it is only through developing the above 
framework that transparency and accountability can be created that can facilitate effective 
monitoring and evaluation once the DDR programs are implemented. It is believed that a 
detailed program of action that is contained in a peace agreement also binds all stakeholders 
and ensures program success (Nilsson, 2005). Although this approach could be an effective 
starting point to ensure sustainable DDR, one has to note that situations on the ground change 
and it is important to be sensitive and relevant to the prevailing conditions at a particular period 




With regard to the specification on DDR details in a peace agreement, the AUC (2014) believes 
that providing too much detail on DDR issues in a peace agreement may have the problem of 
stifling flexibility and pragmatism. A general framework could be the starting point and details 
could be left to the planning and implementing bodies. In this regard, the AUC (2014) 
recommends that in each and every country that is implementing DDR programs there should 
be a National DDR Commission (NDDRC) that develops a DDR policy following the broad 
parameters provided for in the peace agreement but also recognising local contextual factors. 
 One of the challenges could be how to foster political unity and build an inclusive and 
professional army in the midst of political and military formations that are divided by ethnic 
rivalries and suspicions which is the thrust of this thesis. Contrary to what most academics 
believe in, Banholzer (2014) notes that DDR programs can also be launched while the conflict 
is still raging before a peace agreement is signed so as to have a pacifying effect on the ex-
combatants who would be encouraged to lay down arms due to the incentives provided by 
reintegration support. So, to some, flexibility and pragmatism are of paramount importance in 
influencing the success of DDR programs. 
It is no guarantee that all DDR processes that are underwritten by a peace agreement are always 
successful. There are a lot of other related and interlocking factors that are crucial determinants 
of successful DDR. The DDR process in Angola was stipulated in the Bicesse Agreement of 
31 May 1991, but the process was undermined by lack of commitment by the National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), one of the key parties to the agreement. 
Coupled with meagre funding from the international community as well as lax security 
measures that led to the desertion of soldiers from cantonment areas; both UNITA and the 
Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) retained contingency fighting capabilities which 
led to the resumption of fighting between 1992 and 1994 at a cost of about 300 000 lives 




 Arguably, there is no guarantee that a DDR process that is stipulated in a peace agreement will 
always lead to peace and stability. For example, DDR became fruitless in Cambodia despite 
the 1991 ceasefire and DDR-specific peace agreement signed in Paris and the injection of a 
whopping US$ 2 billion to facilitate the demobilisation of around 150 000 soldiers (Ferry, 
2014).  The Khmer Rouge regime refused to cooperate as it claimed that the Supreme National 
Council, a quadripartite body set up to promote reconciliation was not neutral. Besides the issue 
of the availability of resources and a DDR-specific peace agreement, attitudes, perceptions, 
feelings, relationships, and behaviour of ex-combatants and their respective political parties are 
some of the crucial factors that can promote or hinder the success of DDR processes. 
Gleichmann et al (2004) posit that all parties must agree to disarm and demobilise. Further to 
this, the peace process and DDR should receive support from the armed forces command and 
that military leaders should have effective control over their forces. Not only should the field 
commanders pledge theoretical support, but they must demonstrate genuine and practical 
political will to avoid breaches to the peace agreement (Ball and Goor, 2006). In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the World Bank efforts to implement disarmament 
and demobilisation through its MDRP proved to be a mammoth task because of the prevalence 
of a multiplicity of militia groups with loose command structures (Michael, 2006). Besides the 
problem of many loose militia groups without clear and robust command structures, successive 
DDR programs in the DRC have been negatively affected by other different factors. There are 
continued incursions of various fighting factions into the DRC from Uganda, Burundi and 
Rwanda. The central government at Kinshasa is not very strong and does not have firm control 
over the entire country. The government is always negatively affected by both political and 
economic crises. Last but not least, DDR programs have been adversely affected by the dearth 




The political will should not only be dedicated towards guaranteeing the peace agreement and 
the structural issues pertaining to DDR but should also be extended to cover commitment from 
political decision-makers and international institutions and donors to fund the often long and 
expensive reintegration process (Gleichmann et al, 2004). It is for this reason that Gleichmann 
et al (2004) believe it is critical that during the negotiation process of the peace agreement and 
the preparation of DDR programs, donors be consulted and included. The availability of 
adequate funds can act as an incentive that persuades recalcitrant combatants to disarm and 
demobilise.  
2.3.2.2 Funding 
As alluded to above, timeous and adequate funding is one of the critical prerequisites for 
successful reintegration. Funding is not only needed to cater for reintegration assistance. 
According to the UNDPKO (1999) funding in DDR programs cuts across a wide spectrum of 
activities.  All of the three components of DDR need urgent funding. The UNDPKO (1999) 
notes that funds are needed to transport combatants to APs and later to their chosen areas of 
settlement; for the management of APs, upkeep of a lot of ex-fighters at different sites, and for 
the provision of cash and other incentives to encourage combatants to disarm and demobilise.  
Kingma (2001) states that the largest source of funds for DDR programs usually come from 
the international community. Key funders of the DDR comprise of Canada, the EU, Germany, 
and International Committee for the Red Cross, Sweden, UN Development Program, the 
United States of America, World Bank and the World Food Program among others (Kingma, 
2001).  The funding has to be adequate, sustainable and timely to enable the successful 
implementation of all the DDR programs. 
As noted by Ball and Goor (2006) and Knight (2009), it is always difficult for countries 
emerging from violent conflict to raise enough resources on their own to successfully fund 




prosecution whilst on the other hand, conflicts also extensively damage resources that are 
unexploited thereby making it a mammoth task for states emerging from conflicts to single-
handedly fund their post-conflict recovery and reconstruction programs. The support for DDR 
has to be swift so as to cater for the ex-combatants’ basic needs during the reinsertion phase 
and avoid despair at APs.  
 However, funding alone is not the answer to all DDR challenges. As indicated earlier, a huge 
sum of US$2 billion was injected to facilitate demobilisation by the international community 
through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) between 1991 and 
1993. However, the demobilisation process in Cambodia was not all that successful as one of 
the factions, the Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate (Ferry, 2014:135). On the contrary, 
Dzinesa (2013:277) illustrates that adequate funding combined with the cooperation of the 
different belligerents always yield far much positive results in terms of encouraging ex-
combatants to disarm and demobilise. Dzinesa (2013) gives an example of the United Nations 
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia which had substantial funding of US$416 
million and managed to achieve successful disarmament and demobilisation. In Angola, 
meagre funding of US$ 132.2 million coupled with other challenges undermined DDR and the 
peace process (Dzinesa, 2013). 
External aid can sometimes create some unintended challenges if it produces some disparities 
in communities in economic terms through what can be viewed as ‘preferential’ treatment of 
ex-combatants at the expense of other members of the receiving communities.  Many policy 
makers recommend that during the initial phases of the DDR process, most reintegration 
assistance be channelled towards the needs of the ex-combatants due to their vulnerability as a 
result of having been directly involved in conflict. However, after some reasonable time, 
support should cascade down to every conflict affected party and spur general development in 




in this context that Kingma (1997; 2001) and Buxton (2008) underline the centrality of 
balancing support extended to former fighters and that of other civilian members of the 
community if reintegration support is to avoid dividing communities on the basis of ex-
combatants and general civilians. Buxton (2008) explains that if reintegration assistance is only 
given to the ex-fighters, civilians usually become resentful and unwelcoming; viewing ex-
combatants as the only ones compensated for enduring the vagaries of conflict whilst in actual 
fact conflict adversely affects both armed and unarmed people. If members of the community 
are involved in projects undertaken by the ex-combatants, they may easily reconcile.  
Lewis, Harris and do Santos (2010) posit that the best strategy of fostering robust cordial 
relationships in communities is to also capacitate the communities so that they are able to cater 
for the needs of ex-combatants as well as theirs. The Ugandan government was able to foster 
harmonious relationships in communities where ex-combatants returned to. It achieved that 
through establishing what it termed the Veterans Assistance Program (VAP) which among 
other things dealt with specific and special needs of former military pesonnel; gave attention 
to the provision of social services, assisted ex-combatants with productive skills, sensitised the 
civilians about the needs of returning former fighters. Using donor funds and its own resources, 
the government helped to capacitate communities so that they could smoothly absorb the ex-
combatants in social services (Lewis, Harris and dos Santos, 2010). As a result, Uganda was 
able to achieve a more successful reintegration program due to its sensitivity to the plight of 
both ex-combatants and receiving communities. 
Gbemisola (2010) notes quite a number of negatives in reintegration support which is solely 
distributed in the form of cash payouts to the ex-combatants.  Willibald (2006) also observes 
that even though paying ex-combatants in cash during reintegration programs enable them to 
have freedom in using the money on what they think can sustain them, that is, it gives them the 




demobilisation, and can stimulate institutional capacity building through encouraging banks to 
manage large amounts of money. However, he is not oblivious to the fact that cash payments 
have a lot of demerits as a method of facilitating economic reintegration. Willibald (2006) 
contend that cash payments can fuel illicit and illegal arms deals and trigger the smuggling of 
arms across porous national borders. For example, arms were bought in Liberia where they 
were sold for US$ 300 each and re-sold in Cote d’ Ivoire where they were sold for as much as 
US$ 900 each (Knight, 2009:44). 
 The smuggling of weapons between Liberia, Cote d’ Ivoire and Sierra Leone escalated due to 
cash incentives. Huge sums of cash can be abused in gambling and alcohol by ex-combatants 
with little skills of financial management. It is also Willibald’s (2006) view that cash payments 
may not motivate ex-combatants to find employment and may cause civilians to hate them if 
they are viewed to be in privileged positions when compared to other members of the same 
community (Gbemisola, 2010). Civilians may interpret the awarding of cash payments to ex-
combatants as tantamount to rewarding perpetrators of violence. Knight (2009) recognises the 
fact that whilst lump sum payments may stimulate a lot of economic activities in communities, 
the injection of large amounts of money into an economy can also collapse the value of the 
local currency. Disbursing reintegration assistance in small cash quantities has its own 
challenges. In Mozambique, the disbursement of reintegration support in small cash quantities 
diluted the impact of the payments. Much of the money was spent in non-productive sectors.  
The result was that many ex-combatants did not experience significant improvements in their 
socio-economic status (Alusala and Dye, 2010). The economic challenges that affected ex-
combatants in Mozambique despite having gone through DDR programs led to a second 
program of reintegration support that was rolled out in 2009 to specifically cater for the plight 




The economically-crippling effects of an ineffectual DDR process in Zimbabwe forced the 
government to disperse several thousands of Zimbabwean dollars in cash into an already fragile 
economy in 1997. The ex-combatants did not benefit much as inflation rendered the 
Zimbabwean dollar useless within a few weeks. Whatever its unintended demerits, adequate 
funding is pivotal in the realisation of successful DDR programs, provided the resources are 
distributed fairly among and between deserving beneficiaries. Inspite of all the unintended 
repercussions of cash payments in DDR programs, the African Development Bank Group 
(2011) emphasizes that if there are to be any significant and positive changes in the lives of ex-
combatants, both socially and economically, then adequate funding should be availed to back 
all DDR programs. For example, the Ex-combatant Reintegration and Community support 
Project (PRAC) in the Central African Republic (CAR) operated with a lean budget of US$13, 
2 million in the years from 2004-2008. Quite a number of ex-combatants failed to successfully 
reintegrate and as a result, some of them re-joined armed groups in Chad and Sudan (Lamb, 
2012). 
2.3.2.3 Responsiveness to Special Needs of all the Actors 
For any meaningful change to happen, support in any program should be targeted towards 
specific needs of the recipients.  Rufer (2005) proposes that there should be the profiling of 
combatants at APs before demobilisation so as to ascertain their different needs, challenges 
and aspirations. Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, (2004) believe that the needs of the ex-
combatants’ families should be prioritised as well. Rufer (2005) gives an example of ex-
combatants with some university background who may wish to work in professional sectors in 
the urban areas. He contrasts them to ex-combatants of peasant background who may wish to 
get pieces of land in the rural areas and practise farming. In this context, it is therefore not 
prudent to treat different ex-combatants uniformly as if they have universal needs and 




psychological trauma or HIV/AIDS infections have specific and special needs which are 
different from the rest of the normal ex-combatants. IDDRS (2006) gives priority to the 
satisfaction of the special needs of various actors in a DDR process to ensure its sustainability. 
Due to its insensitivity to the needs of female ex-combatants, the government of Namibia had 
to contend with demonstrations by disgruntled female former combatants who were calling for 
government assistance (Dzinesa, 2013).  The case of the disabled ex-combatants who 
barricaded roads in Mozambique further illuminate the insensitivity of both the Mozambican 
authorities and the UN Mission to Mozambique (UNOMOZ) to their special needs. For the 
female ex-combatants in Namibia and disabled ex-combatants in Mozambique, there was no 
reintegration but dumping (Dzinesa, 2013:291). Dumping means demobilising soldiers and 
pushing them into civilian life without developing mechanisms to assist them cope with civilian 
means of livelihhod.  
The International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2010) treats the issue of employment as 
fundamental in DDR processes. For ILO, employment is conceived as a special need of the ex-
combatants. ILO categorically states in its foreword that ex-combatants only become fully 
reintegrated  into civilian life if they are engaged into productive employment which enable 
them to accumulate resources for investment purposes (https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5). It is not 
any kind of employment but effective and relevant employment that can transform an ex-
combatant into a proper civilian. ILO has a bias towards the employment of ex-combatants as 
a vehicle towards sustainable reintegration. For example, Mozambique had to repeat its 
reintegration program in 2009 because quite a large chunk of ex-combatants in that country 
failed to secure decent employment and could not sustain themselves economically (Lamb, 
2013). Although South Africa’s DDR was successful, in terms of employment opportunities, 
some of its ex-combatants faced some daunting challenges due to stiff competition for jobs 




returned to impoverished conditions as they could not secure decent employment (Van de 
Merwe and Lamb, 2009:2; Lamb, 2013). 
2.3.2.4 DDR Implementation Mechanisms and Modalities 
There are different views on the sequencing of DDR processes. According to the UNDPKO 
(1999) DDR should be implemented in a linear way, that is; disarmament should be followed 
by demobilisation and then reintegration should be the third and last aspect. Nilsson (2005) has 
a different view. He states that the linear perspective is rather traditional. For Nilsson (2005), 
it is not always possible to make a clear distinction between the three processes in terms of 
where one ends and where the other starts. Combatants may hide weapons for security reasons, 
and in that context, it can be prudent to have disarmament run alongside reintegration. 
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2010) posit that it is important to keep combatants with their 
arms up until a period when their physical security fears are allayed. Disarming combatants 
before maximum security guarantees makes the disarmed groups vulnerable to attacks from 
their opponents noted Sambanis and Schulhofer (2010). It is for the same reasons that 
disarmament was delayed for a long time in Zimbabwe but with disastrous repercussions. 
Banholzer (2014) accepts that DDR consist of three components but also states that it is not 
always the case that all the three elements are implemented in all post-conflict environments. 
In some countries only disarmament and demobilisation are implemented at the expense of 
reintegration, whilst others skip disarmament and demobilisation and concentrate on 
reintegration. UN traditional peace keeping missions were obsessed with disarmament and 
demobilisation, but the multi-dimensional approach to peace keeping embraces reintegration 
which is viewed as part and parcel of the broader peace building and developmental trajectory 




complementary, that is, the implementation of one helps in the smooth operationalization of 
the other irrespective of the sequence in which they are done.  
Besides the question of sequencing, different writers and policy makers are of the view that 
DDR programs should be implemented in an integrated approach. This means that they should 
be harmonised with other national processes and policies. The AUC (2014) concludes that if 
DDR programs are not integrated with other peace building processes, they are unlikely to be 
successful. It is suggested that DDR programs be linked to land distribution and employment 
programs; Security Sector Reform (SSR), and transitional justice policies among others. On 
the aspect of SSR in particular, the African Development Bank Group (2011) reveals that it is 
pertinent that the relationship between DDR and SSR be fully appreciated so that peace 
building initiatives become successful. 
 Like Knight (2009), the African Development Bank Group (2011) and Dyck (2016) note that 
the failure or success of either DDR or SSR affects the other. For example, post-conflict peace 
agreements always emphasize the absorption of armed groups involved in conflict into the 
national army and the dismantling of the surplus security apparatus. However, Dyck (2016) 
observes that if former combatants are poorly trained, that can adversely affect quality and 
professionalism in the security sector. The African Development Bank Group (2011) concludes 
that successful DDR programs cannot therefore be drawn and implemented in isolation. It is 
for the same reason that this thesis dwelt at great length on ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences 
within the ZNA. The nature of the military integration as well as experiences of ZIPRA ex-
fighters in the ZNA significantly impacted on the entire DDR process. 
2.3.2.5 Ownership and Leadership of DDR Programs 
There has been a growing realisation that quite a number of programs and projects in the Third 




national institutions and authorities is lacking. The UN notes in its IDDRS (2006) that while 
the UN may be called upon to provide the much needed financial and technical resources in 
DDR programs, it is the prerogative of national and local actors to lead the DDR process since 
the greatest responsibility of mantaining peace, security and development in local communities 
and nations rest on their shoulders.  
According to the AUC (2014), national ownership of DDR programs is critical because it 
ensures that any intervention measures that are meant to bring about desired change are 
influenced by contextual factors and dynamics. Relevant information on the local dynamics 
and context of any post-conflict environment is intended to make DDR practical and helpful. 
As it has been explained earlier, the understanding of local contexts is critical in facilitating 
robust interventions in DDR processes. Valters (2015) concurs with the AUC (2014) pertaining 
to the importance of first of all understanding relevant background factors before any 
intervention processes are rolled out. He argues that the purpose of any intervention should be 
primarily based on searching for solutions rather than validation and that there has to be a 
paradigm shift from trying to match donor prescriptions with whatever challenge that is faced 
towards ensuring that change is located in local contexts. It is important that even if the national 
government gets support from somewhere, the leadership of DDR processes from start to the 
end must be in its hands. The DDR process in South Africa was locally planned, owned and 
implemented and was largely successful (Dzinesa, 2005; Seibel and Wirtz, 2006). Examples 
of actors that may assist the national government in making sure that DDR programs are 
properly rolled out are the military, local government authorities, churches, the civil society, 
political parties as well as traditional leaders among others (AUC, 2014).  
SIDDR (2006), in its final report, recommends that national leadership and institutions should 
take responsibility in the leadership of DDR because their cultural, social, economic and 




be pragmatic and flexible in methods and mechanisms of DDR. Even if national governments 
are weak and lack capacity, the principle of national ownership of DDR still applies. What 
national authorities should do is to be involved in all the preparatory stages of the program in 
order to take over responsibilities once capacity is reasonably developed (AUC, 2014). DDR 
programs that are exclusively led by external partners risk the challenge of crumbling once the 
partners withdraw.  
There was tension between government officials and the in-country staff of the MDRP in the 
Central African Republic (CAR) because of lack of meaningful national ownership of the 
program (Lamb and Ginifer, 2008). What made the issue of local ownership of the DDR 
process problematic in the CAR is that the country has weak capabilities due to the debilitating 
effects of coups. N’Diaye (2012) argues that there was little drive at cultivating local ownership 
of the DDR process in the CAR because of inadequate political will. The real intention 
according to N’Diaye was to manipulate the DDR process and use it for soliciting for foreign 
support as well as for pacifying opponents, especially armed groups (2012). Local ownership 
and leadership ensure the sustainability of DDR programs, especially the reintegration process 
(IDDRS, 2006).  
Michael (2006) is of the view that national leadership of DDR programs is important in that 
program sustainability is guaranteed because national leaders have the power and authority to 
create legal and institutional frameworks and can tailor the programming of DDR to country 
requirements. To facilitate effectiveness and efficiency, national leaders can utilise 
internationally established terminologies, models and mechanisms to the specific national and 
local conditions (SIDDR, 2006). Local leadership can also create a national regulatory body 
like the National DDR Commission. The AUC (2014) dwells at great length on what it believes 
could be some of the crucial priority areas for the NDDRC that may not be specified in detail 




issues noted by the AUC (2014) that a NDDRC can specify include the number of combatants 
targeted for demobilisation, size of national army, and eligibility criteria into DDR programs 
among other issues.  
Notwithstanding the importance of local ownership and leadership in DDR programs, 
Banholzer (2014) points out that third party involvement is an integral part of DDR programs. 
He states that the involvement of a neutral and strong third party helps to ensure that there is 
adherence to the terms of the peace agreement if any and that there is minimal manipulation of 
the DDR process by one party at the expense of others. It is important to note that in doing so, 
third parties do not necessarily usurp the powers and obligations of the national governments 
in program design and implementation, but encourage participation and strengthen the 
commitment of local stakeholders to DDR and the peace process.  
Third parties also help to patrol buffer zones that separate former warring factions. Not only 
do third parties enforce compliance, but also give security guarantees to the belligerents who 
are fearful to disarm and demobilise. Knight (2009) has noted that combatants are generally 
fearful to disarm and surrender their forces to the national government if there are no robust 
security guarantees. For an example, some ex-combatants confirmed in Liberia that they would 
not have voluntarily disarmed except to UN peace keepers (Banholzer, 2014). 
The discussion on international literature mainly focussed on five critical issues that are pivotal 
in DDR programs. These are the prevalence of political will and trust among parties to the 
DDR process, the availability of effective and adequate funding, responsiveness of the DDR 
programs to the special needs of all the parties, the implementation mechanisms and modalities 
of the whole process as well as the question of ownership and leadership of DDR programs. A 
glaring gap is that of the subject of politicised ethnicity and its effects on the implementation 




between political formations on one hand and military units on the other that are critical 
stakeholders in the DDR and entire peace process. This thesis seeks to contribute to a deeper 
understanding in this regard. Precisely, it unpacks how differences created between different 
political and military formations by politicians based on ethnic identities affect the 
implementation of DDR processes. 
The study interrogates how weapons are collected, armed forces demobilised and reintegrated 
into civil society, as well as the funding modalities, harnessing of political will and support, 
military integration of different armed forces in the context where both political and military 
formations are in competition for power and mutually antagonistic. 
2.4 DDR Literature on Zimbabwe 
 Literature that is relevant to DDR issues starts from that which traces the history of unease 
relations between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups from before colonial conquest right 
into the colonial era. It does not directly speak to DDR issues per se but helps readers to 
understand ethnic dynamics which fragmented the nationalist movements into competing and 
hostile factions. The competing factions of ZAPU and ZANU led Zimbabwe into independence 
and continued their ethnic rivalry and hostility in the post-colonial state. As seen in chapter 
one, these ethnic rivalries also percolated into the DDR programs and had a negative and lasting 
legacy on unity and peace in the state. 
 The subject on the history of ethnic relations is fully treated in chapter three. Here, it is only 
important to mention that Beach (1980, 1986, and 1994) and Ranger (1969, 1985) are the 
leading scholars on Ndebele and Shona ethnic relations in the pre-colonial era. In short, they 
emphasise that although the relationships between the Ndebele and the Shona were at times 




Gatsheni (2009) argues that colonial authorities accentuated bifurcations based on ethnicity 
because they wanted to perpetually dominate the colonial subjects. 
 On ethnic dynamics during the war of independence, Sibanda (2005); Nkomo (1984); Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2009, 2011); Sithole (1999) and Msindo (2012) are the leading scholars. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2009) argues that the colonial authorities accentuated African bifurcations based on 
ethnicity by politicising ethnicity so that they could easily dominate and exploit them. So, 
relations between the Whites and the Africans were characterised by exploitation which had 
the effect of uniting the exploited Africans across the ethnic divide to confront the colonial 
system during the early years of the nationalist movement. 
 Although finer issues will be explored in the following chapter, it is sufficient to state that 
Sibanda, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Nkomo and Day (2008) explain the 1963 split in the nationalist 
movement along ethnic lines whilst Sithole points to Joshua Nkomo’s ineptitude and 
prevarication as the cause of the split. Msindo’s (2012) view is that ethnic differences and 
rivalries were not the cause but a result of the split.  The history and results of continued 
divisions and clashes between ZAPU and ZANU are well captured by Bhebe (1999) and 
Alexander et al (2000) who emphasize on competition for power, positions, influence and 
legitimacy based on ethnicity as the driving force for hatred and clashes between the military 
wings of the nationalist movements during the struggle to free blacks from colonial bondage. 
The first category of literature which directly interrogates DDR issues consist of work that was 
written in the 1980s mainly by politicians-cum-historians. Most of it was written from the 
victor’s perspective and eulogised ZANU-PF and ZANLA’s heroic execution of the armed 
struggle whilst disparaging PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA as having done little towards the liberation 
of Zimbabwe. Celebratory literature or what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:3) aptly calls ‘praise 




ZANLA as true liberators and genuine nationalists who were committed to build a united and 
prosperous Zimbabwe after independence.  
The roles of PF-ZAPU as a political party and ZIPRA as a fighting force in the war of socio-
political and economic emancipation were concealed and the two were viewed as bitter losers 
who carried out all sorts of reactionary and sabotage work to undermine ZANU-PF after 
independence. Instrumental in propagating that agenda are Martin and Johnson (1982). The 
views of the two authors were infused into History textbooks for all Secondary Schools in 
Zimbabwe and became part of the official history of Zimbabwe. Fay Chung (2006) believes 
that ‘dissidents’ were caused by purely political issues which had nothing to do with DDR 
issues. 
 She argues that some ex-ZIPRA cadres resorted to violence against ZANU-PF government 
from 1982 because they were convinced that their party (PF-ZAPU) lost the 1980 general 
elections due to manipulation by ZANU-PF that kept the majority of its veteran guerrilla 
fighters outside APs for campaign purposes. Sibanda (2005); Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) and 
Alexander et al (2000) locate the problem of ‘dissidents’ directly into the incomplete and partial 
DDR process, especially the persecution of ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA. 
Alongside book articles that were written by key government and ZANU-PF officials in 
contributions to a book edited by Canaan Banana in 1989, Martin and Johnson viewed ZIPRA 
ex-combatants as saboteurs who cached arms and resorted to dissidence for purposes of 
toppling ZANU-PF from power. In fact, the Unity Accord of 1987 is celebrated as a historic 
achievement in Zimbabwe by authors like Mnangagwa and Mutasa who made contributions to 
Banana’s edition in 1989. By then Mnangagwa and Mutasa were key cabinet Ministers in 




dissidence that was sponsored by PF-ZAPU and executed by some of the ZIPRA ex-
combatants. 
 Specifically, Mnangagwa (1989) argues that before weapons were found on farms owned by 
ZIPRA ex-combatants, there were revolts by ZIPRA cadres at Entumbane, Connemara and 
Silalabuhwa, which resulted in many deaths. He further asserts that the desertion of ZIPRA ex-
combatants from the army seems to have been co-ordinated but ZANU-PF could not receive 
satisfactory explanation or responsibility from PF-ZAPU leaders and senior ZIPRA 
commanders on the arms caches and the actions of ZIPRA cadres who were deserting the army.  
Of particular significance is how Mnangagwa views ZIPRA ex-combatants in relation to 
clashes at APs. Mnangagwa believes that ZIPRA ex-combatants were revolting against the 
government or staging a mutiny (Mnangagwa, 1989).   
Joshua Nkomo (1984) blamed ZANU-PF for all the political misfortunes of his party and the 
challenges that affected ZIPRA combatants during demobilisation, military integration and 
reintegration. Writing in 1984, Nkomo blamed what he termed political meddling by ZANLA 
guerrillas for his electoral losses and further alleges that demobilisation favoured ZANLA 
combatants over ZIPRA. Nkomo’s narrative contradicts that of Mutasa and Mnangagwa 
accounts of DDR-related issues of the 1980s. Divergent views and blame game from top 
political leadership of PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF provided negative ingridients for the DDR 
process. 
There appears to be a deliberate creation of politically sensational issues pertaining to DDR 
issues from both sides of the narrative. This could be because the stories were written by 
interested parties. Whilst the clashes at APs, the desertion of ZIPRA from the ZNA, the caching 
of arms, dissidence, and the collapse of the GNU are all blamed on PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA by 




implementation of DDR programs are blamed on ZANU-PF and ZANLA by Joshua Nkomo. 
Nkomo’s side of the story represents the opposition or specifically the PF-ZAPU version of the 
developments. These entrenched and hostile positions from both political divides needed to be 
controlled to avoid them undermining the government led DDR process. 
The second category of literature was mainly written by academics in the 1990s to the post 
2000 period. Many of the scholars took advantage of the improved security conditions and a 
reduction in political polarisations which came with the Unity Accord to use academic lenses 
in interrogating DDR issues. Before the Unity Accord, it was risky to propagate alternative 
views to the government. This is why Joshua Nkomo published his autobiography in exile in 
1984 because it contained an alternative narrative about the arms caches, the clashes at APs, 
the desertion of ZIPRA from the ZNA as well as the 5th Brigade. 
 Even after its publication in London, Nkomo’s autobiography remained banned in Zimbabwe 
for several years because it was deemed to be containing subversive information. Commenting 
on the dearth of scholarly literature on Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1987, especially on the 
violence that happened in Matabeleland and Midlands, Msindo (2012:167) interestingly said, 
‘speaking truth to power’ in post-colonial Zimbabwe has been generally risky. DDR issues 
were linked to the violence that engulfed Matabeleland and Midlands and that also meant that 
discussing DDR issues in writing or verbally remained secretive and risky until the 1990s.  
 Academics like Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) note the shortcomings of both DDR programs of 
1980-1984 and 1997 and conclude that ‘two wrongs do not make a right.’ The programs are 
referred to as two wrongs because the argument is that the first program was inadequate and 
incomplete as disarmament and demobilisation were shambolic and reintegration support did 
not extend beyond 1984, whilst the 1997 reintegration support was targeted at ensuring that 




combatants were fully addressed (Rupiya and Mazarire, 2000; Dzinesa, 2005; Musemwa, 
2011). In the same vein, Baines’ (1995) interviews with four ex-combatants between 
September 1990 and January 1991 portray a picture of sad experiences in DDR by both ZIPRA 
and ZANLA ex-combatants. 
 In the second category of literature, there are scholars who are agreed that the DDR process in 
general was inadequate for all the ex-combatants as reintegration programs failed to 
economically empower ex-combatants (Dzinesa, 2005, 2008; Chitiyo, 2000; Rupiya and 
Chitiyo, 2005; Rupiya and Mazarire, 2000). The other group of scholars within the second 
category of literature recognise the differences in the experiences of the ZANLA ex-
combatants on one hand and ZIPRA on the other (Kriger, 2003; Msemwa; 1994, Alao, 2012; 
Sibanda 2005; Todd, 2007). ZIPRA ex-combatants are seen to have been marginalised in the 
DDR programs. Alao’s detailed treatment of the integration process into the ZNA depicts 
preferential treatment of ZANLA over ZIPRA in high positions whilst Kriger’s thesis reveals 
challenges experienced by ZIPRA ex-combatants in reintegration. 
Whilst Kriger and Todd emphasize on the differential experiences between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA in DDR programs, Sadomba (2011) see it otherwise. Sadomba argues that Kriger and 
Todd view DDR issues from a partisan perspective and that viewpoint oversimplifies issues. 
What Sadomba (2011) sees is the deliberate attempt by the politicians to stir divisions amongst 
former liberation fighters to keep them perpetually divided and hostile to each other and 
therefore unable to speak with one voice against their marginalisation. For Sadomba, ZIPRA 
and ZANLA endured similar challenges in DDR programs and whatever differences were there 
were deliberately magnified so that ex-combatants fought each and left the government alone 
(2011). Sadomba’s perspectives on DDR issues in Zimbabwe resonate with those of some of 




The post-independence animosities between ZANLA and ZIPRA are viewed as similar to those 
that transpired during the liberation struggle. Sadomba (2011) argues that in both instances, 
friction between ZIPRA and ZANLA was fanned by the politicians for their political 
convenience. However, Sadomba’s analysis is not clear on which political side (PF-ZAPU or 
ZANU-PF) these politicians came from.  
 The works of Baines (1995), Alexander et al (2000) and Alexander (2008) provide the richest 
historical studies of DDR in Zimbabwe. The sources of information of these authors were the 
ZIPRA ex-combatants themselves. As indicated earlier, the post-1990 period made it possible 
for scholars to directly interact and interview ZIPRA ex-combatants without attracting reprisals 
from the government. Baines (1995) interviewed four ex-combatants pertaining to their hopes 
and aspirations in a post-independent Zimbabwe and what they actually experienced 
practically. Alexander (2008) interviewed twenty former ‘dissidents’and their perspectives 
illuminate our understanding of the phenomenon of dissidence. During the height of PF-ZAPU 
and ZANU-PF antagonisms (1982-1987), almost all ZIPRA ex-combatants were labelled 
‘dissidents.’ However, in this case, Alexander interviewed ZIPRA ex-combatants who had 
eloped into the bush and decided to oppose the system through acts of sabotage and other 
undemocratic means. 
 She explains that ‘dissidents’ had legitimate grievances which centred on the demand to free 
some incarcerated PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA political and military leaders respectively from 
prison, ethnic tolerance and quest to bring back properties illegally confiscated by the 
government to their rightful owners (ZIPRA ex-combatants). Alexander (2008) also notes that 
‘dissidents’ were embroiled in ethnic politics as they infiltrated Shona speaking areas like 
Belingwe in order to spread curfew to the Shona people. The dynamics of ethnicity are 




generated a lot of their data through primary sources hence they articulate the perspectives of 
the ex-combatants themselves who were at the epicentre of DDR processes. 
Dzinesa (2005, 2008) and Sadomba (2011) also provide a detailed interrogation of the trials 
and tribulations of the entirety of the ex-combatant constituency after the Unity Accord, 
culminating into the formation of the ZNLWVA and the demonstrations by the ex-combatants 
which earned them the second reintegration support in 1997. Sadomba’s (2011) explanation of 
the demonstrations by the ex-combatants is located within the intricacies of White monopoly 
capital. He argues that ZANU-PF government was working in cahoots with White capitalists 
and side lined the ex-combatants and workers in the sharing of the national cake hence that 
invigorated them to unite and fight hard until the government capitulated and awarded them 
gratuities and monthly life pensions in 1997. 
In the post-2008 period a plethora of newspaper articles emerged mainly from the private press 
that articulated the grievances of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR programs. This constitutes 
the third category of literature on DDR in Zimbabwe. After the revival of ZAPU, in 2009, there 
was an upsurge in newspaper articles, especially from the private press that spoke directly to 
the issues that affected the ZIPRA ex-combatants in reintegration programs. The private press 
acts as the mouth piece of ZIPRA ex-combatants and is critical to the government of ZANU-
PF. 
 These newspapers are the Financial gazette, the Newsday, the Southern Eye, the Standard, and 
the Zimbabwe Independent and to a minor extent, the Daily News. The Zimbabwe Independent 
in particular, published in parts in 2017 important literature from academics on the political 
dynamics in the early 1980s leading to the desertions of ZIPRA combatants from the ZNA.  
The private press gives ZIPRA ex-combatants, especially the leaders of the ZWVA and ZAPU 




newspapers centre around the return of ZIPRA properties, the reasons for the formation of the 
ZWVA and alleged preferential treatment of ZANLA over ZIPRA ex-combatants in post-
military employment. What is important to note is that most of the newspaper articles from the 
private press present a one-sided perspective of the DDR experiences and need to be treated 
with caution. 
However, information from academics that was published on a weekly basis in The Zimbabwe 
Independent in 2017 assists in the reinterpretation of the phenomenon of dissidence. Stuart 
Doran and Helen Cameron had access to official documents and communications between 
ZANU-PF and different embassies and government officials in Britain and America who were 
close to and interested in political and military developments in Zimbabwe then. The Newsday 
provides information on the meetings of ZWVA and official communication pertaining to the 
current status of the ZIPRA ex-combatants’ properties. The private press has also afforded 
former ‘dissidents’ a platform to articulate the circumstances that forced them into dissidence.  
Besides literature from politicians, academics and newspaper articles, the CCJP Report of 1997 
and to some extent writings of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010) provide invaluable information which 
enhance our understanding of the ‘dissident’ activities and the operations of the 5th Brigade in 
the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. Although the Report does not deal directly with DDR 
issues, it is a source of vital information that enables analysts to delve deeper into 
understanding the reasons behind the atrocities and these reasons tell a story about DDR 
processes. The Report narrates horrendous scenes and experiences by people who saw their 
homes being burnt and civilians killed by both ‘dissidents’ and members of the 5th Brigade. 
This thesis adds on more literature on DDR issues through interrogating DDR processes in 




political landscape of ethnic divisions that are embedded in the political and military 
formations.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The literature on DDR at the international level suggests that there are varied and pertinent 
factors that affect the success of DDR processes.  In the case of Zimbabwe, there are divergent 
perspectives on the DDR process and these perspectives are at times influenced by the same 
ethnic differences and interpretations that affected the implementation of the DDR process. 
The entrenched position of scholars pertaining to DDR issues in Zimbabwe mirror the 
entrenched positions of both political and military formations in the DDR processes. These 
divergent positions, it is argued, needed serious engagement across both the political and 
















CHAPTER 3: HISTORY OF ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ZIMBABWE 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter deals briefly with the history of ethnic relations and dynamics before colonial 
conquest and during the years of colonial occupation, including during the liberation struggle. 
Ethnicity has profoundly influenced major facets of life in Zimbabwe, especially in socio-
political and economic spheres. Contestations for power, influence and legitimacy among other 
things have to some extent been decided on ethnic lines. Ethnic divisions became pronounced 
after the 1963 split of ZANU from ZAPU.  Ethnicity became politicised and manipulated by 
the nationalist leaders as a means of mobilising supporters.  
 It is pertinent for readers to understand some critical issues like the fragmentation of the 
liberation movement into competing and hostile factions because the DDR process was 
implemented in the context of ethnicised armed factions which had roots in the liberation 
struggle. The liberation movements of ZANU and ZAPU, together with their respective 
military wings which were the key stakeholders in the DDR process had assumed solid ethnic 
identities and orientations by 1979 and these ethnic identities have a traceable background. The 
thesis argues that these ethnic divisions and rivalries had profound implications on DDR and 
the general peace process.  
The post-colonial government that led the DDR process was a by-product of ethnic 
configurations that developed during the struggle for self rule. The thesis argues that any 
intervention activities that are meant to induce positive change and lead to effective DDR 
should be implemented with a clear understanding of the broader context. Woodrow and Oatley 
(2013) articulate that a TOC takes cognisance of the broader contextual factors in which the 
intervention occurs. The assumptions about change should be based on relevant contextual 




proposed activities that are earmarked to transform attitudes and relationships and mitigate the 
problem would be baseless. This is the major reason why this chapter deals at length with 
background interactions between political and military formations of ZANU and ZAPU and 
ZANLA and ZIPRA respectively before the actual implementation of DDR processes in 1980. 
Change that is not contextualised is to a large extent meaningless and unsustainable.  
As will be shown shortly, the post-colonial state that ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants were 
fighting for was largely imagined in Ndebele and Shona ethnic identities respectively.  This 
chapter will mainly focus on the divisions, conflict and violence within and between the 
nationalist movements from an ethnic stand point especially after 1963 when ethnicity became 
a potent tool for political mobilisation in the nationalist movement. The chapter will commence 
with an analysis of the interconnections between ethnicity and conflict before delving into a 
short history of ethnic relations between the Shona and the Ndebele; the two major ethnic 
groups on the Zimbabwean plateau. This discussion is not meant to be a detailed history but an 
overview that allows us to place the issue of DDR in its proper context in line with the thrust 
of the study. 
3.2 Ethnicity and Conflict 
The aim is not to delve deeper into the theoretical underpinnings of ethnicity but to briefly 
explain the concept and analyse how it is connected to conflict generation since the thrust of 
the study is an interrogation of DDR processes within the context of ethnically based and 
conflictual political and military formations. Olayode (2016:244) explains ethnicity as one 
form of identity that is characterised by common symbols, culture and a shared ancestry among 
other issues. Due to common characteristics, a group feels different from other groups. Other 




Primordialists view ethnicity as a social association that is innate whilst to the constructivists; 
ethnicity is an identity that is socially and culturally constructed (Olayode, 2016). Put 
differently, ethnicity is not a fossilised determination but is produced and reproduced by 
material and historical forces. Msindo’s (2012) view on ethnicity is that it is a social 
organisational category which disappears during one period and intensifies during another. 
Many academics are more agreed than ever that ethnicity is not natural and immutable but can 
be mobilised and manipulated to serve certain objectives. 
 According to Ake (1993), competition amongst ethnic groups is not always bad as assumed, 
but can promote human rights and democracy. The common assumption is that Africa is riddled 
with conflict because of perennial competition between and amongst ethnic groups. Of course, 
notions of in-group purity and other group vices can divide people into ‘us’ and ‘them’ thereby 
fracturing society and posing a threat of conflict. However, Ake (1993:5) argues that “people 
are not and cannot be a problem just by being what they are, even if part of what they are is 
ethnic consciousnesses.” In simple terms, what Ake is highlighting is that most conflicts in 
Africa have been attributed to ethnicity, but that argument is not sustainable.  
One lesson drawn from Ake’s argument is that we must transcend our current understanding 
of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness and move beyond the temptation of always blaming 
people and their culture. The issue is that we must learn to problematise real issues that cause 
and sustain conflict in our communities. The issue(s) that caused divisions, intolerance, 
hostility and violence in Zimbabwe could not be simplistically reduced to ethnic differences 
between the Ndebele and Shona. It is possible that politicians exploited minor ethnic 
differences in language and ancestry to mobilise supporters and achieve their grand plans of 




With specific reference to Africa, Olayode (2016) articulates that colonial administrators 
manipulated African ethnic groups by defining, classifying and numbering them in order to 
create administrative units that could facilitate easy political administration and economic 
exploitation of the colonised people. In this way, one should mention that colonialism divided 
ethnic groups through what seemed to be preferential treatment of different ethnic groups. It 
can be concluded that ethnicity was manipulated to achieve the colonialists’ strategy of divide-
and-rule. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that colonial administrators invented 
ethnicity in Africa. Rather, they intensified ethnic consciousness for their own selfish reasons. 
Msindo (2012) emphasises the fact that before colonialism, Africans sustained certain 
traditions and structures in place in the absence of written codes and laws by means of oral and 
spiritual mechanisms that helped to create and sustain new identities.  
It was not only the colonialists who divided the Africans along ethnic lines. African political 
movements used the ethnic card to mobilise and recruit people into their respective political 
parties and liberation forces. Ake (1993) defines political ethnicity as the politicisation and 
changing of ethnic identity into major political divisions. Msindo (2012) prefers to call it 
political tribalism. Political ethnicity or political tribalism is at the centre of causing conflicts 
not ethnicity per se. In the period of nationalist movements, political leaders who knew that 
they could capitalise on ethnicity by virtue of coming from numerically large ethnic groups, 
did not hesitate to invoke the ethnic card to stir political ethnicity for purposes of mobilising 
followers (Ake, 1993). Leaders of the newly founded post-colonial states added the impetus to 
political ethnicity (Ake, 1993). In most instances, the nationalist leaders did not seek to 
transform the colonial states they inherited but perpetuated the exclusive and repressive 
policies of the colonialists to such an extent that Ake (1993) viewed most post-colonial states 
as drifting towards politically monolithic entities which accentuated political ethnicity. Any 




cause divisions, intolerance and violence between political and military entities rather than 
focus on scapegoats. 
It is not correct to conclude that ethnicity by itself causes conflict. One may prefer to work with 
his own kinsmen without necessarily being antagonistic to other ethnic groups.  Ake (1993) 
believes that political ethnicity rather than just simple ethnicity is a source of different 
challenges in many states because it means that if ethnicity is politicised and politics is 
ethnicised, then ethnic groups are motivated to compete against each other and even to indulge 
into violent tactics and strategies in order to achieve their objectives. If that scenario develops, 
it then becomes easier to mobilise and manipulate members of the ‘us’ group against a common 
‘foe’. It is crucial to indicate that many political leaders, especially in Africa often manipulate 
ethnic identity for electoral purposes or to support a conflict. In most cases, ethnic thinking and 
mobilisation generally develop when people feel that they are marginalised in one way or the 
other. It also stems from real or imagined inequitable distribution of power, access to resources 
and political exclusion and not from an intrinsic hatred. In such a scenario, it is possible that 
inclusive political, economic and social activities could encourage and promote a spirit of 
oneness and inclusivity. 
The issue of ethnic relations in Zimbabwe is discussed in this context rather than simply 
attributing conflict and antagonistic relations within the nationalist movement and in DDR 
programs to ethnicity. Through the manipulation of ethnicity for political and economic 
purposes, leaders are usually able to outcompete and ultimately subdue and defeat their rivals. 
Mindset transformation could be one of the critical steps in getting rid of exclusive and selfish 




3.3 Pre-Colonial Ndebele-Shona Relations 
The relationships between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups have long been portrayed as 
confrontational and bloody by White writers like Hole (1926), Willis and Collingride (1894) 
among a group of early writers on the history of the region (Cobbing, 1976). The blame is put 
squarely on the shoulders of the Ndebele who are accused of mercilessly killing the Shona, 
taking their wives, confiscating their livestock, heading their children into slavery and 
disrupting their normal social, political and economic activities. However, scholars like 
Cobbing (1976), Ranger (1985), Beach (1986) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2004) have attempted to 
debunk the mythologies and present an objective view about the nature of the relationships 
between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups. Before a detailed interrogation of the relations 
between these two ethnic groups, it would be prudent to discuss briefly who they are in terms 
of their origins and major political and economic systems. The discussion will start with the 
Shona and end with the Ndebele. 
The Shona are believed to have originated from somewhere to the north of the Zambezi River 
and settled in present day Zimbabwe around A. D 1000 (Beach, 1980). They came in and 
displaced the Khoi-san who had inhabited the area for several centuries before (Beach, 1980). 
A detailed history of the Shona is not necessary here, save only that they were migrants who 
invaded the country earlier than the Ndebele and had a decentralised political system and 
diversified economy that was based on agriculture, trade and metal work. The Ndebele loosely 
used the term Shona in reference to the people of the north-east of the Zimbabwean plateau. 
Today, the Zezuru, Karanga, Kalanga, Korekore, Manyika, Nyanga, Ndau or Shanga among 
others are collectively called Shona people (Beach, 1980:227).  
They are numerically the dominant ethnic group on the Zimbabwean plateau. Mazarire (2009) 




Tshabi, Karanga or Hole. The mainstay of their economy was agriculture which was 
supplemented with a strong trading component. Shona communities used various strategies of 
state building which included violence, conquest, raiding and assimilation of other weaker 
groups (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). 
 Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) concludes that there were features of raiding and violence among the 
Shona because of the war-like names of the Later Iron Age Shona states. The word Mutapa 
means a pillager, whilst Rozvi means a destroyer or to destroy and Torwa means we will fight. 
Mudenge (1988) vividly illustrates the point that at the height of its power, the Mutapa state 
raided as far as the Indian Ocean and once forced many Portuguese to be subservient to their 
authority. This information is critical as it debunks the myth that the Shona were docile victims 
of external intruders, including the Ndebele. 
Whilst the real geographical origins of the Shona remain a subject of speculation, that of the 
Ndebele is clear. The Ndebele originated from Nguniland in the early nineteenth century as a 
result of the Mfecane crises that were caused by overpopulation and other related factors. 
Unlike the Shona, the Ndebele had a centralised political system with the king at the apex 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Like the Shona, agriculture was the mainstay of their economy and 
was supplemented by trade and to some extent raiding. Overpopulation in Nguniland led to an 
acute shortage of essential resources, bred hostile competitions and the survival of the fittest 
syndrome (Omer Cooper, 1987). The finer details that compelled Mzilikazi and his group of 
about 200-300 Khumalo followers to migrate northwards until they settled in present day 
Zimbabwe are not relevant to this study. What is important is that during their northward 
migration, Mzilikazi and his Khumalo group raided, conquered and assimilated weaker groups 
they came across (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). However, other groups were assimilated through 




followers were given the name Matebele, which according to the Sotho meant strangers from 
the coastal area (Omer Cooper, 1987).  
During their migration, the Ndebele assumed a multi-ethnic identity as they incorporated 
various ethnic groups into their ranks. The Ndebele were the last of the Nguni groups that 
entered the Changamire state in the late 1830s (Beach, 1986). Some of the Shona people were 
assimilated into the emerging Ndebele state that grew in the south-western parts of the 
Zimbabwean plateau. According to Beach (1986:32), people of Shona descent constituted 
about 60% of the total Ndebele population by 1890. Although numerically outnumbered by the 
local Shona, the Khumalo clan remained the core aristocratic group who made up the first 
social class known as Abezansi. Those who were captured along the way formed the second 
class known as Abenhla and the local Shona made the third social class that was called 
Amahole (Ranger, 1969). The Ndebele and the Shona could be viewed as two separate ethnic 
groups on the basis of different geographic and ancestral origins as well as minor cultural 
variations. These differences could not be sufficient to explain the high levels of division and 
intolerance that later developed between the two groups. However, they shared a lot in common 
such as economic systems and marriage practices. 
As already alluded to, the history of Ndebel-Shoan relations have generated much debate 
among historians. Ranger (1985) points out that their relations were portrayed as hostile and 
bloody by White writers because they wanted to drive a wedge between these two ethnic groups 
so as to facilitate easy colonisation. Beach (1986) and Ranger (1985) have emphasised the fact 
that Ndebele-Shona relations were characterised by both cordial and hostile interactions at 
different stages of the evolution of the Ndebele state. It is a fact that when the Ndebele arrived 
on the Zimbabwean plateau, they found the Shona of the Changamire dynasty already weak, 
having been adversely affected by the raids of other Nguni groups that passed through their 




politically debilitating effects of a succession dispute that was sparked by the installation as 
king of one of Mzilikazi’s sons, Nkulumane whilst Mzilikazi was still alive and strong (Beach, 
1980). It is in this context that the early Shona-Ndebele relations should be analysed.  
Contrary to claims that Ndebele and Shona relations were always hostile, evidence from Beach 
(1986), Ranger (1985), and Cobbing (1976), among others, have demonstrated that to a large 
extent the relations were cordial. Raiding could have been pronounced during the early phases 
of Ndebele settlement as they needed manpower to increase their numbers. However, as they 
developed into a more settled state, relationships between the two ethnic groups were 
characterised more by trade, intermarriages and religious intercourse than violence. The 
Ndebele traded cattle for grain and iron tools. The Ndebele also loaned some cattle to the Shona 
in what was known as Kuronzera or Ukusisa in the local Shona and Ndebele languages 
respectively (Beach, 1986).  
The Shona people who resided around the Ndebele state were in a regulated relationship of 
tribute payment for immunity against raids (Beach, 1986). The Shona who paid tribute were 
subservient to Ndebele authority but maintained a sizeable level of political independence in 
their daily lives (Omer Cooper, 1987). It is difficult to understand why the two groups finally 
developed brazenly antagonistic relations from the 1963 split in the nationalist movement right 
into post-independence Zimbabwe. One can note that the contestations were not on factors like 
different language and origins per se but their manipulation by politicians to mobilise followers 
in the contest for political power. 
The frequency and magnitude of raiding has been falsified for a couple of reasons. Missionaries 
fabricated the nature of relations, emphasizing on Ndebele violence on the Shona because they 
wanted to gain support from the British authorities to break up the Ndebele state since the 




exaggerated the destructive effects of Ndebele influence on the Shona because they wanted to 
use the Rudd Concession, they had signed with Lobengula of the Ndebele as a ticket to occupy 
the whole of Zimbabwe, including Mashonaland. Furthermore, both the Shona and Ndebele 
were complicit in the myth generation crusade pertaining to their relationships.  
According to Ranger (1985), the Ndebele exaggerated the number of people they killed, as well 
as the number of cattle, women and young men they brought back from the Shona during their 
raiding expeditions. The reason for doing that was to portray their military image as very 
powerful (Beach, 1986). The Shona accepted and even perpetuated the mythology about their 
‘helplessness and vulnerability’ in the hands of the ‘marauding’ Ndebele so as to gain 
‘sympathy and protection’ from the British colonisers (Ranger, 1985:122). These perceptions 
were passed through generations through oral messages. Both the Ndebele and Shona played 
into the hands of the colonialists who wanted to keep them divided and hostile to each other. 
Mindset changes over a long period could facilitate positive engagement, tolerance and more 
peaceful co-existence between the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups. 
The sensationalisation of the effects of Ndebele raids on the Shona has a strong and long-lasting 
legacy as it is perpetuated through oral sources to this day. Some Shona people believe that 
their fore fathers suffered heavily in the hands of Ndebele raiders; losing cattle, women, young 
men and freedom. The post-independence period was therefore seen as an opportune time for 
revenge through the 5th Brigade on the Ndebele for their fore fathers’ 19th century 
transgressions on Shona people (CCJP, 1997). In fact, Coltart (2016) and Munemo (2016) 
believe that heinous tactics of the 5th Brigade on unarmed Ndebele civilians in the early 1980s 





Munemo (2016) argues that the violence that always erupt between supporters of the mainly 
Shona-backed Dynamos football club and the Ndebele-supported Highlanders football club 
smacks of something more than mere football hooliganism. The violence between the 
supporters of the two football teams could be traced to politicised ethnic rivalries and hostilities 
between the Shona and Ndebele that manifested after the 1963 ZANU split from ZAPU. 
However, as Ake (1993) observes, the existence of different ethnic groups does not in itself 
cause conflict. The problem emanates from the politicisation of ethnicity to achieve either 
political or economic goals. It is argued that if inclusive programs could be utilised to build 
common understanding of national issues between the Shona and Ndebele, dissipate tensions 
and encourage them to reconcile and forgive, and harness their different experiences for the 
good of the country, then feelings of hate and revenge could be contained. 
3.4 Ethnic Relations during the Colonial Era.  
Not much has been written about inter-African ethnic relations during the colonial era. Most 
of the available literature focuses on the exploitative relationships between the Africans and 
the settler regime. The exploitation of both the Shona and Ndebele was mainly characterised 
by land expropriation, taxation and extraction of cheap labour. Whilst enduring exploitation, 
the Africans were made to feel more different from each other through the politicisation of 
ethnicity. Ake (1993) argues that colonialism decimated African culture, dismantled their will 
to resist, and kept them divided and weak. The strategy was used to entrench colonial 
domination.  
The manipulation of ethnicity was thus meant to keep the colonised people divided and unable 
to mount any meaningful resistance for purposes of extricating themselves from colonial 
oppression. Msindo (2012) has noted that ethnic identities were not invented by missionaries 




politicising them. Even after independence, the Whites seemed bent on formenting divisions 
between Africans and encouraging them to fight so that they could continue to dominate them 
economically. The collaboration between the RSFs and ZANLA ex-combatants against ZIPRA 
ex-combatants after independence appear to have been targeted at keeping the two former 
liberation armies mutually antagonistic. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) explains how the colonial administrators fuelled division of Africans 
along ethnic lines and prevented them from coalescing into a single national identity. Africans 
were categorised into ethnic-based administrative and geographic units such as Mashonaland 
for Zezuru-speaking Shona; Matabeleland for Ndebele speaking people and other related 
groups like the Kalanga, Venda, Nambiya, Tonga and Sotho, Fort Victoria (Masvingo) for 
Karanga-speaking Shona and Manicaland for Manyikas (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2007). A national identity card system was used to code and classify Africans according to an 
assigned village of origin. Each ‘native district’ was coded using a numerical code which was 
written on each and every adult’s identity card. The major aim of doing all this was to divide 
Africans into distinct groups for easy administration and domination.  
Even though the 1929 factional fights in Bulawayo between the Shona and the Ndebele 
occurred during the period of the politicisation of ethnicity by the colonialists, they were far 
from being induced by ethnic hatred. Phimister and Onselen (1979) have located the violence 
outside ethnic rivalry but within the orbit of pure workers’ competition for limited job 
opportunities. According to Msindo (2007), the Shona went to Bulawayo to look for jobs and 
they offered themselves as cheap labour thereby displacing the Ndebele. The Ndebele wanted 
better wages which the employers could not give due to the adverse effects of the economic 
depression. As a result, the Ndebele were squeezed out of the labour market hence the fight 
between them and the Shona. The Ndebele mobilised themselves along ethnic lines to achieve 




overcrowding the Ndebele in Bulawayo, snatching their wives and jobs. Since the Shona and 
Ndebele were taught to develop strong regional and ethnic identities, in the same way, they 
could be taught to discard that mindset and develop national identity and stop to imagine 
independent Zimbabwe in Shona and Ndebele terms.  
3.5 Mass Nationalism, the Liberation Struggle and Ethnic Relations 
Different ethnic groups coalesced and formed a united nationalist identity during the formative 
years of the nationalist struggle. Msindo (2012) has observed that right from the birth of the 
first nationalist party in Zimbabwe, the African National Congress (ANC), in 1957, up to the 
ZAPU-ZANU split of 1963, ethnic groups made frantic efforts to complement rather than stall 
the growth of African nationalism. Nationalist parties that were formed were located within a 
multi-ethnic context. The ANC, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and ZAPU cut across 
the ethnic divide. However, the nationalist leaders were alive to the issue of ethnic balancing 
within the top leadership of the nationalist movement from the earliest times. When Joshua 
Nkomo, a Ndebele won the ticket to be the ANC President by defeating James Chikerema, who 
was Shona, by thirty-two votes to thirty-one, it was decided that James Chikerema should 
automatically deputise him to represent the Shona ethnic group (Interview with Gwakuba-
Ndlovu, 2017). If pursued throughout the liberation struggle and thereafter that spirit of 
inclusivity could have averted the politicisation of ethnicity and minimised divisions and 
violence that came with it. 
Even though the spirit of nationalist identity overrode other forces of division, Gwakuba-
Ndlovu remembers very well that some Shona speaking politicians did not hide their 
displeasure over the election of Nkomo as the President of the ANC. People like Edson Sithole, 
Leopold Takawira, and Henry Hamadziripi thought that the leadership of the nationalist 




people (Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). The issue of who is ‘indigenous’ and ‘alien’ 
between the Shona and Ndebele is controversial. Historical evidence points to the fact that both 
ethnic groups originated from outside the Zimbabwean plateau but the Shona arrived much 
earlier than the Ndebele.  
3.5.1 Split in the Liberation Movement 
The issue of ethnic relations experienced no significant developments and challenges up until 
the split in the nationalist movement in 1963. For Msindo (2012), ethnicity morphed into 
political tribalism after the 1963 ZANU split from ZAPU. Msindo (2012) argues that ethnic 
differences were not central to the split, but its politicisation thereafter by political leaders to 
garner and mobilise party supporters meant that ethnic identity drove a political wedge between 
ethnic ‘Others’ thereby inspiring unbridled hatred. The possible causes of the split are critical 
in this study because after the split, ethnic relations between the Ndebele-dominated ZAPU 
and ZANU which was chiefly made of the Shona speaking leaders and supporters took a turn 
for the worst. 
There are mainly three schools of thought that explain the causes of the 1963 split. One 
represents the ZANU perspective which is well captured by Shamuyarira (1965) and Sithole 
(1999). The opposite view is explained by Nkomo (1984) and is also captured by Sibanda 
(2005). The third version locates the causes of the split in wider political developments of the 
time and is articulated by Dabengwa (1995) and Msindo (2012). Both Sibanda and Nkomo 
represent the ZAPU perspective about the causes of the split. The first two perspectives are 
from interested parties, and suffer from a couple of limitations. Nonetheless, they provide some 
vital information that enable people to comprehend ethnic dynamics and reconfigurations of 
the nationalist movements and their effects on the prosecution of the liberation struggle and on 




ineptitude and blunders made by Joshua Nkomo as President of ZAPU. ZANU’s version as 
represented by Shamuyarira and Sithole alleges that Joshua Nkomo did not exhibit full 
commitment to the armed struggle, was vacillating, dictatorial, an indecisive coward who was 
always secretive on some fundamental issues that determined the course of the liberation 
struggle (Sithole, 1999:40-41). 
The so-called ZANU ‘rebels’ who engineered the split are said to have been incensed by 
Nkomo’s cowardice when he failed to return home and give leadership and direction to the 
grassroots when ZAPU was banned (Msindo, 2012). Instead of returning home, Nkomo is 
blamed for having misled ZAPU Executive members to travel toTanzania on the belief that 
they had been invited there by President Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) for purposes of constituting 
an alternative government-in-exile. ZAPU leaders are said to have been disappointed when 
they arrived in Tanzania since they were told that the other African governments had not 
sanctioned the move (Msindo, 2012). Shamuyarira (1965) is of the view that the rest of the 
ZAPU Executive were so disappointed by what they considered to be Nkomo’s betrayal hence 
they decided to form another party.  
 Nkomo disputes the authenticity of ZANU’s version of the story and lays the blame for the 
split squarely on political tribalism that was embraced by young political leaders who were 
power hungry and overwhelmed by greed. Nkomo (1984) alleges that some of his colleagues 
within ZAPU who were Shona-speaking like Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira and Morton 
Malianga always undermined his leadership and authority. In one incident, he says that they 
actually made it impossible for him to present a professional and sound speech at the Addis 
Ababa meeting, Ethiopia, in 1962 (Nkomo, 1984). The prepared speech was not availed to him 




 Nkomo (1984) believes that the Shona leadership within ZAPU had decided to sabotage him 
so that he could appear a weak leader at the international level. Nkomo also alleges that Joseph 
Msika, one of the ZAPU Executive members snatched a circular from Morton Malianga that 
fermented ethnic feelings by categorically urging the numerically superior Shona people to 
ditch Nkomo who was from the numerically inferior Ndebele ethnic group and then assume 
leadership of ZAPU. In the said circular, Nkomo is derogatorily referred to as ‘Zvimundebere’ 
which in Shona means an old and boring Ndebele man (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). 
Msindo’s (2012) version of the split acknowledges the two opposite views expressed above, 
but doubts the centrality of ethnicity and Nkomo’s political ineptitude in explaining the split. 
For Msindo, ethnicity became an issue after the split as warring factions politicised it to 
mobilise support for their parties. Msindo argues that the split needs to be taken within the 
wider political developments of the time. The political context is explained in the following 
way. First, the wind of decolonisation was sweeping across Africa in the early sixties. It was 
natural that the nationalists in Southern Africa also expected the wave of change to engulf their 
region and produce spectacular results in the political front (2012).  However, the situation was 
not to be in Southern Rhodesia as successive political parties were banned and their leaders 
detained (Msindo, 2012:196). Under the prevailing politically-prohibitive conditions, younger 
politicians became disillusioned and blamed Joshua Nkomo for the setbacks (Msindo, 2012; 
Dabengwa, 1995). 
The second scenario was where some nationalist leaders were under the false sense of optimism 
that majority rule was around the corner. The thinking was predicated on the belief that with 
the end of the Federation, the British policy of decolonisation would quicken and that would 
mean the achievement of independence for most of its colonies, including Southern Rhodesia 
(Msindo, 2012). Again, this was not to be with regards to Southern Rhodesia since the end of 




However, some of the ZAPU executive members who were under the illusion that the end of 
Federation would concide with decolonisation began to position themselves to assume 
influential leadership positions, and thus caused leadership wrangles within ZAPU. Although 
plans to oust Nkomo could have developed earlier on, the euphoria for independence that was 
sparked by the thinking that the end of Federation would usher in independence could have 
triggered the split. Msindo (2012) argues that it was natural that ambitious elites in the ZAPU 
Executive who thought about power and positions started jostling and positioning themselves 
strategically for post-colonial leadership posts. Whatever weaknesses Nkomo was accused of 
came as a pretext rather than cause of the 1963 split. Msindo questions why Nkomo’s 
weaknesses were spotted by only Shona speaking leaders save for one Ndebele, Enos Nkala. 
 It is therefore possible that ethnic differences could have played peripheral roles in causing 
the split in 1963, although these were being suppressed. The undercurrents of ethnic rivalry 
could not be underestimated as even as early as 1957 when the first nationalist political party, 
the ANC, was formed in Salisbury, there were some grumblings by some Shona politicians that 
the Presidency of the party should have gone to the majority and ‘indigenous’ Shona-speaking 
people. Gwakuba-Ndlovu remembers vividly how Edson Sithole displayed political and 
regional tribalism when he told him that, ‘…the Shona would not stand by and watch the 
country being led into independence by Joshua Nkomo, a reincarnation of King Lobengula of 
the Ndebele’ (Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). 
Lobengula was the son and successor to Mzilikazi, the founding king of the Ndebele state. 
After the 1963 split Nkomo was mocked and likened to Lobengula who some Shona blamed 
for ‘selling’ the country to the British imperialists through signing the Rudd Concession in 
October 1888. In fact, the NDP which succeeded the ANC did not escape the embryonic 




the Karanga sub-ethnic group formed the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) under the leadership 
of Michael Mawema (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). 
 Msindo’s thesis on the causes of the ZAPU split in 1963 resonates with Dabengwa’s (1995) 
assessment on what could have caused the split. Dabengwa locates the causes of the split in 
opportunism by some of the leaders, impatience and political greed but does not rule out the 
contribution of ethnic differences (1995:26). When closely looking at some of the accusations 
against Nkomo, one finds out that they contain some loopholes and could only have been used 
as a cover up for real issues which brought about the split. Sibanda (2005) and Chimhanda 
(2003) graphically illustrate how ZAPU executed the armed struggle in the early 1960s as 
opposed to what Martin and Phyllis (1982) present as the official commencement of the Second 
Chimurenga on 28 April 1966. Therefore, the argument that Nkomo was anti-armed struggle 
has some weakness. Sibanda (2005) argues that in terms of ideology, strategy and tactics, there 
was nothing where ZANU could claim to be different from ZAPU. Since they did not differ in 
the stated issues above, ZANU had to escalate its rhetoric about its unwavering commitment 
to the armed struggle and radicalism in order to appear different from ZAPU.  
A few other things which show that some of the allegations against Nkomo were baseless was 
that immediately after the split, ZANU vigorously engaged the international community for 
purposes of securing military bases and logistical support. They later went on to establish rear 
bases in friendly countries like Tanzania and Mozambique (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). In the 
light of the above development, the argument that Nkomo was a coward who abandoned cadres 
at the home front in preference of a government-in-exile in Tanzania to prosecute the struggle 
through remote control is not very convincing. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:80) observes that, 
‘setting up an exile base in Tanzania was part of ZAPU’s preparations for an armed struggle.’  
Nkomo’s argument that the split was caused by purely ethnic differences also has a challenge 




present day Harare, is in the heart of Mashonaland and could have shifted allegiance quickly 
to the Shona-dominated ZANU rather than cling to ZAPU which was predominantly Ndebele 
constituted (Msindo, 2012). 
 It is true that the split was in the top political leadership of ZAPU not among the rank and file 
and it remained so for some few years until the gospel of political tribalism cascaded to them 
and up until ZANLA guerrillas went about uprooting ZAPU structures in Mashonaland in the 
1970s, replacing them with ZANU ones (Bhebe, 1999; Interview with Mazinyane, former 
senior ZIPRA commander, 2017). From the evidence, the split was mainly precipitated by 
power struggles between Nkomo and some ZAPU executive members.  
 It was reduced to ethnic rivalry and Nkomo’s political ineptitude and blunders by ZAPU and 
ZANU rival camps respectively in order to justify their separate existence. Msindo (2012) has 
alluded to the fact that many people in the 1960s began to view the ZAPU-ZANU split as a 
Ndebele-versus-Shona issue not a power struggle between Nkomo and his opponents. 
However, ethnic rivalry was not a dominant divisive factor by 1963 but its foundation as a 
centrifugal force was laid down then as will be shown in the following discussion. With 
hindsight, it can be argued that a government that emerged from such a polarised environment 
could not manage to be an impartial facilitator of peace building processes, especially DDR. 
3.5.2 Ramifications of the Ethnic Split   
Whilst the causes of the 1963 split are debatable, its repercussions are clear and incontestable. 
The split had a clear and long-lasting legacy of division and hostility between ZAPU and 
ZANU first as political parties and between ZANLA and ZIPRA as their military wings. The 
1963 split led ZAPU and ZANU to execute the liberation struggle from the 1960s until 1979 
as separate and to some extent hostile political entities.  Relationships remained like that until 




and ZANU could hardly co-operate in the execution of national duties. The period after the 
split was however characterised by intermittent attempts at unifying the liberation movements 
but to no avail as the ghost of political tribalism kept on lingering. 
Msindo (2012) notes that the moral ethnicity that had kept African peoples self-conscious, and 
at times divided, was translated into regional political ‘tribalism’ after the split as political elites 
used it to mobilise popular support. ZANU mobilised ethnicity into a Shona super tribe whose 
geographical extent not only encompassed Mashonaland but all other Shona-speaking areas 
including Masvingo, Manicaland and some parts of the Midlands (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). On 
its part, ZAPU mobilised the Ndebele and became a general regional political identity that also 
covered the areas inhabited by the Kalanga, Venda, Sotho, Tonga and other people closely 
associated with the Ndebele.  
The period immediately after the split witnessed horrific scenes of bloody clashes between the 
supporters of the rival parties. Doran (2017) articulates that when ZANU was formed in 1963, 
its members immediately became victims of physical attack from ZAPU members. 
Interestingly, Doran (2017:15) states that: 
ZANU and ZAPU did not fight because they were different, but because they were 
the same. The nationalist mindset, already well established by the time of the schism, 
was that there could be only one liberation party, one authentic representative of the 
people. Those who formed or joined different organisations were—with their 
supporters; ‘sell-outs’, ‘stooges’ and ‘agents’ of imperialism. Violence was the 
inevitable off-spring of this zero-sum ideology, as those in the opposing camp were 
regarded not simply as competitors or misguided fellow travellors but as traitors. 
Whilst Doran’s analysis throws weight into the argument that the 1963 split was engineered by 
power-hungry individuals rather than any ideological, tactical and strategic differences, it also 
reveals that the two parties became fiercely intolerant towards each other. Besides physical 
fighting and upping rhetoric that portrayed its adversary as anti-revolutionary, there was 
nothing more these two parties could do to mobilise supporters and outdo one another because 




the grassroots, the clashes were mainly between new ZANU recruits and hordes of ZAPU 
supporters who included both Shona and Ndebele speaking people. It is for this reason that 
Msindo (2012) articulates that Ndebele-Shona hostility was not clearly evident immediately 
after the split as ZAPU retained support in Salisbury and some parts of rural Mashonaland. In 
the late 1960s, ZANU used its publicity experience to fan political tribalism and it is during 
this period that the two political parties evolved into intolerant and strong regional and ethnic 
entities along Ndebele and Shona lines.  
For Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), the split set the stage for the imaginations of the post-colonial 
state along Ndebele and Shona ethnic lines. What had begun as ‘sons of the soil’ during the 
formative years of African nationalism turned into ‘sons of segregation’ after the split up to the 
end of the liberation struggle as both Ndebele and Shona nationalists tried to strategically 
position themselves in order to be leaders of the envisaged independent state (Staffer, 2009). 
That mentality was not only espoused by the nationalists but by the military as well. This meant 
that the military envisaged the structure and functions of the national armed forces after 
independence with the lens of political and regional ethnicity. Such a mentality was bound to 
present some challenges to any government that wanted to implement a DDR process, be it a 
ZAPU or ZANU-led government.  
The presentation of the 1963 split in the public domain as an Ndebele-versus-Shona issue had 
the effect of amplifying the rivalry between the Shona and Ndebele whereby the latter was 
portrayed as a foreign and minority ethnic group. Ethnic emotions were also whipped up 
through the African Daily News, a Salisbury based African paper that was owned by ZANU 
and was effectively used to disseminate disparaging propaganda against ZAPU and its 
leadership, especially Nkomo (Staffer, 2009). The perceptions of differences between 




perceptions, it can be argued that quite a big investment in reconciliation and inclusive 
activities was a necessity. 
Shona emotions and hatred against the Ndebele were raised by such publications as the one 
that likened Nkomo to Lobengula, the late Ndebele King who is accused in Shona traditions 
for having abused the Shona and for also ‘selling the country’ to the British (Msindo, 
2012:197). Through its paper, ZANU also accused Nkomo of abandoning Shona men to 
languish in detention each and every time when nationalist parties were banned. By doing so, 
a wedge was gradually drawn between ZAPU and ZANU supporters to the extent that even 
some of the Shona-speaking people in Salisbury and other areas who had remained with ZAPU 
during the split decided to shift political allegiance to ZANU which claimed to be championing 
the cause of the Shona ethnic group that was ‘deliberately undermined’ by the Ndebele within 
ZAPU. Due to the gradual loss of Shona support, ZAPU’s stronghold shifted from High fields 
in Harare to Bulawayo and Matabeleland region in general (Msindo, 2012). 
It is crucial to notice that although ZAPU remained with an ethnically balanced leadership at 
the top as it retained quite a number of prominent Shona-speaking cadres, that ethnic balance 
did not cascade down to the rank and file. The ZAPU Executive Committee had such Shona 
leaders as Chikerema, Nyandoro and Msika, whilst ZANU had only one Ndebele, who 
according to Msindo (2012) had sharp personal differences with Nkomo on the grounds that 
he did not marry his sister whom he had an intimate relationship with. The Shona leadership 
within ZAPU did not alter the perception outside Matabeleland that ZAPU was basically for 
the Ndebele-speaking people (Msindo, 2012). As time went on, regional and ethnic loyalties 
started to be significant factors in the recruitment, training and operations of ZIPRA and 
ZANLA cadres. Since recruitment of cadres for training became regionalised and ethnicised, 
ZAPU largely constituted of the Ndebele people from the south-western parts of the country, 




ethnic lines, it did not cease to be characterised by competition for recruits between the political 
parties (Tungamirai, 1995).  
 Furthermore, when the trained guerrillas infiltrated the country to wage the armed struggle, 
they mainly operated among their kith and kin although there are some areas where they 
overlapped (Bhebe, 1999; ZAPU Department of Information and Publicity, 2012). To illustrate 
the effects of the politicisation of ethnicity on the composition and operations of the trained 
cadres, Sadomba (2011) states that some Shona-speaking guerrillas that had trained under the 
auspices of the ZAPU Department of Special Affairs before the formal constitution of ZIPRA 
as a military force defected and joined the newly formed ZANU as a result of the ethnic 
differences that were mainly emphasised by ZANU through its propaganda machinery. Robson 
Manyika and Rex Nhongo are among some of the senior Shona military leaders who defected 
from ZAPU and joined ZANU due to the amplification of ethnic differences and hatred 
(Brickhill, 1995). 
The differences between ZIPRA and ZANLA were also magnified by the different training 
backgrounds of the two liberation armies. Many ZIPRA recruitees trained in the then Soviet 
Union, whilst Chinese instructors trained quite a number of ZANLA guerrillas. On their own, 
the differences in training backgrounds did not make the cadres different. However, each party 
was told that its sponsor’s ideology and quality of training was superior to its rival’s (Brickhill, 
1995). As a result, guerrillas from the two rival groups undermined each other. Bhebe 
(1999:89) had this to say about the levels and nature of rivalry and hostility between ZIPRA 
and ZANLA cadres: 
These young men and women were trained to hate each other by their leaders, who 
wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties. Each party had its 
Commissariat Department, whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, 
how the party was different from the other, who the leaders were and how they 
were different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. 




The guerrillas were subjected to indoctrination by their respective political parties in which 
each political party portrayed the other as bad and harbouring evil intentions (Bhebe, 1999). 
These guerrillas could be easily indoctrinated because they had strong ethnic and regional 
biases. They were thus turned into ‘political armies’ and that naturally affected the DDR 
processes later on. As a result of the divisive and malicious teachings they got from their 
respective political parties, ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants also spread the gospel of ethnic 
hate into the hearts and minds of civilians wherever they operated. As they operated along 
ethnic and regional lines to a greater extent, this meant that the politicisation of ethnicity into 
rigid Ndebele and Shona political identities was reinforced even among the civilians. In this 
context, it is envisaged that dialogue with various stakeholders acknowledging multiple 
viewpoints and recognition of power relations and dynamics could bring about mutual trust 
and respect of each other (Vogel, 2015). 
 ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants also fought each other wherever they came side by side. 
There were bloody clashes which pitted guerrillas aligned to ZANU against those aligned to 
ZAPU in Mgagao and Morogoro in July 1976 in Tanzania where ZANLA and ZIPRA were 
undertaking joint training under the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) military outfit (Sithole, 
1999; Alaxander et al, 2000). With hindsight, any future attempts of implementing DDR 
processes within such a conflictual and deeply polarised context without simultaneously 
implementing some change-oriented programs and activities to transform the exclusive and 
negative mindsets, perceptions and relationships of both political parties and military forces 
were bound to be ineffective.  
 They also clashed in Mozambican military camps as well as in the home front during the period 
of ZIPA as well as in Ethiopia and Libya where they were meant to conduct joint trainings 
(Bhebe, 1999 cited in Staffer 2009; Nkomo, 1984; Alexander et al, 2000). Unlike the 1960s 




ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas were couched in ethnic terms because the armies were to a large 
extent organised along ethnic lines although ZIPRA had a small percentage of Shona-speaking 
guerrillas.  
Not only did ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants clash at the rear but at the home front as well. 
Clashes were always prevalent where operational zones overlapped like in Filabusi, Gwanda, 
Shurugwi, Zvishavane, Mberengwa, Mwenezi, and Beitbridge to name only a few of those 
areas (ZAPU Department of Information and Publicity, 2012). One of the ZIPRA ex-
combatants who operated around the Beitbridge area recounts that they endured torrid times of 
having to contend with the RSFs on one hand and the ZANLA guerrillas on the other (Interview 
with Dumani, ZIPRA ex-combatant who operated around Beitbridge, 2017). 
As the struggle for independence intensified in the 1970s, so were the slogans and political 
rhetoric that were targeted at fanning ethnic divisions among the Africans along Ndebele and 
Shona ethnic fault lines as a way of competition for legitimacy, supporters and political power. 
Opponents were always cast in the negative as sell-outs, counter-revolutionaries and divisive 
elements that were not committed to the full prosecution of the armed struggle. According to 
Kriger (1992:101), ZANLA guerrillas uttered divisive and disparaging slogans during their all-
night mobilisation meetings called Pungwes that they held with the masses. In the Pungwes, 
the slogans were always: 
 Pasi na Smith    Down with Smith 
 Pasi na Muzorewa   Down with Muzorewa 
 Pasi na Nkomo   Down with Nkomo 
 Pasi na vanematumbu   Down with those with big stomachs 




 Pasi ne varoyi    Down with witches 
 Pasi ne nhunzwatunza   Down with troublesome people 
 Pasi ne nharadada   Down with disobedient people 
It is clear that not only was the Smith regime identified as the enemy of the ‘revolution’, but 
other African leaders as well. Much of the political tirade was directed against Joshua Nkomo 
of ZAPU as they referred to him derogatorily as Zvemutumbu, which meant someone with a 
big stomach. Physically, Nkomo had a big body and stomach. It is important to realise that 
ZANU and ZANLA did not only identify the Smith regime, Muzorewa’s United African 
National Council (UANC), witches, sell-outs, ZAPU, ZIPRA and Nkomo as enemies but also 
the Ndebele people in general. Gwakuba-Ndlovu states that in their training camps in 
Mozambique, ZANLA trainees were told to treat the Ndebele people in general with suspicion 
(Interview with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). The slogan was always, ‘Tamba wakachenjera. 
Mhandu yekutanga ndiyani?-Mabhunu. Mhandu yechipiri ndiyani?-MaNdevere’. In the 
English language this meant, ‘Be very careful or play it safe. Who is our first enemy? They are 
the Whites.Who is our second enemy? They are the Ndebele’ (Interview with Gwakuba-
Ndlovu, 2017). The feeling of enmity that divided the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups 
developed long back. 
One has to note that the hate and divisive language did not emanate from the ZANLA side 
only. ZIPRA derogatorily labelled ZANLA guerrillas as ‘oPasi’ from their popular slogan, 
‘Down with….’ They were also portrayed as poorly trained, poorly armed, undisciplined, fond 
of sleeping with women and forcing people to cook for them and responsible for making 
civilians vulnerable to mass killings through their Pungwes (Dabengwa, 1995; Interview with 
Dumani, 2017). Although ZANLA guerrillas were poorly trained and armed compared to 




of the ZANLA recruits were trained using sticks and were only given a gun when they crossed 
into Rhodesia to fight (1995). On the issue of indiscipline, Mazarire (2011) is of the view that 
indeed there was gross indiscipline amongst the ZANLA guerrillas. He states that by 1978, acts 
of indiscipline among ZANLA guerrillas were on an increase as they engaged in brutal beatings 
and killing of masses that were accused of being witches and wizards, as well as raping women 
and girls at the same time.  
ZIPRA also did not want ZANLA guerrillas to encroach into their operational zones. ZIPRA 
combatants believed that whilst they were busy fighting the RSFs, ZANLA guerrillas were 
busy forcing people to cook for them and violently uprooting ZAPU structures in Mashonaland 
(Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). However, the fact that political tribalism had promoted 
narrow ethnic, regional and personal interests did not mean that people were unsupportive of 
the efforts of uniting beyond ethnic solidarities. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the 
notion of the nation and the main goals of the struggle were lost due to ethnic tensions and 
rivalries. The main goals of the struggle were never in doubt (Msindo, 2012).  
Though the overall agenda of the liberation struggle was never compromised, the nationalist 
movement continued to fragment along ethnic lines and the following discussion will focus 
briefly on the second ZAPU split and its implications on ethnic reconfigurations. It is difficult 
to imagine how such antagonistic forces could be expected to work together in peace building 
processes like DDR programs, which at times meant competition for few positions and 
resources. It can be argued that politicians took advantage of some issues that helped to 
distinguish the Shona from the Ndebele like different ancestry, language and a few other minor 
cultural aspects to mobilise along ethnic and regional lines and to entrench hardline positions. 
Instead of emphasizing on a multiplicity of common practices between the Shona and Ndebele 
to foster unity and a common vision for nation and peace building, they deliberately picked on 




combatants saw themselves as very different people who could not compromise, unite, share, 
and work together, but should compete and fight to subdue each other. 
3.5.3 The Second ZAPU Split 
The nitty-gritties on the causes of the split are not very relevant to this study save to say that 
there was a power struggle between J.Z.Moyo and James Chikerema for the control of ZAPU 
in exile and the allegations centred on preferential treatment of the Ndebele by J.Z.Moyo and 
strategic blunders by Chikerema on the military side (Dabengwa, 1995:29). What became more 
glaring were ethnic reconfigurations during and in the aftermath of the split. As indicated 
earlier, ZAPU had remained with a sizeable number of Shona politicians at its apex. 
Allegations of tribal factions resurfaced in ZAPU in 1967 between the Ndebele and Shona 
elements (Msindo, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The allegations were that Shona members 
had formed ‘Chaminuka ZAPU’ whilst the Ndebele members had formed what they termed 
‘Mzilikazi ZAPU’ and these factions were pulling in different directions and threatening the 
life of the party (Msindo, 2012).  
Unlike the 1963 split where the factor of political tribalism was silent though present, the 
second ZAPU split witnessed loud and open tribal sentiments. The leader of ZAPU in exile, 
Chikerema complained that military recruitment was in favour of predominately Ndebele areas, 
but that accusation did not go down well with the triumvirate of J. Z, Moyo, Edward Ndlovu 
and George Silundika who seemed to be representing the Ndebele voice within ZAPU. They 
accused Chikerema and George Nyandoro of trying to usurp power within ZAPU and that they 
were also working with other Shona elements outside ZAPU (Sithole, 1999; Msindo, 2012). 
Precisely, Chikerema was accused of attempting to set up a structure of his own ethnic (Shona) 




During the power struggle over the control of ZAPU, George Nyandoro was brazenly clear of 
his political tribalism when he declared that: 
I am finding it necessary to organise on proper lines the complete military structure 
of ZAPU, which will henceforth come under my direct control and l will be 
appointing new Secretaries of new departments. All the senior officers will be of 
the Mashona tribes, that is to say Vazezuru, Vamanyika, Vakaranga people only. 
The ZAPU organisation has been completely riddled by traitors from Matabeleland 
since we are compelled to leave Zimbabwe as refugees, and no progress at all has 
been made on the liberation of Zimbabwe, so we must constantly remember that 
our duty is now to the Mashona…Amandebele…are still showing themselves to 
be our pure enemies. I am appointing myself as Commander-in-Chief of ZAPU 
Military Council and we will forthwith be known as ZMC, a driving movement of 
militancy to liberate Zimbabwe from the illegal Smith regime without the help of 
the Amandebele. (Msindo, 2012:205). 
Once news of the split reached ZANU, they were received with high enthusiasm and were used 
to further stoke the fires of division and hate between ZAPU and ZANU as well as between 
the largest ethnic groups that supported the two parties (Ndebele and Shona respectively). Its 
mouthpiece, the Zimbabwe News was used to publicise the disorder, blowing up the issue of 
tribalism to the level of inciting the Shona people in ZAPU to leave (Msindo, 2012). It was 
obvious that ZANU sympathies lay with Shona leaders within ZAPU. ZANU is also said to 
have been very pleased with the ZAPU split of 1971 because it helped more than the 1963 one 
to confine ZAPU to Matabeleland and to diminish its posture as a nationalist party (Interview 
with Gwakuba-Ndlovu, 2017). This happened because Chikerema and Nyandoro alongside 
other many Shona speaking supporters of ZAPU left the party and formed the Front for the 
Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). To this end, Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007) 
conclude that ethnic rivalries were an essential resource to the nationalist leaders in their battles 
for political power; hence they condemned them during the day and used them during the night. 
It is clear that politicians across the political divide took advantage of each and every political 
misfortune during the liberation struggle to entrench hardline positions which made prospects 




3.6 Ethnic-related Rivalries and Clashes between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA 
during the Liberation Struggle 
There were several attempts at forging unity between ZANU and ZAPU in order to mount a 
united political and military front against the settler regime and the RSFs. However, all the 
efforts came to naught mainly because political leaders were scheming against each other and 
positioning themselves to assume the leadership of the post-colonial state. Msindo (2012) 
observe that the unhealthy relationship between nationalism, regionalism and ethnicity spilled 
into post-colonial Zimbabwe and had negative effects on the DDR process and the entire peace 
process.  Between 1967 and 1979 there were four crucial political and military processes that 
were aimed at creating unity between ZANU and ZAPU on one hand and between ZANLA 
and ZIPRA on the other. On the military front, there was the Joint Military Command (JMC) 
of 1967 and ZIPA of 1975-76.  
Politically, the African National Congress (ANC) initiative of 1972 and the Patriotic Front (PF) 
of 1976 to 1979 were the major initiatives at unity. Basically, all of the four initiatives were 
driven by external parties to the Zimbabwean conflict especially the Front Line States (FLS) 
and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee (Sithole, 1999). These 
parties wanted to encourage the direct parties to the Zimbabwean conflict to unite so that they 
could prosecute the liberation struggle effectively. In this regard, they made unity the pre-
condition for the release of logistical support to the liberation parties. The FLS were also wary 
of the negative repercussions of a divided and mutually antagonistic nationalist movement to 
the peace building efforts in a post-colonial Zimbabwe (Bhebe, 1999). The discussions will 
centre on the ethnic relations within the military circles since the study is on the military and 




3.6.1 The Joint Military Command (JMC), 1967 
First and foremost, the JMC suffered a stillbirth because of jostling to control the military outfit. 
The JMC was the brainchild of the OAU Liberation Committee that pushed for joint military 
operations between ZAPU and ZANU combatants. Chimhanda (2003) observes that ZAPU 
and ZANU were pressured by parties who hoisted them to unite their military forces, but as 
individual parties, they neither had the will nor faith in the JMC. ZAPU attitude was the major 
stumbling block that rendered the JMC dysfunctional. According to Dabengwa (1995), ZAPU 
deliberately seconded very junior military officers to work with senior ZANU military cadres. 
That strategy was resisted by ZANU as it thought that ZAPU was not fully committed to the 
JMC. During this period, ZIPRA and ZANLA were not formally constituted hence the use of 
terms ZAPU military officers and ZANU military cadres. 
 By 1967 ZANU was still struggling to establish its feet on the ground in terms of recruiting 
military personnel hence Mazinyane underscores the fact that ZAPU felt that it was impossible 
for it ‘to carry ZANU on its shoulders’ (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). In fact, Dabengwa 
is clear that ZAPU was deliberately sabotaging the JMC and did not want it to see the light of 
the day as it thought that ZANU was a ‘rebel’ party that had to be forced to disband and re-join 
ZAPU (1995). It can be seen that suspicions, mistrusts and hostility bordering around ethnic 
politics and power struggles that generated the 1963 split and intensified thereafter were rife 
and militated against unification endeavours on the military side. 
Attempts to revive the JMC in 1972 also faltered. This time around, ZANU was the stumbling 
block. ZANU thought that it could not share its strategic advantages with ZAPU which had 
been crippled by the 1971 split (Sithole, 1999). By 1972 ZANU enjoyed massive recruitment 
of cadres and was beginning to clandestinely infiltrate them into Zimbabwe to wage guerrilla 




from the political turmoil that engulfed it in 1971. Chimhanda (2003) argues that the 1972 
initiative at the revival of the JMC was the brainchild of ZAPU that wanted to use the JMC to 
thwart Shamuyarira and Chikerema’s efforts of trying to hoodwink the OAU Liberation 
Committee into thinking that FROLIZI was the legitimate face of the liberation struggle.  
 A closer look at the factors that militated against efforts aimed at creating unity between ZAPU 
and ZANU reveals that the two parties remained rivals since the 1963 split and were not 
prepared to prop up each other during a period each one of them was experiencing crisis. 
Instead, each party capitalised on the weaknesses of the other by using ethnic differences to 
amplify hatred and suspicion. According to Chimhanda (2003), this strategy was mainly 
motivated by each party’s desire to constitute the first government in independent Zimbabwe. 
 One important development that went with the fragmentation of political units along ethnic 
lines was the division of the military along the same lines. Many Shona military cadres left 
ZAPU during its turbulent political period and joined ZANU that was on a political upsurge. 
Shona recruits in Zambia left en masse during the period of political upheavals within ZAPU 
and headed towards Mozambique where their ‘kith and kin’ were based, leaving an almost 
entirely Ndebele-speaking army in the hands of ZAPU (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). 
The division of the military along ethnic identities had far reaching negative effects on post-
liberation war DDR processes. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2009) view on these developments is that 
the liberation struggle was by and large fought by ‘tribalised’ armed men of ZIPRA and 
ZANLA. This was a recipe for disaster in DDR processes as these ‘tribalised’ armed men were 
joined together at APs and in the ZNA after independence under the tutelage of a ‘tribalised’ 





3.6.2 Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), 1975-76 
 The second attempt targeted at joint military training and operations between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA was through ZIPA. Like the JMC before it, ZIPA was the initiative of the FLS, the 
OAU Liberation Committee together with senior politicians from major liberation movements 
(ZAPU and ZANU). The initiative was aimed at rejuvenating active military engagement 
against the colonial system that had stagnated during the period of the détente that was pushing 
for negotiations at the expense of vigorous military action (Dabengwa, 1995; Sithole, 1999). 
ZIPA was initiated in November 1975 and became operational in January 1976.  
ZIPA consisted of eighteen military leaders, nine from each of the two parties to organise the 
training and spearhead the operations in Zimbabwe (Alexander et al, 2000). Immediately after 
its formation, ZIPA fell into serious challenges, both at the rear and in the front. In the rear 
where ZIPRA and ZANLA recruits were undergoing joint military trainings at Mgagao and 
Morogoro, fierce physical clashes erupted between the two groups. The actual causes of the 
fighting are not clear since each side accused the other for inciting the fighting. The ZIPRA 
version is that the fighting was orchestrated by the ZANLA recruits with the aid of the Chinese 
instructors (Interview with Jack Mpofu, one of the nine ZIPA commanders from the ZIPRA 
side, 2017). Mpofu explains that the fighting was actually sparked by trivial issues like who 
controlled keys to the dining hall; suspicions over food poisoning by those who held the keys 
to the dining hall among other issues. In actual fact, Mpofu claims that the Ndebele speaking 
people were resented in ZIPA. In all, about one hundred and fifty ZIPRA recruits were killed 
(Interview, 2017). 
The ZANLA version of the story contradicts that given by ZIPRA. John Netsiyawa who was 
one of the ZANLA recruits at Morogoro alleges that ZIPRA cadres who had received military 




February 2018). He says that about 450 fully-trained ZIPRA forces had joined Morogoro 
training camp from Mgagao camp. Since they were fully trained, they undertook light drills 
and also volunteered to cook for the new recruits who were doing heavier training. Netsiyawa 
alleges that ZIPRA forces laced the food with poison with the intention of wiping all the 
ZANLA recruits but ZANLA refused to eat as they told ZIPRA forces that they were guided 
by the spirits who helped them to dictate the intended harm (Daily News, February 2018). 
 That development heightened tensions and suspicions according to Netsiyawa (Daily News, 
February 2018). What actually sparked the fighting according to Netsiyawa was one ZIPRA 
cadre called Sam who commanded his forces to advance and kill ZANLA recruits. Before that, 
ZIPRA forces are said to have taunted ZANLA saying that they would allow them to fight the 
Rhodesians and then come in to take the country from ZANLA through the gun. ZANLA 
recruits had access to the engineering armoury where they grabbed grenades and killed about 
one hundred and fifty-six ZIPRA cadres (Daily News, February 2018). What is questionable 
though is how a trained military force could provoke fighting without being armed as the 
ZIPRA forces did on the said fateful day. Ethnic rivalry and hatred could not be ruled out in 
these clashes over food sharing, allegations of food poisoning and provocation of ZANLA by 
ZIPRA forces.  
 Both versions of the story by Jack Mpofu and John Netsiyawa could have some biases but 
what is true is that fighting took place between ZIPRA and ZANLA, and more than one 
hundred ZIPRA cadres were killed (Nkomo, 1984; Alexander et al, 2000; Chung, 2006). 
Testimonies to this are ZIPRA graves at Morogoro. Besides the challenges faced in the rear, 
Sibanda (2005) notes that when ZIPRA combatants reached the ZANLA military camps in 
Mozambique from where the joint operations were supposed to be launched, they were 
dumbfounded because they were taken as if the purpose of travelling to Mozambique was to 




to denounce ZAPU, its President Joshua Nkomo as well as the entire leadership of ZAPU. 
According to Jack Mpofu, ZIPRA combatants were forced to chant slogans like ‘Pasi 
naDumbuguru’ which meant down with Nkomo (Interview, 2017). Some Shona referred 
derogatorily to Nkomo as Dumbuguru because of his big stomach. ZIPRA cadres resisted to 
be made subservient to ZANLA. Their refusal contributed to clashes again where some of them 
were killed given the numerical superiority of ZANLA against ZIPRA in Mozambique 
(Sibanda, 2005). 
ZIPRA combatants who survived in both Tanzania and Mozambique and managed to get into 
the front with ZANLA guerrillas under the banner of ZIPA faced another dangerous challenge. 
They could be shot by the numerically superior ZANLA in the front whilst executing joint 
operations. Jack Mpofu claims that one of the ZIPRA cadres by the name Tommy Sithole was 
gunned down by ZANLA in one of the ZIPA military campaigns in north-east Zimbabwe 
(Interview, 2017). Mazinyane points out that most of the ZIPRA cadres that were seconded to 
ZIPA by ZAPU ‘disappeared’ for ever and never came back and the reasons were not that they 
became causalities in contacts with the RSFs but were victims of ethnically-oriented fights with 
ZANLA combatants in ZIPA military outfit (Interview, 2017). As noted by Kriger (2003), it is 
true that liberation war guerrillas were complicit in inter-party feuding. 
ZIPRA combatants who managed to flee back to Zambia through Botswana spread the news 
of their horrible experiences in Tanzania, Mozambique and in the front, and that; according to 
Alexander et al (2000:180), ‘powerfully hardened the existing antagonism between ZANLA 
and ZIPRA.’ The ZIPRA-ZANLA antagonisms were transferred from the rear bases to the 
battlefields at the front. As a result, wherever the two armies met within Zimbabwe, their 
interactions were not all that cordial. Although Moore (1995) and Sadomba (2011) view ZIPA 
as an independent and effective fighting force which developed its own strategies, Nkomo 




calculated strategy by ZANU and Nyerere of Tanzania to subordinate ZIPRA to ZANLA and 
ZANU and then collapse ZAPU.  
The two military outfits of JMC and ZIPA indicate that rivalries for power, influence and 
legitimacy had also percolated ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants. That was made possible 
because the two armies were not just simple armies but were liberation forces that were fighting 
to achieve certain political ideologies. ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants were therefore used as 
instruments of propagating those ideologies to the masses by their parties. ZANLA and ZIPRA 
combatants were both a military and political force.  Further to this, they were also ethnic 
instruments as their parent political parties were ethnicised by political elites vying for political 
office. With hindsight, it can be concluded that a government that evolved from any one of the 
two parties (ZANU and ZAPU) was likely to be intolerant and vindictive against the other party 
and to abuse the DDR process to settle old political scores. It was also not likely that the party 
in government would embrace inclusive and collaborative problem-solving strategies given the 
exclusive strategies and slogans around which ZAPU and ZANU built their parties and military 
wings. It is possible that a third party could help to bridge the wide chasm between political 
parties and their military wings. 
3.7 Conclusion 
All peace building processes and activities require collaborative efforts among all parties and 
stakeholders for them to succeed. Parties and stakeholders that work at cross purposes stifle 
the success of peace building processes. Discussions in this chapter indicate that conflictual 
and competitive developments between political and military formations during the liberation 
struggle laid a firm foundation for the birth of a fractured nation that was unable to come to 
terms with it self in building a united and peaceful state. Long term divisions between 




With such entrenched divisions, robust interventions meant to cultivate mutual respect, co-
operation, tolerance, and bridge polarisations at the political level could be a crucial 
prerequisite to encourage hitherto antagonistic parties to work together.  In a polarised 
environment like the one that prevailed in Zimbabwe during the liberation struggle, behavioural 
and attitudinal changes could be critical to enable antagonistic parties to embrace and trust each 
other and work for the nation rather than for narrow and partisan interests. Effective DDR 
processes that are a foundation to sustainable peace building are predicated on inclusive 
political and military factions that are reconciled to each other and have one vision for the 
country. Divisions in the political and military front that developed over a long time needed 
concerted efforts to bridge for DDR processes to succeed.  
Valters (2015:10) concludes that relationships can be changed from ‘adversarial ones to 
partners in problem-solving, from different ethnicities to a common nationality, behaviour can 
be changed from hostile to a peaceful one, and disruptive behaviour can be transformed into 
co-operative one whilst intolerant attitudes can be transformed into greater tolerance of 
different perspectives and from fear of others to trust in others.’ The polarised and antagonistic 
environment which characterised the relationship between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA 
had a long background. Even though ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas had imagined independent 
Zimbabwe through Ndebele and Shona terms respectively, inclusive and transformative 
programs targeted at nation building and reconciliation like reconciliation workshops, it is 
envisaged, could change their behaviour and attitudes and develop a national outlook that could 
promote effective DDR. However, intervention activities can be implemented successfully if 
there is a clear understanding of the contextual background of the previous relationships, 
feelings, and perceptions between political and military formations, and this chapter has done 




 As would be shown later, it was unfortunate that the post-independence government in 
Zimbabwe decided to promote reconciliation between Blacks and Whites and left inter-Black 
(between ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA) grudges and hostilities unresolved. The reason 
could be that the governing party itself was a by-product of ethnic-related antagonisms and 






CHAPTER 4: THE DDR PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE 
4.1 Introduction 
Zimbabwe rolled out two DDR processes within a period of eighteen years. The first DDR 
process was implemented between 1980 and 1984 after the achievement of independence. It 
ran alongside other peace building elements like the national election, the GNU, a national 
policy of reconciliation and the rehabilitation and restructuring of fundamental social services 
that were meant to reflect the will and character of a government of the black majority. The 
DDR process was preceded by an internationally brokered peace agreement that ended the 
conflict and brought together the major warring parties to the negotiating table as well as 
providing a general framework for the DDR process. The context under which the first DDR 
process was implemented was characterised by ethnic motivated rivalries, suspicions, mistrusts 
and hostilities between the two major former liberation forces that were inherited from the 
liberation struggle. 
The second process took place in 1997 after about thirteen years after the end of the first one 
and only covered the process of reintegration since disarmament and demobilisation had been 
accomplished during the first phase of the process though with some challenges. The 1997 
reintegration process was preceded by countrywide demonstrations by restless ex-combatants 
who were clamouring for an improvement in their welfare. In both phases, the processes were 
spearheaded and led by ZANU-PF which was now the legitimate governing party.  This chapter 
focuses on policy and institutional issues that guided the DDR process. It starts by interrogating 
the peace agreement that preceded the DDR process and moves on to discuss the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration processes under specific contextual backgrounds. The chapter 




4.2 The Peace Agreement and DDR 
The liberation struggle in Zimbabwe ended through the signing of a peace agreement; the 
Lancaster House Agreement on 21 December 1979. No single party could claim outright 
military victory in the battlefield. As such, the peace agreement was a by-product of protracted 
negotiations and many compromises by the different parties involved (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 
2005; Sithole, 1999). Without the involvement of another or other external parties to supervise 
and underwrite the DDR process, the government was in a difficult position to carryout DDR 
on its own. The parties to the negotiations were the Patriotic Front that represented both ZANU 
and ZAPU, the Muzorewa delegation that represented the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government 
that was a result of the internal settlement of 1978, and the Rhodesian delegation of the settler 
regime (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). 
 The negotiations were chaired by Lord Carrington who represented the British government. 
All these parties were guided by specific interests. As for the Patriotic Front, a democratic 
election and black majority rule was top in their agenda whilst the settler regime wanted to 
protect its economic interests in the new post-colonial political dispensation (Kriger, 2003). 
Whilst the Patriotic Front was agreed that there should be majority rule as well as increased 
economic participation by the black majority, the vexing question remained as which political 
party should assume the reins of power. Herein lay a critical challenge that haunted the peace 
process, including DDR, that is, the continued divisions between ZAPU/ZIPRA and 
ZANU/ZANLA. 
 Agreements were reached on three fundamental issues that were on top of the agenda. These 
were the constitutional issues, an interim administration and a ceasefire (Nzombe, 1989:187; 
Kriger, 2003). One notable issue about the Lancaster House talks is that there was no 




colonial government that was to be decided through the ballot box (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 
2005:336). The ceasefire agreement provided for the cantonment of the guerrilla forces into 
designated APs, a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) to monitor breaches to the 
ceasefire agreement, keep in contact with senior commanders of ZIPRA, ZANLA and the RSFs 
so as to allow for the conduct of credible elections. However, there were no means to avoid 
breaches to the peace agreement as well as the general DDR process as the CMF was 
numerically weak. This was a major loophole that militated against effective DDR given that 
the process took place within a context that was conflictual and characterised by competition 
and hostility and breaches were bound to occur. 
Whilst the guerrilla forces were cantoned in APs, the RSFs were free to move around and to 
also monitor the guerrillas wherever they were assembled. The agreement was that the RSFs 
could no longer attack guerrilla camps in neighbouring countries and guerrillas in these 
countries could not enter the country during the transition period (Kriger, 2003). The country 
transitional authority was in the hands of Lord Soames who assumed the governorship roles in 
December 1979 pending the elections. Although the PF raised the issue of military integration 
at Lancaster, it was rebuffed by the Rhodesian delegation that did not want their military 
structures tampered with before the elections (Kriger, 2003).  
Specifics on the military front were that there would be merging of unspecified numbers of the 
RSFs, ZIPRA and ZANLA forces into a single national army; that guerrilla forces would keep 
their personal weapons and would also be left subject to their command structures but 
responsible to the British governor whilst at APs and that the government of the day would 
assume overole control of all the key security sectors (police, army, intelligence, airforce and 
judiciary) (Chung, 2006). Muzorewa’s auxiliaries and the Selous Scouts that were formed 
specifically to fight the PF were to be disbanded (Dzinesa, 2005). Besides that, there was 




volunteered to provide future training of the envisaged national army and to provide 
demobilisation assistance should the new government request (Kriger, 2003). Besides the fact 
that the peace agreement remained loose on some fundamental details pertaining to the DDR 
process, the restricted mandate of the CMF did not make things any better. The CMF was to 
monitor breaches to the ceasefire and nothing more whilst British support was voluntary. That 
was not the best approach towards DDR issues, especially in an environment that was highly 
polarised and conflictual. 
There are two critical issues to note with regards to the peace agreement in relation to DDR 
processes. First, the three armies to be integrated were mutually antagonistic. They emerged 
from the war intact and undefeated and under different command structures which they strictly 
adhered to even after the war. Secondly, the agreement was not explicit on what the ex-
combatants were supposed to receive as demobilisation and reinsertion assistance, pensions 
and reintegration support in general. Some analysts have concluded that it could have been part 
of the deliberate strategy by the British to ignore crucial DDR issues so that former guerrillas 
continue fighting each other in the post-colonial state whilst they entrenched their economic 
interests (Sadomba, 2011). How antagonistic forces could be expected, without the 
involvement of a neutral third party to integrate themselves into a single national army without 
some challenges is the major question that one should ask. 
 With hindsight, the skirting of fundamental issues that would directly affect the welfare of the 
ex-combatants after the war was likely to have negative results on the integration of the armies, 
reintegration and the general peace process. If the key elements of a DDR process are not 
specified in the peace agreement in an environment where the parties to the process are 
competing and fighting, the result can be disastrous. The UNDPKO (1999) advises that clear 
DDR specifications are very crucial in the context of antagonistic former warring parties like 




detriment of another or other parties. In the light of previous protracted divisions, competition 
and conflict between ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA, one would suggest that a lot could 
have been done during the Lancaster peace agreement to lay a solid foundation for 
collaborative processes and activities that would promote rather than undermine peace 
building. By and large, the Lancaster peace agreement was not DDR-specific. 
4.3 Disarmament 
The disarmament exercise was done at the sixteen APs dotted right across the country (Sibanda, 
2005). However, it only applied to the guerrilla forces and not to the RSFs as all of the RSFs 
were allowed to join the security establishments on a voluntary basis. Many of the RSFs joined 
or rather chose to remain in the army, air force, police and intelligence services (Rupiya and 
Chitiyo, 2005). They also voluntarily left in large numbers between 1980 and 1982 when the 
command of the security sectors was gradually brought into the hands of the Africans and when 
they witnessed the politicisation of these institutions (Kriger, 2003; Sadomba, 2011). As will 
be explained later, not all ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants got into APs.  
 Due to the fact that the war of independence ended without outright military victory by any of 
the parties, coupled with that there was no UN or any other body to implement disarmament 
coercively, the process became voluntary (http://www.un.org). However, according to 
UNOSAA (2005), the majority of the forces complied with the ceasefire stipulations and also 
voluntarily participated in the disarmament process. The reason was that they did not want to 
be seen to be contradicting the commands of their political and military superiors whom they 
respected and had confidence in. The disarmament process was in the hands of a Joint 
Operations Command (JOC). The JOC was made up of representatives from the three parties 
to the DDR process. On the other hand, military integration was supervised by a Joint High 




the ZNA. However, a lot of weapons were not collected. UNOSAA (2005) indicates that the 
disarmament process stretched as long as the ex-guerrillas remained at APs. As a result, and as 
guerrillas moved in and out of the APs, they took with them some weapons which were in most 
cases unaccounted for. Undoubtedly, some of the weapons were hidden in the process 
(Interview with Gatsheni, 2017). The voluntary nature of the disarmament process undertaken 
within a context of suspicion, rivalry and hostility between military factions proved to be 
problematic. Omach’s (2013) observation is that voluntary disarmament’s success depends on 
the goodwill of the stakeholders to the DDR process and their general commitment to the larger 
peace process.  
As already indicated, parties to the DDR process in Zimbabwe lacked mutual trust and 
confidence. Furthermore, there were no efforts by the government to develop mutual trust and 
confidence in them after independence. What the government did was to put rival and 
antagonistic military factions together and just expect things to be normal. They (guerrillas) 
could not be expected to smoothly execute total disarmament on a voluntary basis except with 
the assistance of implementing partners who could act as impartial referees. The same was true 
of the MPLA and UNITA of Angola. Due to mistrust, UNITA surrendered only obsolete 
weapons (Omach, 2013). However, disarmament and demobilisation of various military forces 
was successful in Namibia because the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) was able to carryout measures where they exerted pressure on ex-combatants and 
escorted them to APs to facilitate swift and efficient weapons surrender (Dzinesa, 2013:279). 
 One has to hasten to mention that the disarmament process was undertaken in the context of 
political competition that was induced by campaigning for the 1980 general election (Kriger, 
2003). The other issue to note is that thousands of ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas and their 
weapons were still in Zambia and Mozambique respectively during the transition period. The 




and fears as ZANU-PF believed that PF-ZAPU wanted to use the weapons to sabotage the new 
government. Dabengwa indicate that ZIPRA told ZANU-PF that the heavy weapons supplied 
by the Soviet Union after the war would be passed on to the new Zimbabwe army. Although 
ZANU-PF suspected that the weapons would be used against it, Dabengwa points out that the 
issue was handled transparently where Russian officials were also present when they were 
transferred to the government (Interview with Dabengwa, 2017). 
 Contrary to what Dabengwa said about the handover of arms to the government, Doran (2017) 
indicates that both ZIPRA and ZANLA were stockpiling weapons. He noted that quite a huge 
consignment of armaments from Zambia was not handed over to the government but hidden 
by ZIPRA (https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/. Pertaining to the arms from Russia, 
Dabengwa later testified that they could not actually hand over all of them to the government 
and remain empty-handed. In case of any fighting, they needed something to defend themselves 
with (https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/). ZIPRA was not an innocent victim of 
ZANLA machinations. They were also preparing for any eventuality. Given the levels of 
mistrust between the former liberation movements, Dabengwa’s information that all arms from 
Russia were handed over to the government cannot be wholly trusted.  
Doran does not doubt that both ZIPRA and ZANLA stockpiled weapons. He also concludes 
that Joshua Nkomo once weighed options of physically fighting against ZANU-PF on several 
occasions (2017). Nkomo is said to have clandestinely met the South Africans in June 1980 so 
as to have assurances on their neutrality in case of physical fighting that pitted ZANLA against 
ZIPRA. He found out that his idea could not succeed and stopped it. In all this, Doran believes 
that ZANU-PF bore primary responsibility for the ‘Security Dilemma’ that ensued and 
indicates that much of what PF-ZAPU did, which made ZANU-PF insecure, was a direct 
response to ZANU-PF’s actions (2017). In the midst of this entire imbroglio, effective 




Without any prescribed framework for disarmament, the process was undertaken by the GNU 
that was formed after the elections. Before that, any guerrillas who wanted to surrender their 
weapons and go into civilian life were allowed to do so during the assembly phase although 
they were later called back to various designated places so that they could provide the 
Demobilisation Directorate personnel with their personal details to facilitate registration so that 
they could be eligible to receive demobilisation assistance (Interview with I.G, one of the 
ZIPRA ex-combatants, 2017). Mashike (2000) notes that the assembly phase is crucial in any 
disarmament process because it helps authorities to account for all soldiers and their weapons 
and in a conflict where there is no outright winner, to build confidence in the warring parties 
so that each party remains committed to the peace agreement. Since the assembly phase was 
chaotic in Zimbabwe, so too was the disarmament process. 
 The head of government, who was then Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Robert Mugabe, 
stipulated that Zimbabwe’s national army would be made up of about 35 000  men and women 
out of a total estimated 80 000-100 000 guerrilla forces plus the RSFs who were automatically 
assured of positions in the security sectors of the country (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The 
surplus guerrillas were disarmed and let into civilian life.  Peter Walls headed the army and 
was deputised by three commanders of ZIPRA, RSFs and ZANLA. 
Although Sadomba (2011) asserts that the disarmament of liberation forces was quick and 
effective, it is crucial to note that it was not without its challenges. First, it is usually difficult 
in general to ascertain the exact number of guerrillas and their weapons as they at times conceal 
or exaggerate their numbers for political and strategic reasons (Mashike, 2000). Secondly, there 
were a number of security concerns by ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants during the transition 
period which motivated them to hold back some of their weapons and personnel. All this made 
effective disarmament problematic. Furthermore, there were no processes aimed at dissipating 




Some guerrilla forces believed that the nationalist leaders sold out at Lancaster and they felt 
not bound by the ceasefire regulations (Alexander et al, 2000). Guerrillas with that mentality 
did not surrender themselves to the APs and it was difficult or impossible to disarm such 
elements (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). Guerrillas that refused to get into APs remained 
in the countryside, committed ceasefire violations, also engaged in criminal activities against 
civilians and forced civilians to vote for their respective parties during the 1980 elections. In 
the process of doing that, they cached some of their weapons (Nkomo, 1984; Todd, 2007). 
Another issue which made disarmament difficult was that there were no physical security 
guarantees for guerrilla forces that congregated at various APs. Many guerrillas thought that 
they were now easy targets for the RSFs who were allowed to move around with their weapons. 
As a result, guerrillas had the tendency of moving in and out of APs doing reconnaissance work 
willy-nilly (Alexander et al, 2000). It is possible that some of the weapons could have been 
cached during this period. In fact, the fears of the guerrillas were not misplaced.  Nyathi and 
Hoffman (1990) cited in Mashike (2000) articulate that one of the ZIPRA units was surrounded 
by the RSFs and seven of them were shot dead on 29 December 1979. It is in this context that 
both ZIPRA and ZANLA military commanders instructed their cadres to cache weapons 
(Nyathi and Hoffman (1990) cited in Mashike (2000)). According to Kriger (2003), both 
ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres hid arms as an insurance measure not only in case of the collapse 
of the ceasefire but also to be ready for whatever new political dispensation emerged from the 
election. 
In actual fact, some ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres resisted demobilisation as they did not accept 
the authority of the Demobilisation Directorate officials from the opposing army (Kriger, 
2003). For example, in March 1981, three ZNA soldiers trying to enforce disarmament were 
killed by two ZIPRA members at Mashumbi Pools AP (Kriger, 2003:95). Due to lack of 




changes, they contined to perceive and treat each other as enemies rather than partners in the 
peace building endeavour. 
 Nkomo (1984) points out that thousands of seasoned ZANLA guerrillas did not get into APs 
but instead, were hidden in villages amongst the civilians. The majority of the people who were 
sent into APs by ZANLA were war collaborators (Mjibhas) who were unarmed. The duty of 
the veteran ZANLA guerrillas who remained in the villages was to campaign for ZANU-PF 
and possibly resume the war if it lost the elections (Nkomo, 1984). In the same vein, several 
ZIPRA combatants remained with their weapons up to the election time because they did not 
trust ZANU-PF and ZANLA (Alexander et al, 2000). The security concerns that militated 
against successful disarmament were compounded by the fact that the PF decided to contest 
the elections separately hence political rivalry for political leadership intensified and the 
liberation forces were not left out as they played pivotal roles in political feuding between their 
political parties. The issue of mutual mistrust stemming partly from ethnic rivalries between 
ZIPRA and ZANLA was to some extent a stumbling block in the disarmament program. 
 Kriger (2003) notes that the Soviet Union escalated its provision of arms to ZIPRA during the 
transition period and continued to do so even after the election and these arms remained in 
Zambia right up to the mid-1980s, whilst part of them were transported into the country and as 
noted earlier, partly contributed in heightening security concerns and suspicions within the 
government which believed that PF-ZAPU was bent on sabotaging it. Kriger (2003) reported 
that weapons worth US$ 60 million were actually handed over by the Soviet government to 
ZIPRA during the ceasefire period. However, nearly 400 disobedient ZIPRA guerrillas were 
rounded up between May and June 1980 and taken to Khami Maximum Prison near Bulawayo 
where they were disarmed and detained (Alexander et al 2000; Alexander, 2008).  Kriger 
(2003) notes that ZANLA clandestinely infiltrated about two thirds of their approximately 30 




retained their weapons unlawfully. The disarmament process was therefore not quick and 
effective and could have contributed to the hiding of weapons. 
Disarmament was chaotic because both ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres kept their weapons 
throughout the period they were at APs. The government was unable to regulate and collect all 
the weapons, a situation that could have been averted only if there was a strong organisation 
with enforcement powers like the United Nations to forcibly collect weapons. Due to the 
protracted period spent by ex-guerrilla fighters at APs coupled with security concerns held by 
both former liberation armies, first against the RSFs, and secondly, against each other, the exact 
number of weapons collected in Zimbabwe through the disarmament process remains a matter 
of speculation. It also became difficult to ascertain the actual number of ex-guerrillas who were 
disarmed. A lot of weapons were cached. The disarmament challenge was also compounded 
by the bizzare arrangement that APs be guarded by the RSFs. Ex-guerrilla armies could not be 
at ease seeing their former adversaries in the liberation struggle assuming the role of monitoring 
them and exercising a superior position over them (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). It was 
natural that they would be tempted to hide some of their weapons for security reasons. 
The Zimbabwean case indicates the perils in a disarmament process that is implemented by the 
government in the face of divisions and mistrust between parties to the DDR process. 
Notwithstanding the fact that allowing ex-combatants to keep their personal weapons over a 
protracted period was dictated by security concerns, delays in disarming ex-combatants proved 
catastrophic. Tensions fuelled by both political and ethnic factors exploded into physical 
clashes at APs between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-guerrillas thereby undermining the whole DDR 
process. There was lack of transparency, accountability, and commitment in the disarmament 
program in Zimbabwe. The reasons were that the ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants were 




disarm. The Lancaster House peace agreement did not help the situation because it did not 
emphatically deal with DDR issues. 
4.4 The Military Integration Exercise 
The merging of ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSFs elements into the ZNA was a sensitive and delicate 
exercise. The integration process coincided with the campaign period for the February and 
August 1980 general and local government elections respectively. The election periods were 
characterised by campaigning along political party lines with heightened inflammatory 
speeches which agitated the military. As already seen, the military was in various stages of the 
election period part of the campaign teams for their respective political parties. The other issue 
to note is that the elections were held whilst quite a lot of ex-combatants were at APs awaiting 
either demobilisation or integration into the army. What made the whole exercise dangerous 
was that the ex-combatants were armed whilst at APs. There third issue that made the 
integration exercise delicate and dangerous was that the armies that had fought and competed 
against each other for a long time had now to come closer to each other and work together 
under a single command structure. 
Not only was the environment characterised by hostility but there was also a general mood of 
high expectations from ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. The two former liberation forces 
expected privileges for their roles in liberating Zimbabwe. Their expectations were likely to 
generate further competition for positions within the new army. Due to the fact that they were 
fighting for the emancipation of their motherland, they also expected to form the core of the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) while hoping that their erstwhile enemies (RSFs) would be 
disbanded altogether (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006).  
 On the opposite side, the RSFs viewed ZANLA and ZIPRA as ill-trained and unprofessional 




forces were agitated that their party had lost elections whilst ZANLA were very happy that 
theirs had won the elections in 1980 and expected more privileges than ZIPRA (Mazarire and 
Rupiya, 2000). Basically, these were the conditions under which the integration of the military 
unfolded. 
According to Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005), the integration of ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RSFs was 
undertaken by both foreigners and locals, that is, by the British Military Advisory and Training 
Team (BMATT) and the JHC respectively. Very senior military leaders from all the three 
military units made up the JHC. Evans (2011) views BMATT as an ‘impartial broker’ between 
three military forces whose relations were characterised by intense feelings of animosity, 
distrust and hostility for a period of fifteen years of civil war. According to Lamb (2013), the 
duty of BMATT was to make sure that issues of transparency, integrity, fairness, inclusivity 
and professionalism were not compromised in setting up the new defence forces of the country. 
BMATT also provided the needed technical assistance in building up a professional national 
army. The creation of the ZNA was to be guided by the spirit of national reconciliation hence 
the Mugabe administration made a number of concessions to its former ‘enemies’ (the RSFs) 
and its former ‘rivals’ (ZIPRA) (Alao, 2012:38). Peter Walls’ position in the army confirmed 
earlier attempts to cultivate a spirit of forgiveness in the military.  The World Bank (1993) cited 
in Lamb (2013:15) underlines the centrality of working with a neutral and strong party during 
the implementation stages of DDR programs by stating that: 
In politically tense situations, a neutral monitor has been instrumental in verifying 
the numbers of combatants demobilised from each force (often a subject of 
contention by each side), in enforcing disarmament in camps, and in assuring the 
equitable distribution of benefits. Without a neutral party, the demobilisation and 
reintegration programme can succumb to factional disputes on these issues. 
A neutral party was more needed in Zimbabwe given the context of factional hostility that has 
been outlined. After surrendering their weapons, eligible and willing cadres at APs were called 




the three armies that participated in integration although ZIPRA had few combatants during 
the war when compared to ZANLA. The formula of balancing numbers was used to ensure 
ethnic representation and parity and avoid complaints of favouritism from any of the three 
armies. In order to actualise the issue of parity, both former commanders of ZANLA and 
ZIPRA that is Solomon Mujuru and Lookout Masuku respectively were promoted to the ranks 
of lieutenant generals whilst their deputies were promoted to major generals (Alao, 2012). The 
idea of demonstrating unity at the top echelons of the military hierarchy was to facilitate 
balance and inclusivity at all levels of the army (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005).  
The new army was divided into Commissioned Officers (COs), Non-Commissioned Officers 
(NCOs) and the general soldiers or Privates (Alao, 2012). Aptitude tests were written to select 
the command element of the various military units. Due to the high levels of military training 
by ZIPRA cadres plus the numerous professional courses they did during the liberation 
struggle, most of them excelled in the selection tests (Interview with retired Lieutenant Colonel 
Dube, ex-ZIPRA cadre and Chairperson of the ZIPRA Veterans Trust, 2017). If aptitude tests 
were allowed to be the only criterion to select commanders of different units, ZIPRA ex-
combatants could have dominated the command element (Alao, 2012). It was then decided to 
balance the command element between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. If the commander 
in one unit was a ZIPRA ex-combatant, his deputy would come from ZANLA and vice versa. 
However, the integration exercise did not go smoothly as envisaged. As it was carried out 
during the period of elections, there were inflammatory speeches by politicians which sparked 
factional fighting at APs and within some already integrated units thereby adversely impacting 
the DDR and peace building processes. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) points out that during the 
initial stages of military integration, ZANLA and ZIPRA forces co-existed.  However, the 
peaceful co-existence was short-lived as ZANLA started to behave as if they were superior to 




since ZANU-PF was the party in power. The DDR process in Zimbabwe should be analysed 
together with what was taking place in the ZNA because of its direct and indirect linkages. 
Due to the tense and polarised political atmosphere, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants 
clashed in different APs. Fierce fighting broke out in APs of Entumbane, Chitungwiza, 
Connemara, Glenville and Ntabazinduna (Stiff, 2000). Fighting also broke out between ZIPRA 
and ZANLA within the already integrated units. As integration was taking place, politicians 
across the political divide were busy trying to outdo each other and, in the process, ZANU-PF 
in particular was involved in disparaging ZIPRA through its slogans and speeches. ZANU-PF 
was on an overdrive in their strategy to undermine PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA. Slogans like ‘Pasi 
ne Machuwachuwa’ (Down with ZIPRA) and inflammatory speeches like those uttered by 
Enos Nkala, one of the high ranking ZANU-PF politicians at a White City rally in Bulawayo 
helped to intensify ethnic rivalry because, among other things, he underplayed the roles of PF-
ZAPU and ZIPRA cadres in the war of liberation and directly incited ZANLA cadres and 
ZANU-PF supporters in general to mete out violence against ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU (Todd, 
2007). These developments demonstrate the flaws in a government implemented DDR process 
if that government supports one of the military factions against another and if there are no 
regulatory mechanisms from external implementing partners to ensure fairness. 
The net effect of all this was the desertion of some of the ZIPRA cadres from both APs and the 
ZNA and the caching of weapons. Although the issue of ZIPRA desertions from the ZNA 
would be fully covered in the following chapter, at this juncture, one should just point out that 
continued rivalry and hostility between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces undermined the integration 
process. Problematic integration impacted negatively on disarmament and demobilisation as 
the next chapter will show. The other issue worth mentioning is that there seemed to be no will 





The other security sectors did not experience noticeable challenges like those in the ZNA even 
though the Air Force of Zimbabwe was built on the foundation of the Rhodesian air force. The 
same applied to the Central Intelligence Organisation that was built on the foundation of the 
Rhodesian Special Branch of the settler regime (Alao, 2012). During the early days, ZANU-
PF relied on intelligence reports from the Special Branch (Alexander et al, 2000; Alao, 2012). 
This was in spite of the fact that ZIPRA had a developed intelligence unit and a functioning air 
force by the end of the liberation struggle (Nkomo, 1984). 
4.5 Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Like disarmament, the two processes were carried out alongside other peace building processes 
and reintegration was done twice. The demobilisation process was undertaken as from 5 
October 1981 and officially ended with the dissolution of the Demobilisation Directorate in 
1983, although some of the programs proceeded until 1984 (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). The 
second reintegration process started in 1997 and progressed into the early 2000s (Mazarire and 
Rupiya, 2000). In both periods, the processes did not succeed as the country remained marred 
by political, economic and military challenges that did not reinforce other peace building 
processes, but instead, undermined them. First, demobilisation was on a voluntary basis 
whereby combatants were asked to choose to demobilise and join civilian life or to remain 
under the military (Alao, 2012). Many combatants opted to remain in the military and the 
number surpassed the target figure of the envisaged army hence demobilisation ceased to be 
voluntary. 
 There were four categories of combatants who were asked to demobilise. There were some 
people who were below eighteen years in 1980. These were too young to be part of the national 
army. Others were in their thirties and forties in 1980 and were deemed too old to carry on with 




incapacitated during the war. The last group included those who wanted to explore 
opportunities outside the military structures. The last category decided to demobilise on its own 
(Dzinesa, 2005:85). The size of the army still remained too high. The authorities decided to use 
academic qualifications as a criterion to screen people who would remain in the army. The 
academic qualifications required for someone to join the ZNA were not very high as those with 
Grade Seven and lower Secondary school qualifications were eligible (Alao, 2012). 
Since demobilisation and reintegration exercises were taking place in the context of competing 
interests of the former guerrilla armies of ZIPRA and ZANLA, there were bound to be 
accusations of partiality in the handling of sensitive issues like the numbers that qualified for 
integration from each former guerrilla army. From the onset there were accussations that more 
ZIPRA cadres than ZANLA were coerced to demobilise (Nkomo, 1984; Alao, 2012). One thing 
for sure is that guerrilla armies have a tendency of concealing or exaggerating their numbers 
and as a result, it usually becomes difficult to know their exact numbers. This is usually done 
for security and strategic reasons. However, Tapfumaneyi (1996:44) points out that ZANLA 
had 21 500 guerrillas eligible for demobilisation, whilst ZIPRA had 15 000, and the RSFs had 
23 000.  
Zimbabwe’s demobilisation strategy revolved around persuading and to some extent 
supporting ex-combatants who wished to continue with their education after the war, technical 
and vocational skills training, and encashment of demobilisation funds (Bangidza, 2016:89). 
The first step that was taken to facilitate demobilisation of excess numbers that remained to be 
included in the ZNA was to encourage combatants to engage in agricultural activities as groups. 
In pursuit of this objective, Operation Soldiers Employed in Economic Development (SEED) 
was rolled out with the intention of keeping demobilised soldiers busy in spearheading 




The ex-combatants were roughly organised into manageable groups of about 700 soldiers per 
unit. ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RSFs cadres were represented in each agricultural unit. The 
government then gave agricultural equipment and some other inputs to various units that were 
created (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The government also committed itself towards facilitating 
the marketing of the products to the local government departments and parastatals at the same 
time paying a basic salary to each soldier (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The government thought 
of perpetuating the mind set of being soldiers in those who were involved in Operation SEED 
as they would keep their weapons whilst working in their allotments. As the name indicates, 
they were soldiers who engaged in economic development. 
Operation SEED was not successful. Political tensions which went along with the campaigning 
for the local government elections of August-September 1980 divided the soldiers involved in 
Operation SEED along factional camps of ZIPRA and ZANLA (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). 
Instead of working together harmoniously, the soldiers rushed to the armouries to get weapons 
to destroy each other. Many soldiers abandoned Operation SEED and went to the urban areas. 
Rupiya and Chitiyo conclude that what destroyed Operation SEED was the lingering legacy of 
mistrust and hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants emanating from their 
conflictual wartime relationships. Chitiyo and Rupiya (2005) also state that since ex-
combatants had not peacefully mingled before, lack of confidence and mistrust overwhelmed 
them, thereby forcing them to finally resort to physical fighting along factional lines instead of 
working together with confidence to advance the government-supported agricultural scheme. 
After the collapse of Operation SEED, the government moved on in the direction of assisting 
ex-combatants and disbursed financial rewards to facilitate smooth transition into productive 
civilian life. A Demobilisation Directorate was specifically established to deal with dispersing 
government support to the ex-combatants. Sadomba (2011) states that the Directorate was 




ZIPRA ex-combatant. In the absence of external funding for the DDR process and bearing in 
mind the economic challenges of a state emerging from conflict, the Directorate could not fully 
accomplish that which it was mandated to do due to a lean budget of Z$116 million aimed at 
catering for the welfare of several thousands of ex-combatants (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). The 
money given to the Directorate was meant to complement the other small amount of Z$43 
million that had been disbursed by the government earlier on in 1980 to facilitate 
demobilisation.  
According to Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005), there were three options that were followed by the 
Demobilisation Directorate in its endeavours to achieve demobilisation and reintegration. The 
first one was not to renew RSFs contracts that lapsed. The second option included a two-year 
monthly stipend of Z$185 to each ex-combatant. Each ex-combatant was asked to open an 
account with the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) so as to access his or her money. Ex-
combatants who benefitted from this scheme were urged to invest their money in co-operative 
schemes so as to avoid sinking into poverty after the end of the payments (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 
2005). The third option was the establishment of a rehabilitation centre for special cases. When 
looking at the constrained funding modalities for the ex-combatants, Sadomba (2011) 
concludes that the aim of the Demobilisation Directorate was not to genuinely demobilise, 
rehabilitate and reintegrate the ex-combatants but to get rid of them.  
Due to meagre support facilities, a majority of demobilised ex-combatants failed to 
economically reintegrate into civil life and ended up in deplorable living conditions.  Apart 
from the severance package of Z$400 that each ex-combatant was given at APs, there were no 
further support schemes until 1981 when demobilised ex-combatants started to receive Z$185 
each per month. According to Dzinesa (2008), the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) in Zimbabwe 
around the 1980s was about Z$128 per month. Even though Z$185 per month was above the 




start from scratch; building homes, buying food and clothes for themselves and their families 
(Dzinesa, 2008). The African Development Bank Group (2011) observes that demobilised ex-
combatants are unlikely to lead decent lives as civilians if funding is inadequate. 
 Some of the ex-combatants with parents and relatives who were killed during the war 
overstretched the Z$185 through supporting vulnerable extended families. Mashike (2000) 
argues that besides the fact that the monetary benefits were insufficient to facilitate effective 
economic reintegration; lack of measures targeted at ensuring that communities were given 
enough capacity to cope with needs of returning ex-combatants compounded the challenges of 
the demobilised ex-combatants. In short, the demobilisation and reintegration programs in 
Zimbabwe failed to facilitate effective peace building as the ex-combatants’ human security 
was not met. Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005) conclude that the demobilisation exercise promised 
too much but practically delivered too little thereby leaving ex-combatants in an expectation 
crisis. Even though it would appear that ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants had universal 
experiences in demobilisation, discussions in the next chapter will negate this. 
Although some ex-combatants heeded the call to pool resources into co-operatives, the scheme 
did not ensure positive peace amongst the ex-combatants as many of them did not get adequate 
food and money from their co-operatives. Severe drought negatively affected the emerging 
agricultural co-operatives, whilst others were affected by poor management skills (Msemwa, 
1994). Quite a number of co-operative schemes that were spearheaded and run by ex-
combatants survived up to the early 1990s but could not withstand the debilitating economic 
effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) prescribed by the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 During ESAP programs, businesses experienced high lending rates, job layouts, liquidity 




affected the business fraternity in general. In fact, Sadomba (2011) concludes that many 
agricultural co-operatives were a result of coercion from government so that members received 
their demobilisation money in bulk to fulfil government policy of model B resettlement. As 
will be seen in the next chapter, co-operative schemes owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants 
experienced other challenges that were not witnessed by the other members of the co-operative 
scheme who were not ZIPRA and that was directly linked to the challenges of a government 
led DDR in the context of competing and hostile ethnic based military and political formations. 
The government that was born from one of the liberation parties did not transform its mindset 
from that which it had during the liberation struggle. It continued to compete with PF-ZAPU 
and ZIPRA after independence although it was now expected to spearhead impartial and 
inclusive peace building and nation building programs. 
Besides investing in co-operatives, ZIPRA ex-combatants bought a variety of movable and 
immovable properties through their severance packages. Each ZIPRA ex-combatant 
contributed Z$50 towards the purchase of farms, motels, garages, a fleet of vehicles, cattle and 
agricultural equipment (Interviews with Ndebele, Bhebhe, Berry, I.G and Ngxongo, all of 
whom contributed towards the purchase of ZIPRA properties, 2017). The aim of purchasing 
the properties was to contribute towards positive peace for its demobilised and disabled ex-
combatants (Nkomo, 1984). The properties were spread right across the country to benefit 
ZIPRA ex-combatants in different regions. Like their co-operatives, the ZIPRA ex-combatants’ 
properties also fell victim to ethnic politics of competing political parties. The story of ZIPRA 
ex-combatants’ properties would be presented fully in chapter five. 
Attempts to ensure that ex-combatants enjoyed positive peace did not end with Operation 
SEED and the monetary demobilisation assistance that was spread over a period of 24 months, 
but also extended to other sectors. There was an affirmative program that prioritised the 




government (Kriger, 2003). This was in recognition of lost educational and employment 
opportunities as they had interrupted their education through joining the struggle and had to be 
assisted to find employment in a competitive job market. What remains to be seen is whether 
or not these empowerment programs were not tainted by the ethnic rivalries, that is to say, 
whether they were impartial or not. 
 Musemwa (1994) observes that many private companies did not want to employ ex-
combatants. To encourage an increased uptake of ex-combatants in the private companies and 
parastatals, the government availed a special subsidy to all those organisations that employed 
more than 5% ex-combatants. However, in spite of government efforts to cushion the ex-
combatants through assisting them to get employment, ex-combatants well in excess of 25 000 
were unemployed and lived in destitution by 1993 (Musemwa (1995:45). 
 Many ex-combatants could not secure sustainable employment because they lacked necessary 
educational qualifications. The minimum educational qualifications of five ordinary level 
passes and above including a C or better pass symbol in English Language for employment in 
the Civil Service was too high for most ex-combatants who ended learning at Primary School 
level. Many of the ex-combatants did not have these qualifications. Mass education after 
independence produced thousands of well-educated young people who made competition very 
stiff in the job market for uneducated or semi-educated former combatants (Musemwa, 1995). 
The empowerment of the ex-combatants through targeted education was another sector that 
caught the attention of the government in its efforts towards empowering them. Ex-combatants 
who were willing to learn were encouraged to do so. Quite a number of schools that specialised 
in entreprenueral development skills were built. These schools emphasized more on vocational 
training and apprenticeships than on formal education (Lamb, 2013; Rupiya and Chitiyo, 




There was also the establishment of Ruwa rehabilitation centre east of Harare to cater for the 
physically and psychologically challenged ex-combatants. However, the maimed ex-
combatants that were at Ruwa Rehabilitation Centre were soon evicted and left to look for their 
own transport to their homes (Sadomba, 2011). The challenge could have been lack of adequate 
resources for the upkeep of the disabled ex-combatants. 
The major stumbling block towards the education of the ex-combatants was that they had 
meagre resources to fund their education. To augment government efforts of assisting ex-
combatants in the education sector, the Canadian government availed over 3 400 scholarships 
to cater for their needs (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000). However, government corruption in the 
selection and allocation of scholarships meant that the program failed to benefit the targeted 
population (ex-combatants) but ended benefitting the children of government Ministers and 
well-connected party officials (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000).  
Although ex-combatants had some challenges in securing employment and going back to 
school, it would be an exaggeration not to note that there are some ex-combatants who were 
not affected by these challenges. This was the case with those who came from rich families. 
Besides, a sizeable number of ex-combatants got land through the resettlement programme of 
1980-1984 (Sadomba, 2011). The discussions above reveal that in some instances, both ZIPRA 
and ZANLA ex-combatants suffered the same predicament. However, rivalries that were 
hidden behind ethnic differences meant that even where it appeared as if both ex-guerrilla 
fighter groups experienced similar challenges, there were peculiar challenges that affected 
ZIPRA ex-combatants differently from their ZANLA counterparts. What is crucial to note is 
that in all the instances where ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants were supposed to work 
together before 1987, they ended up clashing; an indication that they were not reconciled and 




4.6 The Second Reintegration Program, 1997 
Several pitfalls in the first DDR process (1980-1984) left many ex-combatants economically 
vulnerable and bitter. It failed to guarantee positive peace to a lot of the ex-combatants. By the 
early 1990s, many of them were in extreme poverty, having last received government support 
in 1983-84 after the termination of the Z$185 monthly payments. Their miseries were 
exacerbated by the negative economic effects of ESAP. Whilst they were wallowing in abject 
poverty, the governing elite seemed to have forgotten about their plight hence their despair and 
heightened anger. Ex-combatants organised themselves into a strong force and formed the 
ZNLWVA in 1989. The association was inclusive as it brought almost all the ex-combatants 
together under one umbrella association. The ZNLWVA sought to attend to deplorable 
economic conditions faced by a majority of ex-combatants. 
 The promulgation of the War Veterans Act in 1992 brought issues pertaining to the welfare of 
the ex-combatants to the limelight. Before then, there was no specific legislation which spoke 
directly to the challenges faced by former freedom fighters. The War Victims (Compensation) 
Act of 1980 just provided a loose framework for disability pensions for people injured during 
the liberation war as well as pensions for their widows (Kriger, 2000). Unlike the War Victims 
(Compensation) Act which provided for the compensation of those injured during the war, the 
War Veterans Act (1992) provided for the compensation of all genuine ex-combatants who 
were involved in the war of liberation (Dzinesa, 2005). 
 Due to improved and solid organisation under the ZNLWVA, ex-combatants were able to 
engage in focussed negotiations with the government leading to the promulgation of yet another 
piece of legislation; the second War Victims Compensation Act of 1993 which laid ground for 
the strengthening of an already existing fund for the compensation of all war injured ex-




Act stipulated that compensation would only be paid to genuine ex-combatants who were 
maimed during the course of the war of independence (Chitiyo (2000). The level of 
compensation was supposed to match the degree of injuries sustained. One can realise that 
other categories of vulnerable and disempowered ex-combatants were not covered by this Act. 
For example, ZIPRA ex-combatants who got injured in the hands of the 5th Brigade after 
independence were not covered by the Act. 
 However, one positive thing to note is that ex-combatants got a legal instrument through the 
War Veterans Act which for the first time since independence clarified the legal status of ex-
combatants and accorded them the status of War Veterans. A War Veteran is: 
Any person who underwent military training and participated, consistently and 
persistently, in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe and 
neighbouring countries between 01 January 1962, and 29 February 1980, in 
connection with the bringing about Zimbabwe’s independence on 18 April 1980 
(War Veterans Act, 1992). 
The War Veteran identity became very strong in the 1990s and was instrumental in the 
remobilisation of the former guerrillas of the war of independence into a united force never 
seen before (Sadomba, 2011). Through the ZNLWVA, and armed with an Act of parliament 
which directly spoke to their issues, the War Veterans were able to influence the government 
to pay attention to their plight. What incited the War Veterans to confront the government was 
the suspension of the WVCF after serious scandals bordering around its corrupt administration 
and looting were unearthed.  
The WVCF had become an escape route from poverty for thousands of economically 
vulnerable ex-combatants. Although the fund was established long back, it was only known to 
the majority of the ex-combatants around the mid-1990s when it was already badly looted 
(Dzinesa, 2005). Chenjerai Hunzwi, who was Chairperson of the ZNLWVA in the mid-1990s 
made many ex-combatants aware of the existence of the WVCF and called upon them to come 




injuries since the rate of compensation was proportional to the percentage of injuries sustained 
(Sadomba, 2011). 
Right from its inception up to its closure in March 1997, the administration of the WVCF was 
chaotic. First and foremost, the people who benefitted were those who had knowledge about 
the existence of the fund. Secondly, the fund benefitted mostly undeserving, comfortably 
employed government Ministers, serving police and military officers (Dzinesa, 2005). Thirdly, 
the administration of the fund was centralised in Harare and that meant that it benefitted mainly 
those who resided in and around the capital (Harare). Fourthly, doctors were bribed so that they 
could exaggerate the degrees of injury for would-be-beneficiaries. Fifthly, there were incidents 
of multiple claims by connected individuals who were nowhere near the battlefronts during the 
liberation struggle (Mashike, 2000). As a result of these scandals, a large amount of Z$450 
million dollars that was injected into the WVCF by the government in the last 8 months of 
1996 to benefit injured ex-combatants was looted by criminals (Dzinesa, 2005). 
According to Dzinesa (2005), it was possible for the fund to be looted due to a couple of 
loopholes in its administration. First, there were no clear-cut guidelines that directed doctors 
when examining the degree of injuries on potential beneficiaries. The situation was even worse 
when assessing claimants with invisible and non-physical injuries such as psychological 
disorders. Due to massive abuse, the WVCF was suspended by the government in March 1997 
and this was to curb further abuse and to properly re-vet potential benefifiaries (Dzinesa, 2005). 
The suspension of the fund took place when many ex-combatants had already submitted claims 
and were awaiting payments. This was a recipe for disaster as infuriated War Veterans 
embarked on nationwide demonstrations against the government in 1997.  
The demonstrations shook ZANU-PF to its foundations as ex-combatants directed their wrath 




1997 and forced him to abandon his speech (Dzinesa, 2005). What made their demonstrations 
successful and dangerous at the same time was that they were not blocked by law enforcement 
agents. This was for the simple reason that the top leadership of the police, who were 
themselves war veterans, were sympathetic to the War Veterans’ cause. Through a Presidential 
decree, the government announced a once-off Z$50 000 financial grant to each and every 
successfully vetted War Veteran.  
This was accompanied by a revisable monthly life pension of Z$2 000 (Mazarire and Rupiya, 
2000). The payments were paid to all ex-combatants who were successfully vetted irrespective 
of whether they were employed or unemployed. Mazarire and Rupiya (2000) put the total 
national figure of all War Veterans at about 52 000 by 1997. All this was done by the President 
with little or no consultation at all with the tax payers or the officials who were supposed to 
implement the program (Coltart, 2016). The whole process was not budgeted for since it was 
forced on the government by restless War Veterans. Funding obviously became a problem.  
The first strategy was an attempt to introduce a special tax before the end of 1997 to fund the 
gratuities. This proposal was vehemently resisted by the workers. With no other option, the 
government resorted to the printing of money to finance the exercise. The total cost of the 
grants gobbled over Z$4, 5 billion (Mazarire and Rupiya, 2000; Coltart, 2016). The aim to 
improve the welfare of the ex-combatants was not only expressed in financial terms. A quota 
of 20% was reserved for ex-combatants in all farms designated for distribution (Zulu, 2009). 
Other privileges extended to the ex-combatants under the second reintegration phase were the 
payment of school fees for their children by the government at government-run educational 
institutions, free health services for them and their children at government hospitals as well as 




Msemwa (2011:115) notes that the gratuities were not simply an altruistic measure by the 
government but they came after a series of protests by the ex-combatants. In the same vein, 
Dzinesa (2005:135) observes that the gratuities to the ex-combatants in 1997 were 
diplomatically targeted at pacifying them since they had grown restless.  
In short, the second reintegration program also undermined peace building efforts as the 
general society was economically destabilised by the effects of the gratuities to the ex-
combatants. It is crucial to briefly outline the effects of the unbudgeted gratuities to the 
economy. The printing of money had calamitous repercussions on the already fragile economy. 
The rate of inflation rose to unprecedented levels. The Zimbabwean dollar shed almost 73% of 
its value on 14 November 1997: a day that has been remembered as the ‘Black Friday’ due to 
a multiplicity of economic challenges associated with it (Coltart, 2016:248).  
From then onwards, the economy plummeted and left the ordinary people as well as ex-
combatants who had no sound economic base in dire economic conditions. By January of 1998, 
the prices of basic commodities were sky-rocketing thereby leading to serious rioting by a 
disgruntled citizenry in almost all the major urban centres of Zimbabwe. The riots were only 
suppressed at the cost of eight civilian lives (Coltart, 2016). Many of the ex-combatants who 
were in unstable economic conditions could not buy anything meaningful as the value of their 
money was quickly eroded by inflation. 
In the light of the failure of both the first and second reintegration processes, Mazarire and 
Rupiya (2000) conclude that ‘two wrongs do not make a right’. There are two important issues 
that persuaded Mazarire and Rupiya to make that conclusion. First, the same levels of grants 
and pensions were extended to ex-combatants that had been unemployed since 1980 and 
cabinet Ministers as well as top government officials who were living in luxury. Secondly, the 




them for such ‘large amounts of money.’ Many of the jobless ex-combatants simply squandered 
the proceeds (2000:77). Rich ex-combatants quickly pooled together their resources and 
established income generating projects whilst poor ex-combatants who were in the majority for 
that matter tried to feed, clothe themselves, and pay school fees and secure accommodation 
with the dollar that was on a downward spiral on a daily basis.  
Even though the economic conditions of the majority of ex-combatants did not improve after 
the second reintegration program, the government had succeeded in one of its objectives. It 
was able to pacify and then forge an alliance of convenience with the hitherto restless ex-
combatants. Musemwa (2011:124) has analysed the predicament of the ex-combatants in the 
following way: 
They were (War Veterans) first demobilised, then neglected and eventually 
remobilised again but this time to wage a different kind of war to keep the same 
establishment, which largely marginalised them from enjoying the ‘fruits’ of 
independence in power. 
When viewed from Musemwa’s perspective, one notes that the major aim of the government 
in conceding to the demands of the ex-combatants in 1997 was predicated on its desire to ensure 
regime rather than human security. In their poverty, ex-combatants could be manipulated by 
ZANU-PF during campaigns for votes in elections. In fact, ex-combatants acted as ZANU-
PF’s storm troopers as they coerced people to vote for it. Chitiyo (2000:86) succinctly 
summarises his thoughts about why ex-combatants entered into an alliance with the 
government that had neglected them for a long period. He states that: 
The War Veterans already owe the government a favour (because of the pay outs); 
but government is dangling another carrot and stick before them (i.e. increases to 
War Veterans monthly pensions and the threat that if any government comes to 
power, the War Veterans could lose this largesse). 
One thing that is apparent about the second reintegration program of 1997 is that it was heavily 
politicised by the ruling ZANU-PF party so that even though many ex-combatants remained in 




would be alleviated. Dzinesa (2005) explains that the ex-combatants could easily be 
manipulated to do ‘dirty’ activities by ZANU-PF due to their continued destitution in spite of 
the 1997 pay outs. The net effect of the ex-combatants’ indulgence into these ‘dirty’ activities 
did not promote effective social reintegration into civil society as they were viewed as enemies 
of the people and became isolated from the communities they were supposed to reintegrate 
into. 
 To date, the majority of ex-combatants still look up to the government for their subsistence. 
The 1997 reintegration program failed to positively and significantly transform the lives of 
many ex-combatants. The government was again unable to implement successful reintegration 
in 1997 because it had vested political interests in the exercise. The implementation of the 
second reintegration process indicated that the government had learnt nothing from the failure 
of the first process of 1980-1984.  
4.7 Conclusion 
The DDR process in Zimbabwe was atypical because the peace agreement which terminated 
the conflict skirted fundamental DDR issues and left them to the incoming government despite 
the prevalence of a polarised and conflictual post-conflict environment. There were no specifics 
on how disarmament and demobilisation would be done. Entitlements to ex-combatants in the 
form of reintegration support were not mentioned. Without any experience and support, the 
government blundered. In the context of mutual fear, suspicion, mistrust, and hostility between 
ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants, the government decided to make disarmament and 
demobilisation voluntary and the results were not impressive. The movement of combatants 
into APs was not strictly supervised. ZIPRA cadres trained in conventional warfare, for 
example, were asked to hunt down their colleagues who were refusing to get into APs, not a 




outcome was that there was abuse of reintegration programs by ZANU-PF to settle old political 
scores with its rival, PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants.  
It is mind boggling to imagine how a government that was part and parcel of ethnic-based 
rivalries and hostilities was expected to design and implement fair, impartial, and effective 
DDR programs alone. To expect fairness, impartiality, and effectiveness was to expect too 
much from a government that was under-resourced and in support of one military faction 
against another. In other cases with a context almost similar to that of Zimbabwe, the UN has 
been heavily involved to give the much needed political and technical support as well as 
supervisory role to guard against partiality and abuse of the DDR process by any one of the 
parties. In Zimbabwe, there was no UN to enforce disarmament and also provide funds for 
reintegration programs. In short, the government was left alone to experiment with a sensitive 
and delicate process as DDR in a context that was conflictual.  
The DDR process was attempted twice and both attempts were a failure. It can be concluded 
that the government was motivated more by political self interest than by national interests 
aimed at achieving both state and human security and bringing finality to the DDR issue. In 
both processes, the design and implementation mechanisms were not inclusive and change-
oriented. To date, Zimbabwe is still affected by problems brought about by failed DDR 
processes, and as will be seen in the next two chapters, ZIPRA ex-combatants are the most 
affected. The ZANU-PF government resciscitates DDR issues during election times to 
encourage ex-combatants to support it and this has not helped the situation.  





CHAPTER 5: NATURE OF ZIPRA EX-COMBATANTS’ EXPERIENCES 
IN DDR 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically interrogates the specific experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in 
various DDR programs. It argues that ZIPRA ex-combatants had peculiar experiences in the 
DDR process that were a result of power struggles for political supremacy embedded in 
historical and ethnic dynamics that were at play during the struggle for emancipation from 
colonial bondage and spilled over into the post-colonial state. A context-specific approach is 
adopted in articulating the unique experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants. Most of the 
evidence is generated from primary sources (ZIPRA ex-combatants) and to some extent from 
secondary sources. 
 Although the focus of the study is on DDR issues, the integration process into the army which 
is mainly a SSR issue would be discussed in greater detail because an analysis of ZIPRA ex-
combatants’ experiences in DDR processes would be incomplete without a clear interrogation 
of military issues. In fact, what happened within military circles directly fed into DDR 
programs and processes, hardened perceptions, feelings and relationships throughout the entire 
ex-combatant constituency and made it difficult for them to reconcile and embrace each other 
where ever and when ever they met. For instance, some ZIPRA ex-combatants who were 
victimised within the ZNA left the army with their weapons, leading to difficulties in 
disarmament. Others (ZIPRA ex-combatants) demobilised in large numbers after realising that 
they were not welcome in the army. The continuous politicisation and ethnicisation of the army 
also pushed many ZIPRA ex-combatants out of the military and made it difficult for them to 




the ones who ‘demobilised’ due to unpleasant treatment within the ZNA could not effectively 
reintegrate into civilian society.  
5.2 Political Context 
The first DDR process was launched in the midst of political jostling among the major political 
players due to campaigning for the 1980 general elections. During campaigning, political 
tensions heightened as parties sought to outdo each other. What made the situation particularly 
volatile was that the Patriotic Front that had helped the two parties to present a united front in 
the diplomatic front during negotiations collapsed. As noted in chapter one, ZANU decided to 
run for elections independently as ZANU-PF not as a Patriotic Front with ZAPU. ZAPU 
belatedly registered itself for elections as PF-ZAPU. The split in the Patriotic Front did not 
help the situation in any way as it compounded political tensions. 
 In fact, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants became active players in political power games as 
each political party tried to use its former military wing in building a power base in society. 
However, it was ZANU-PF that had gained the levers of power that vigorously used its former 
guerrilla army to build its influence in critical sectors of government (Kriger, 2003). It can be 
seen that the post-independence environment was not conducive to foster collaborative peace 
building endeavours. 
The hotly contested 1980 elections gave emphatic victory to ZANU-PF which garnered 57 
seats. PF-ZAPU got 20 seats, the UANC of Abel Muzorewa managed a paltry 3 seats whilst 
all the 20 reserved seats went to Smith’s party (Sithole, 1999:179). What is interesting to note 
is that the ethnic factor was strong in determining the results of these elections. ZANLA 
guerrillas had penetrated deep into ZAPU traditional strongholds of Matabeleland around the 
Beitbridge, Gwanda and Kezi areas for about three years before the 1980 elections. However, 




regardless of the three-year period of politicisation and indoctrination by ZANLA guerrillas in 
favour of ZANU through Pungwes (Sithole, 1999).  Similarly, ZANU-PF won almost all the 
seats in former ZIPRA operational zones of Mashonaland West. Sithole (1999) concludes that 
the ethnic factors were dominant in influencing the voting trends during the 1980 elections. 
 After its electoral victory, and in the spirit of national reconciliation, ZANU-PF formed a GNU 
with PF-ZAPU and the Rhodesian Front of Ian Smith. The Prime Minister also asked the parties 
to avoid dwelling on past injustices and to forgive each other in order to build a united and 
peaceful nation. The aim was to avoid retributive justice and to also facilitate the washing away 
of liberation war grudges. These developments on the political front were supposed to impact 
positively on the military sector, especially the integration exercise and bring unity, inclusivity 
and reconciliation. Even though PF-ZAPU was invited into the GNU, it was always treated as 
a junior partner (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). ZANU-PF’s political rhetoric continued to disparage 
PF-ZAPU, ZIPRA and Joshua Nkomo as losers. Music, songs, symbols and slogans only 
depicted ZANU-PF and ZANLA’s triumphant history at the expense of PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).  
5.3 ZIPRA Experience during the Transition Period 
The disarmament process was problematic due to a couple of security concerns on the side of 
the guerrilla forces that were briefly outlined in the previous chapter. Many combatants 
cooperated with the JHC and voluntarily handed in their weapons. However, a sizeable number 
of both ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas were reserved outside the APs by their respective 
political parties. Other guerrillas took their weapons and ran out of the APs on their own. These 
constituted what ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU variously termed ‘outlaws’, ‘bandits’, ‘renegades’ 
or ‘unruly elements’ (Alexander et al, 2000). These loose elements were a menace and security 




2007). However, after the election period, armed men who did not abide by the cease fire 
regualations in Matabeleland were called ‘dissidents’ by ZANU-PF and their motives were 
increasingly located in political rather than security and strategic terms (Alexander et al, 2000). 
After the election, there was silence on the ZANLA ‘dissidents’ in Mashonaland (Todd, 2007). 
It can be observed that the presentation of ‘dissidents’ by ZANU-PF was deliberately meant to 
soil the image of ZIPRA ex-combatants whilst exonerating ZANLA from any acts of 
lawlessness. What motivated ‘renegades’ from both ZANLA and ZIPRA were security 
challenges of the transition period plus political motives mainly on the part of ZANLA, many 
of whom were stashed within the civilian population for purposes of campaigning for ZANU-
PF (Nkomo, 1984; Todd, 2007). The notion of ‘dissidents’ assumed both political and ethnic 
meanings. On the political front, ‘renegades’ in Matabeleland were conflated into one and 
projected as representatives of bad losers who did not want to concede defeat in elections. The 
‘renegades’ were also ethnicised. 
In this context, PF-ZAPU was deliberately viewed as a party that worked in cahoots with 
‘dissidents.’ Its President was not spared in this smear campaign. Joshua Nkomo was accused 
of being the mastermind behind the whole ‘dissidents’ issue. To make matters worse, the whole 
population of Matabeleland was viewed as ‘dissidents’ sympathisers. In the same vein, the 
label of ‘dissident’ was also given to all ZIPRA ex-combatants, including those serving in the 
ZNA. In general terms, the whole population of Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands 
where there were Ndebele speaking people constituted a ‘dissident’ community (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2011:14). Since ZIPRA ex-combatants were portrayed as ‘dissidents’ as early as 
1980, they were deemed enemies rather than partners of ZANU-PF and ZANLA ex-combatants 
in the peace building process. PF-ZAPU’s alleged role in sponsoring ‘dissidents’ was to be 




at APs, within the ZNA and those who had demobilised panicked and became restless when 
they discovered that they were perceived as ‘dissidents’ who were anti-peace building.  
Through the creation of ‘dissidents’ from lawless ZIPRA guerrillas who were roaming the 
countryside in 1980, a stage had already been set for further confrontational relationships 
between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. Efforts taken by ZIPRA commanders and PF-
ZAPU leaders in rounding up the ‘renegades’ and bringing them to book illustrated that they 
were in fact not abetting lawlessness among its military ranks. As seen before, 400 unruly 
ZIPRA cadres were rounded up and thrown into Khami Prison. The co-operation of the ZIPRA 
leaders was despite the fact that the RSFs were fuelling security fears from guerrillas at APs 
by displaying their power through patrols in military jeeps with mounted machine guns and by 
also flying lowly above APs (Alexander et al, 2000). Worse still, the RSFs had shot at a bus 
load of ZIPRA ex-combatants at Lupane Business Centre that was heading towards St. Paul 
AP and injured many on board (Alexander et al, 2000). 
According to Coltart (2016), the emphasis by the government was on rounding up ZIPRA ex-
combatants who were on the loose whilst ZANLA ex-combatants who were engaged in the 
same unruly behaviour went scot-free. This could be interpreted as part of smear campaign 
meant to discredit both ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU so as to justify their elimination. Lookout 
Masuku, the former ZIPRA commander was quite incensed by what he viewed as a partisan 
and discriminatory application of justice to ZIPRA and ZANLA ‘renegades.’  
 Masuku went into meticulous details on acts of indiscipline by ZANLA ex-combatants that 
were concealed by the governing party whilst it concentrated on ZIPRA transgressions. For 
example, ZANLA destroyed Sgt Major Gava’s vehicle in Zvimba Police Post on 22 June 1980. 
They also assaulted police officers at Chipinge, shot at Kachuta TTL, and threatened farmers 




ex-combatants at Sanyati, Zvimba and Hurungwe was exaggerated, condemned and portrayed 
as organised acts of rebellion by the government (Todd, 2007:151). It has to be pointed out that 
ZIPRA bandits attacked government agents and projects in Matabeleland and Midlands. 
Besides being on the loose due to security fears, the attack on government agents and projects 
could be an indication that to some extent, some ZIPRA elements also resented a ZANU-PF 
government.  
The selective application of justice against ZIPRA ex-combatants in dealing with military 
indiscipline during the early days of DDR implementation flew in the face of concerted efforts 
by the JHC to eradicate military indiscipline. Even after independence, it seems ZANU-PF, 
even though it was the government continued to behave as if it was still a liberation movement 
rivalling PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA for the leadership of the post-colonial state. 
5.4 ZIPRA Experience in Disarmament 
After the ceasefire of December 1979, both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants were supposed 
to congregate at various designated APs for disarmament, demobilisation and integration. The 
exercise of entering APs started on 26 December 1979 and was to end on 04 January 1980 
(Interview with Ndebele, 2017). However, the period was extended to accommodate guerrillas 
who were coming in from training bases in other countries in Africa as well as from overseas. 
It was only when one was integrated into the ZNA or demobilised that weapons were 
surrenderd to the commanders for onward transmission to the national armoury (Kriger, 2003). 
During the APs phase, guerrillas were provided with rations, pay, housing, and perfomed some 
light drills for fitness purposes (Kriger, 2003:89). 
ZANLA had a total of 16 000 guerrillas at APs, whilst ZIPRA assembled around 5 000 cadres. 
About 20 000 ZANLA and 8 000-10 000 ZIPRA guerrillas remained outside APs (Kriger, 




in Zambia and Angola. However, for ZANLA, many of their guerrillas who did not get into 
APs were in the home front and were hidden among villagers, either campaigning for ZANU-
PF or ready to resume the war if election results did not go in favour of their party (Nkomo, 
1984).  
 Nyathi testifies that in Mashonaland where ZANLA guerrillas were encamped, a majority of 
them were roaming outside APs with their weapons, urging and threatening people to vote for 
ZANU-PF instead of PF-ZAPU. They actively did that even in areas like Mashonaland West 
Province where ZIPRA guerrillas had operated throughout the liberation struggle hence 
ZANU-PF was able to win overwhelmingly in that province. Whilst ZANLA guerrillas were 
doing that, Nkomo and PF-ZAPU were restricting ZIPRA guerrillas into APs and enforcing 
disarmament in accordance with the Lancaster peace agreement requirements (Interview, 
2017). Nyathi’s version of the story viz-a-viz the disarmament process and the issue of APs 
reinforces that of Nkomo (1984), and indicates that ZANLA was not sincere in carrying out 
disarmament whilst to a large extent, ZIPRA was.  
Since most of the ZIPRA guerrillas who were at home entered APs, they went through the 
formal disarmament processes than ZANLA guerrillas, who most of them were loose elements 
amongst villagers. The government of Zimbabwe had little capacity and political will to 
execute effective disarmament and demobilisation. These two critical processes were made 
voluntary in the midst of mistrust and hostility between ZANLA and ZIPRA hence the limited 
level of success. 
Nkomo (1984:223) observed that three months after the demobilisation of ZIPRA guerrillas 
who were not absorbed into the ZNA, brigade strength ZANLA guerrillas had been kept intact 
and hidden around the eastern parts of the country near the border with Mozambique. It would 




excess guerrillas (those who could not be absorbed into the ZNA) to disarm and demobilise. 
ZANLA was not transparent to ZIPRA with regards to disarmament (Interview with 
Dabengwa, 2017). It appears ZANU-PF wanted PF-ZAPU politicians and ZIPRA senior 
commanders to assist them in disarming ZIPRA guerrillas. Once ZIPRA guerrillas were 
disarmed, PF-ZAPU politicians and ZIPRA commanders’ usefulness to ZANU-PF ended. 
Nkomo (1984:223) had this to say about disarmament: ‘Once ZIPRA was disbanded, my 
usefulness to Robert Mugabe’s government was at the end.’ Although traces of discrimination 
against ZIPRA in disarmament programs were visible, they were not pronounced. The reason 
was that they (ZIPRA) had to be persuaded to disarm as they were a formidable army which 
could not be coerced through violent means by the government without external assistance. It 
was only after they had disarmed that they endured manifest discrimination and 
marginalisation. 
5.5 ZIPRA Experience in Demobilisation 
The demobilisation process stretched from 1980 to around 1985. Officially, it ended with the 
closure of the Demobilisation Directorate in 1983, but members of the ZNA who wished to 
demobilise were allowed to leave the army up until 1985 (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). 
Tapfumaneyi (1996:44) reveals that ZANLA had 21 500 guerrillas eligible for demobilisation, 
whilst ZIPRA had 15 000, and RSFs had 23 000. Like disarmament, the demobilisation process 
was voluntary. However, very few ex-guerrillas were willing to leave the military voluntarily. 
This meant that demobilisation had to be enforced through other strategies to shed off excess 
manpower that could not be accommodated within the security services. As alluded to in the 
previous chapter, the demobilisation package consisted of four elements. These were technical 




 As the above demobilisation programs were implemented during a period of heightened 
tensions between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants, compounded by clashes at APs, some 
ZIPRA ex-combatants forfeited their demobilisation stipends as they feared to be taken as 
‘dissidents’ and be caught by government agents. The argument by ZIPRA ex-combatants was 
that more of them compared to ZANLA were involuntarily demobilised. This was done 
indirectly through disparaging Joshua Nkomo their former commander-in-chief, their political 
party PF-ZAPU as well as their former military commanders (Interview with Ndebele, 2017). 
Many ZIPRA ex-combatants could not bear that humiliation. As a result, they left APs and the 
ZNA.  
In direct terms, many of the ZIPRA specialists like doctors, engineers, pilots, technicians, and 
teachers could not be accommodated into the ZNA and were forced to demobilise. This was 
not because their qualifications and experiences were irrelevant, but they were discriminated 
against (Interview with Gatsheni, 2017). Ngxongo had trained in artillery in Yugoslavia and in 
engineering in Romania but ended up working in a construction company in Bulawayo because 
he could not be made part and parcel of the new army (Interview, 2017). ZIPRA airforce and 
intelligence units were disbanded and ZANU-PF government built its airforce and central 
intelligence organisation around the nucleus of the Rhodesian airforce and Rhodesian Special 
Branch respectively (Nkomo, 1984; Interview with Gatsheni, 2017). 
The preference of the RSFs over ZIPRA in the military circles was almost similar to the 
scenario explained in chapter one where ZIPRA collaborated with Umkhonto We Sizwe 
guerrillas of the ANC of South Africa  and ZANLA with FRELIMO of Mozambique in the 
execution of joint military campaigns in Rhodesia during the liberation struggle but fought 
against each other during the same time. The collaboration between ZANLA and the RSFs 
against ZIPRA was even worse. This was because the RSFs had decimated thousands of 




made to illustrate the magnitude of mistrust and hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA. As 
noted by Kriger (2003:44), ZANU-PF used its ex-guerrilla base to dominate the security sector 
and the economy in general.  
Political factors also contributed to the demobilisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants in large 
numbers. They were frustrated because they had firmly believed that PF-ZAPU would win the 
1980 elections. Ndebele explains that ZIPRA cadres only expected PF-ZAPU and no other 
party to win the elections and when ZANU-PF won, they were demoralised. They also thought 
that ZANU-PF won through fraudulent means. Within the ZNA, it was announced that ‘those 
who were not willing or unable to work with the government were free to leave’ (Interview 
with Ndebele, 2017). Due to mistrust in ZANU-PF government that was fuelled by the 
perceptions that the 1980 elections were rigged, many ZIPRA ex-combatants demobilised from 
the ZNA.  
5.6 Clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA at APs 
Guerrillas who could not join the security forces remained at APs from the end of 1979 up to 
1981. The long periods which the ex-combatants spent at APs doing nothing was a recipe for 
disaster. The situation was particularly volatile at Entumbane and Chitungwiza APs where 
ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres with a well-documented history of ethnic-driven rivalry and 
hostility were juxtaposed in council houses in Bulawayo and Harare respectively (Alao, 2012). 
The cantonment of former warring ex-combatants side by side is recommended by the 
UNDPKO (1999). According to the UNDPKO, former warring parties should mingle at APs 
and share whatever facilities are available so as to facilitate early reconciliation. Whilst this 
could be a good idea, in a context where there are high levels of mutual fear, mistrust, suspicion, 
rivalry, and tensions, it can be dangerous to put former warring military factions together. 




 The case of ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants at Entumbane and Chitungwiza illustrate the 
reality of the above fears.  Instead of facilitating reconciliation, the unease interaction of ZIPRA 
and ZANLA cadres in these two APs heightened feelings of fear, mistrust and hostility within 
the two groups of former guerrillas and led to physical confrontation. The major issue to note 
is that reconciliation is not a hollow process. It has a number of critical processes like 
acknowledgement of the wrong done, truth telling, confession, contrition/remorse, mercy, 
repentence, apologies, asking for forgiveness, compensation and then finally reconciliation 
among others. In the case of Zimbabwe, ex-combatants were expected to reconcile without the 
implementation of any of these processes. 
What compounded the risk of the situation sliding back into violence was the fact that both 
factions were armed. As indicated earlier, ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants kept their 
personal weapons whilst at APs. Since final official demobilisation took place in mid-1981, 
this means that other ex-combatants still held up to their weapons outside the regulation of the 
ZNA up to that time. Gleichmann et al (2004) suggest that the active involvement of neutral 
international monitors can be a critical stabilising factor especially in a situation of mistrust 
between former belligerents. Neutral monitors may help to create buffer zones that separate 
former warring factions.  
Clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres at Entumbane AP in November 1980 are said to 
have been sparked by reckless and inflammatory political speeches by ZANU-PF politicians at 
a rally at White City Stadium where they denigrated ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU. Enos Nkala played 
a key role in inciting violence. He did that through openly disparaging ZIPRA, PF-ZAPU, 
Joshua Nkomo and the Ndebele people in general in front of Ndebele crowds in Bulawayo 
(Todd, 2007). According to Todd (2007:36) Nkala declared that: 
…the party’s task (ZANU-PF) from now on is to crush Joshua Nkomo and forget 




by the grace of ZANU-PF. They contributed in their small way and we have given 
them a share proportional to their contribution. If they now want more than their 
small share then we shall have to tell them that they will not have any share at all. 
These utterances were bellicose and provocative. One important issue to note is that such a 
language (inflammatory and anti-unity) was used at a time when efforts were underway to 
perform the delicate business of integrating hitherto antagonistic military factions. Retired 
Sergeant Major Sibanda recalls that ZANLA cadres who were emboldened by what they heard 
from the speech at White City Stadium passed through the ZIPRA camp at Entumbane singing 
and chanting provocative slogans that were denigrating PF-ZAPU, ZIPRA and Joshua Nkomo. 
The ex-combatants did not attend the rally but heard the speeches from their radios. Sibanda 
further states that in the evening of that day, ZANLA soldiers started shelling the ZIPRA camp 
with mortar 60s and ZIPRA fought back (Interview with Sibanda who was part of the ZIPRA 
cadres that fought with ZANLA at Entumbane in November 1980).  
 As ZIPRA cadres retaliated, a two-day pitched battle ensued between the two rival guerrilla 
forces. The fighting spilled out and engulfed most of the low-income residential suburbs of 
Bulawayo and many civilians became victims of the fighting (Interview with Sibanda, 2017). 
What became apparent was that ZIPRA forces also beat and killed Shona-speaking civilians 
they came across. They also destroyed their houses. Nyathi who was part of the Rhodesian 
forces that were deployed to deal with the violence testifies that they actually met a lot of Shona 
speaking people along the Bulawayo-Harare road with their luggage waiting for transport to 
take them to Mashonaland (Interview with Nyathi, 2017).  
 ZIPRA regular forces with their tanks started moving from Essexvelle in Esigodini, 
Matebeleland South whilst some were moving from Gwaai AP in Matabeleland North towards 
Bulawayo to reinforce their colleagues at Entumbane (Interview with Jack Mpofu, one of the 
senior ZIPRA commanders, 2017). If nothing urgent and decisive was implemented, the 




Esigodini and Gwaai did not reach Bulawayo as the convoy from Esigodini was pulverised by 
the Rhodesian air force at Ascot Shopping centre just at the door steps of Bulawayo. The Gwaai 
convoy was also stopped along the way (Interview with Jack Mpofu, 2017). So, the speedy 
intervention of former RSFs on the side of ZANLA and the use of their sophisticated air force 
and mechanised infantry became instrumental in the defeat of ZIPRA forces who had initially 
overpowered their ZANLA rivals (Evans, 1991). It also took the intervention of senior military 
commanders from both ZIPRA and ZANLA to quell the violence.  
 Sadomba (2011) notes that ZANU-PF was able to reconcile with the Whites but failed to 
achieve Black-to-Black reconciliation and that was worse between the armed forces that failed 
to tolerate each other. Mutual hate and fear ran high within both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-
combatants. Munemo (2016) suggests that if only the inter-Black differences were attended to 
at Lancaster, perhaps the contradictions and violence at APs could have been averted. 
ZIPRA also fought against ZANLA cadres in February 1981 at Entumbane in what is generally 
known as the second Entumbane skirmishes. The precise causes of the clash are not clear. 
However, what is clear is that factional fighting spread to other APs like Ntabazinduna, 
Chitungwiza, and Glenville and to Connemara in the Midlands (Jackson, 2011). What was 
more disastrous is that factional fighting also percolated the integrated units. Specifically, three 
out of the nine integrated battalions were embroiled in fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA 
former guerrillas (Jackson, 2011). BMATT advised that the three battalions be disbanded. As 
noted by Jackson (2011), the parties to the conflict were now Blacks against Blacks unlike 
during the liberation struggle where it was mainly Blacks against Whites. The factional fighting 
not only intensified mistrust and hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers but also 




Due to a heightened sense of fear and insecurity, many ZIPRA ex-combatants deserted the APs 
and the ZNA and returned to their homelands. Put differently, several ZIPRA ex-combatants 
‘demobilised’ from the ZNA as they felt unwanted and insecure (Interview with Leornad 
Ndlovu who left the ZNA during the period of clashes at APs, 2017). In order to stabilise the 
security situation, ZANU-PF decided to disarm thousands of ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres at 
APs without consulting the JHC (Kriger, 2003). Some of the ZIPRA soldiers thought that they 
had been betrayed by their military leaders who urged them to stop fighting during clashes at 
APs whilst they had thought that they would urge them to fight to the bitter end. Nyathi noted 
that ZIPRA soldiers actually tried to shoot the helicopter that was used by the ZIPRA 
commanders to urge restraint between the fighting forces (Interview with Nyathi, 2017). 
According to Nyathi, when the former RSFs arrived in Bulawayo, they positioned themselves 
between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces and started to fight ZIPRA soldiers who were refusing to 
ceasefire (Interview with Nyathi, 2017). ZIPRA forces thought that the Rhodesian forces were 
assisting ZANLA against them and that accentuated the feelings of being unwanted and 
perceptions that their liberation war sacrifices were all in vain (Interview with Leornard, 2017). 
 Sibanda states that there were about two major results of the clashes at the APs to the ZIPRA 
ex-combatants. First, their morale plummeted to the lowest ebbs and a feeling of being 
unwanted crept in. They also felt they had been betrayed by their former commanders 
(Interview, 2017). The fissures between the top ZIPRA commanders and PF-ZAPU political 
leadership and between ZIPRA commanders who helped to contain the clashes and ZIPRA 
rank and file was to the benefit of an insecure and suspicious ZANU-PF government (Evans, 
1991). 
ZANU-PF was insecure over ZIPRA cadres because they had sophisticated military hardware 
as well as an air force which the new government assumed PF-ZAPU would use to launch a 




ZANU-PF fears and mistrust of PF-ZAPU were also intensified by the fact that Soviet support 
for PF-ZAPU dramatically increased during the transition period and continued even after the 
election period. According to Munemo (2016), the increase in Soviet support fuelled 
speculation that the Soviets were planning to back Nkomo in a military campaign against 
ZANU-PF, a party that capitalist powers saw as a lesser threat than PF-ZAPU. 
 ZANU-PF also thought that PF-ZAPU had deliberately held back some of its best trained 
forces in Zambia in preparation for a conventional onslaught against a ZANU-PF government 
(Kriger, 2003). It is possible that the government thought that Joshua Nkomo and his party 
were up to sabotage it. Ngwenya (2014) believes that the former Rhodesian Special Branch 
intelligence unit could have also exaggerated these issues in order to further accentuate the 
levels of antagonism between the former liberation parties. 
The blame for the fighting was entirely put on ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU by the government. What 
made the accusations against ZIPRA unbelievable is that the findings of a commission that was 
set up to investigate the causes of the clashes were never made public (Msipa, 2015). Whilst 
all this was happening on the military front, there were concerted efforts by ZANU-PF to 
downplay or even discredit the roles that PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA forces played to liberate 
Zimbabwe. Songs, dance, music and slogans that were played on national radio and television 
were exclusively ZANLA (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). For example, ZANU-PF ran a radio 
programme every Sunday morning which it called Dzimbo dzeChimurenga Dzakasunungura 
Zimbabwe (Chimurenga Songs that liberated Zimbabwe). These were songs used by ZANLA 
guerrillas to mobilise and motivate supporters during the war (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). PF-
ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants resented such partisan portrayal of the liberation struggle 
which undermined their contribitions and sacrifices during the war. ZANU-PF strategies 
against ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU in general undermined reconciliation, inclusivity 




5.7 The Arms Cache ‘Discovery’ and the Collapse of the GNU, 1982 
The ‘discovery’ of arms caches on two ZIPRA farms was a result of a botched disarmament 
process and also bordered around political malice by ZANU-PF. The ‘discovery’ of arms 
caches had adverse effects on the DDR and peace processes in Zimbabwe in general and 
specifically, on ZIPRA ex-combatants with regards to how they were treated in the ZNA and 
in civilian life. Whilst the issue of the arms caches before and after independence was real, 
what have not been fully investigated are the motives behind the caching. The lack of 
government commitment to fully interrogate the arms caches as well as their ‘discovery’ led 
Nkomo (1984) to conclude that ZANU-PF deliberately fabricated the issue and blew it out of 
proportion in order to get a pretext to annihilate ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU and then 
establish a one-party state. 
5.7.1 The History of Arms Caches in Zimbabwe 
According to Mnangagwa who was Minister of State Security by then, different weapons were 
‘discovered’ on ZIPRA farms in 1982. According to ZANU-PF, these weapons had been 
cached by the ZIPRA ex-combatants with the full knowledge and concurrence from their 
former senior military commanders and PF-ZAPU politicians, including Joshua Nkomo. The 
alleged aim of caching arms was to topple ZANU-PF government and then install PF-ZAPU 
into political power (Mnangagwa, 1989). To ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU wanted to get into power 
through the back door by using a military coup (Mnangagwa, 1989). 
Armed with the arms cache ‘discovery’ story which it presented as an act of treason by ZIPRA 
and PF-ZAPU, ZANU-PF went on to sack four PF-ZAPU cabinet Ministers from the GNU on 
17 February 1982 (Sibanda, 2005). Alongside the sacking of PF-ZAPU cabinet Ministers was 
the arrest and detention of senior former ZIPRA military commanders. The list of detained 




Masala Sibanda, Misheck Velaphi, Isaac Nyathi and Jack Mpofu. They were arrested and 
detained on allegations of treason (Sibanda, 2005; Interview with Jack Mpofu, 2017). Although 
these military leaders were acquitted by the courts, Dabengwa and Masuku remained in 
detention for unclear reasons up until the end of 1986. 
 The third effect of the arms cache ‘discovery’ was the confiscation of all ZIPRA properties. 
Given the well-documented history of ZANU-ZAPU rivalry and ZIPRA-ZANLA clashes 
before independence and thereafter at APs, it is possible that ZANU-PF could have genuinely 
believed that arms caches were earmarked to topple the government. However, what became 
questionable and suspicious was that even though the suspected culprits behind the caching of 
arms were acquitted by the courts, they remained under unexplained detention for quite a long 
time. 
All these developments made the demobilisation and reintegration of ZIPRA ex-combatants 
difficult to achieve. UNOSAA (2005) prescribes that trust and confidence should be built in 
DDR programs through the participation of senior commanders of all the military factions. 
This can happen if there is no competition among and between parties to the DDR process. 
Where there are mutual suspicions and hostilities, this could be difficult to achieve. The 
dissolution of the GNU and the arrest of senior ZIPRA personnel contradicted the prescriptions 
of UNOSAA and helped to intensify inter-party rivalries and hostilities. During the period of 
heightened inter-party animosities, the levels of trust and confidence between the stakeholders 
to the DDR process subsided to the lowest ebbs as open and frank dialogue was muzzled. 
Vindictive measures replaced whatever little co-operative activities had earlier on prevailed in 
the GNU and that helped to further harden positions. The DDR process in Zimbabwe was 
atypical because, instead of promoting inclusivity, the government that was leading the process 




As the thin veneer of unity and reconciliation within the GNU crumbled, the DDR process was 
also adversely affected. Open confrontations came to characterise and shape PF-ZAPU-
ZANU-PF and ZIPRA-ZANLA relationships. The dismissal of Joshua Nkomo and his 
colleagues from the GNU as well as the arrest of ZIPRA senior commanders left the ZIPRA 
ex-combatants within and without the ZNA with deep feelings of being politically and 
militarily leaderless (Interview with Mazinyane and SaSidudla, 2017). It became difficult for 
them to trust and respect institutions where they were not represented at leadership levels. 
Although they had new leaders under a ZANU-PF government, what has to be noted is that 
ZIPRA ex-combatants had unflinching respect and admiration for their former commander-in-
chief, Joshua Nkomo and to a large extent, their former senior military commanders, Dabengwa 
and Masuku in particular (Interview with Mazinyane, Sibanda and Jack Mpofu). Although 
Sibanda remained in the ZNA until his retirement in 2006, he recalls that the sacking of cabinet 
Ministers aligned to PF-ZAPU from government and the unlawful detention of senior ZIPRA 
commanders sparked an exodus of ZIPRA ex-fighters from the army. According to Sibanda, 
many ZIPRA ex-combatants quit the army as they felt they no longer had any representation 
in government and in the military circles (Interview, 2017). A closer scrutiny of the case of the 
arms caches, especially the circumstances surrounding their ‘discovery’ indicate that to a large 
extent, the issue was politicised and also stage managed in order for ZANU-PF to get a pretext 
to eliminate PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants.   
The motivation for the caching of arms during the transition period was both political and 
security-oriented (Sibanda, 2005; Hoffman and Nyathi (1990) in Mashike, 2000). Lot revealed 
that they cached quite a lot of weapons around Mashumbi Pools AP in Mashonaland West in 
1980 just in case they were attacked by ZANLA after the election results (Interview with Lot 
who was a driver and responsible for supplying ZIPRA cadres with weapons during the 




PF government should PF-ZAPU lose the election. There were some hard core ZIPRA cadres 
who did not want to think of any prospects of a ZANU-PF government (Interview with Mr X, 
2017). The fact that the cached weapons were not used to destabilise a ZANU-PF government 
on a larger scale was due to the fact that PF-ZAPU leaders did not support any planned violent 
manoeuvres by ZIPRA against ZANU-PF government. 
Since PF-ZAPU political leaders did not support any moves to topple the government through 
unconstitutional means, it can be noted that the caching of arms had no blessings from them 
and it could not be true that they were planning a coup against ZANU-PF. To a large extent, 
the caching of arms was common security guarantee that had the blessings of some senior 
military commanders from both ZANLA and ZIPRA. The late General Vitalis Zvinavashe 
(former commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces) made it clear to Dzinesa that indeed 
ZANLA cached arms and that was mainly done for security reasons (Dzinesa, 2005:89). In one 
of the interviews that Dzinesa had with him in 2004, Zvinavashe stated that: 
Fighting groups surrendered their weapons to the national armoury and these were 
registered with their serial numbers. However, not every weapon was surrendered. 
Some fighters were uncertain of the ceasefire and feared the worst should the war 
restart. So, some hid weapons. This partly explains the presence of arms caches. In 
every (armed) revolution it is difficult to account for every weapon (Dzinesa, 
2005:89). 
Zvinavashe’s point is corroborated by what the former President, Robert Mugabe told mourners 
during the burial of Murozvi, who was declared a national hero and buried in Harare at the 
national shrine on 12 April 2017. Mugabe told the mourners that James Murozvi was one 
among thousands of ZANLA guerrillas that ZANU-PF kept outside APs in readiness for any 
eventuality (Live television broadcast on 12 April 2017). It is obvious that these guerrillas that 
ZANU-PF kept outside APs could have cached their weapons. One therefore is persuaded to 




ZANLA and ZIPRA military leaders instructed their guerrillas to hide arms for security 
reasons.  
The reason for focussing on the arms caches by ZANLA guerrillas is simple. It is meant to 
debunk the myth that ZIPRA guerrillas cached arms with the sole intention of toppling a 
ZANU-PF government. Both guerrilla forces cached weapons and military leaders from both 
ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU knew about that. Although the idea of fighting against a ZANU-PF 
government could have been initially part of the ZIPRA motives in caching arms, the idea 
dissipated when Joshua Nkomo told them to support the new government.  
 The arms cache ‘discovery’ was more likely part of the political ploy by ZANU-PF to 
capitalise on the traditional rivalry between ZIPRA and ZANLA and then to eliminate the 
former. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) argues that the government happily capitalised on the so-
called arms cache ‘discovery’ on ZIPRA farms to pick up a fight with PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA 
ex-combatants. The story was manipulated and then used as one of the clearest examples and 
exhibits that indicated ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU were counter-revolutionaries and bitter losers 
who were scheming to violently depose a democratically elected government (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2006). 
Further adding on to the impossibility of having cached arms with the motive of staging a coup 
is Comrade Cecil Banda’s revelations. Banda was Brigade Chief of Logistics for ZIPRA at 
Gwaai River Mine AP in 1980. Banda argued that: 
If the motive for caching arms was to topple ZANU-PF government, then we could 
all (ZIPRA) have rushed to all the places where we had cached the arms 
immediately after we heard about ZANU-PF electoral victory; took up arms and 
rendered the country ungovernable through physical violence if we so wished. We 
hid arms for security reasons. It is for this reason that l prefer to call the so-called 
‘arms cache discovery’ an ‘arms cache scandal’. It was a scandal not an arms 
discovery because ZANU-PF knew very well that arms were hidden all over the 
country by both ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas, but decided to blame only ZIPRA 




something which you have prior knowledge of its existence (Interview with Banda, 
2017). 
Banda’s version of the reasons behind the caching of the weapons could be true for some not 
all of the ZIPRA combatants. As would be seen later, some ZIPRA ex-combatants were against 
any propects of a ZANU-PF government such that they could have cached weapons with the 
intention of opposing and destabilising it. 
 Alao (2012) believes that some of the arms could have been cached for use by the UMkhonto 
WeSizwe guerrillas of the South African National Congress. An interview with A. Mpofu 
pointed to the fact that the Umkhonto WeSizwe story in relation to the arms caches is true 
although not all arms which were hidden were earmarked for the South African guerrillas. 
Mpofu highlighted that ZIPRA commanders told them that it was better if they gave their heavy 
weapons to UMkhonto WeSizwe guerrillas for use in their struggle against Apartheid than to 
donate them to a ZANU-PF government (Interview with Mpofu who was one of the ZIPRA 
cadres involved in caching weapons, 2017). This further indicates the high levels of mistrust 
and rivalry between ZANLA and ZIPRA.  
 The line of thinking by ZIPRA commanders regarding helping UMkhonto WeSizwe rather 
than ZANU-PF gives ample evidence that ZIPRA ex-combatants did not like a ZANU-PF 
government. It would be an exaggeration therefore to suggest that ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
mere innocent victims of ZANLA harassment. The relationships between the two were 
mutually antagonistic. It is possible that a PF-ZAPU constituted government could have also 
persecuted and marginalised ZANU-PF and ZANLA ex-combatants. What made PF-ZAPU 
and ZIPRA ex-combatants to be at the losing end is that ZANU-PF had political power and 
controlled the state media through which it disseminated anti-ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU 




Nkomo (1984) is of the view that the hiding of arms could have intensified during the period 
of fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA former guerrillas at APs. Nkomo substantiates his 
view by stating that the locations of the arms cache sites were close to APs where factional 
fighting once took place and it is possible that arms could have been hidden during the course 
of fighting. Arms caches were discovered at Hampton Ranch near Connemara Barracks and 
also at Ascot Farm which is about less than eleven kilometres from the then Entumbane AP 
(Nkomo, 1984). 
5.7.2 Circumstances Surrounding the Arms Cache ‘Discovery’ 
The timing of the arms cache ‘discovery’ was well calculated. It coincided with the period 
when ZIPRA cadres had been completely disarmed following the second clash between them 
and ZANLA at Entumbane in February 1981 (Alao, 2012). The timing of the arms cache 
‘discovery’ was strategically convenient for ZANU-PF to offload PF-ZAPU from the coalition 
government since the latter had assisted in ensuring that ZIPRA was disarmed. Alao (2012:81) 
opines that: 
When they were first discovered (arms caches), the government believed that 
Nkomo had not outlived his usefulness; integration was still going on and Mugabe 
did not know what the reaction of the ZIPRA guerrillas would be if Nkomo were 
to be punished. Thus, the government waited for a more favourable time to deal 
with the arms cache issue, and February 1982 was considered perfect. The 
integration of the armed forces was almost over, and the Entumbane experience 
had given Mugabe the confidence he needed to deal with the issue. He could also 
count on the former Rhodesian African Rifles and the white-piloted air force to 
deal with any problem that could emerge. 
Sibanda (2005) supports Alao’s view by arguing that the arms caches had to be ‘discovered’ 
after ZIPRA was completely disarmed and scattered around. The ‘discovery’ was supposed to 
be at a time when ZIPRA forces were already incapacitated since the Prime Minister was 
unsure how they would respond to the victimisation of their former superiors, both in the 
political and military fields. The case of the identification of the location of arms caches at 




before the ‘official’ arms cache ‘discovery’ by the government in February 1982 but was kept 
a secret (Doran, 2017). 
 Nkomo (1984) also believes that although weapons were ‘discovered’ in and around ZIPRA-
owned farms, ZANU-PF investigators could have ferried some weapons from other places at 
night and dumped them on ZIPRA farms to swell the number of the ‘discovered’ weapons in 
order to build a big case against ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU and justify their suppression. From the 
above analysis, one can deduce that ZANU-PF was guided by the spirit of eliminating PF-
ZAPU and ZIPRA in DDR processes not that of accommodating them. In Doran’s (2017:15) 
words: 
The focus of Mugabe’s attention during the first year of Zimbabwe’s independence 
was to eliminate ZIPRA because ZAPU had to be disarmed before it could be taken 
apart politically. 
Nkomo’s suspicion that ZANU-PF could have clandestinely swelled the quantity of weapons 
on ZIPRA properties is based on the fact that although he travelled together with Mnangagwa 
from Harare to Bulawayo in February 1982, he (Mnangagwa) did not hint to him that the 
purpose of his journey was to investigate arms caches on ZIPRA-owned farms. Nkomo reveals 
that he was shocked in the evening of that day when Mnangagwa reported on national television 
that stock piles of weapons had been ‘discovered’ on two ZIPRA farms (Nkomo, 1984).  These 
developments were a testimony that political and military rivals in Zimbabwe could not 
effectively conduct DDR processes alone without assistance from external players who would 
help them to reconcile and develop trust and confidence in each other. They could not do that 
on their own. In South Africa, political and military rivals were able to work together in DDR 
programs because they immediately developed trust and confidence in each other after 
independence. Reconciliation and inclusivity initiatives in South Africa were made practical. 




and they failed to forgive and reconcile. In fact, reconciliation was never fully implemented, 
especially between rival African political and military formations. 
Dzinesa (2005) concludes that the lingering legacy of mistrust and hostility between ZANU-
PF and PF-ZAPU and between ZANLA and ZIPRA, continued to impede the DDR process. 
Furthermore, mutual mistrust, suspicion, rivalry and hostility immensely led to a partisan DDR 
process that was characterised by the blame and counter blame game between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA ex-combatants. Even though there was no conclusive proof that linked ZIPRA ex-
combatants to the arms caches besides the fact that they were found on two of their many 
properties, Alexander et al (2000:188) noted that: 
Mugabe treated the caches as definitive proof that PF-ZAPU had always been 
planning a coup; that it had held back forces and cached weapons in a final struggle 
to overthrow a ZANU-PF government. 
In other words, through the arms caches, it can be argued that Mugabe had finally got a strong 
scapegoat that would enable him to destroy both ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU. Doran (2017:15) 
reveals that South African Intelligence indicate that Mugabe wanted to physically confront 
ZIPRA and nothing could stop him from pursuing and fulfilling that objective. Given the fear 
that ZANU-PF had on the superiority of ZIPRA, Doran argues that Mugabe wanted to show 
Joshua Nkomo that he was now on top of the situation through provoking a fight where he 
would convincingly trounce him militarily. A two-day rally held in Bulawayo that was 
addressed by Enos Nkala together with other prominent ZANU-PF politicians seems to have 
been meant to spark violent conflict and achieve Mugabe’s dream. According to Doran (2017), 
ZANU-PF got what it wanted as fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA exploded at Entumbane 
cantonment site on the second day of the rally. 
It is also believed that the Rhodesian intelligence network could have been behind the 




liberation movements and their former military wings divided and antagonistic to each other 
(Ngwenya, 2014; Doran, 2017). For example, intelligence supplied to ZANU-PF implicated 
ZIPRA ex-combatants in a series of bombings of strategic installations and assassination 
attempts on the Prime Minister. The strategy could have been meant to strengthen the evidence 
that indeed ZIPRA had cached arms with the intention of bringing down a ZANU-PF led 
government. In other words, the former Rhodesian Special Branch operatives wanted to make 
the accusations levelled by ZANU-PF against ZIPRA ex-combatants for caching arms appear 
real. The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (2005) documents these bombings in greater 
detail and they are worth noting due to their significance in contributing towards straining 
relations and in making ZANU-PF more suspicious of ZIPRA intentions. 
On 25 July 1981, the Freedom Arch near Harare International Airport was damaged by an 
explosion. In December of the same year, the ZANU-PF headquarters were rocked by another 
massive explosion. As if that was not enough, there was an attempt on the Prime Minister’s life 
on 26 June 1982. On the military side, powerful explosives pulverised the Inkomo Barracks 
armoury on 16 August 1981 whilst incendiary devices destroyed Thornhill Air Base in Gweru 
on 25 July 1982 (Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa, 2005:39-40). Although ZANU-PF 
pretended to be in a quandary pertaining to the source of all these subversive activities, it 
enthusiastically listened to sources that laid blame squarely on ZIPRA ex-combatants’ 
shoulders.  
Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005) state that it is very possible that South African-backed elements 
clandestinely got into Thornhill Air Base and planted explosive devices in the planes and also 
went to Cranborne military site in Harare and stole some weapons. The saboteurs could have 
capitalised on the well-known history of ZANLA-ZIPRA mistrust and fears to further stoke 




subversive activities were sponsored by South Africa but ignored that as it wanted a pretext to 
decisively deal with ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU and subdue them. 
The discussions on the arms caches and their ‘discovery’ point to the fact that the mistrusts and 
suspicions that existed between ZIPRA and ZANLA since the liberation struggle did not 
subside after independence. Instead their hostile relationships characterised the whole process 
of DDR.  It is possible that ZANU-PF felt that it could not accomplish its political objectives 
when its rival was still intact. In order to weaken it, its military backbone had to be destroyed 
first. This meant that ZIPRA had to be marginalised in DDR processes. Measures that were 
taken by ZANU-PF in response to the arms cache ‘discovery’ provoked a trail of other 
developments which further compromised the DDR process as the chasm between ZANU-PF-
PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA-ZANLA became very wide and dangerous. A ‘Security Dilemma’ 
intensified and prospects for reconciliation became dim. 
5.8 ZIPRA Experiences within the ZNA  
After the resignation of General Peter Walls in June 1980 and the ascendancy of former 
ZANLA commander Solomon Mujuru as the commander of the ZNA, the politicisation and 
ethnicisation of the army to serve ZANU-PF interests took centre stage. Kriger (2003:43) 
points out that right from the beginning of the integration process, Mujuru had envisaged an 
exclusively ZANLA constituted ZNA. Mujuru’s thinking was predicated on the assumption 
that ZANLA guerrillas contributed more than ZIPRA towards the liberation of Zimbabwe. His 
perception was also shared by a majority of ZANU-PF politicians (Kriger, 2003).  
5.8.1 Promotions 
Due to the arms cache ‘discovery’, two key ZIPRA leaders were removed from the JHC. These 




grounds that they were complicit in the treasonous actions of their senior leaders. With the 
removal of the top ZIPRA leaders from the ZNA, the ground was open for the ZANLA ex-
combatants to fill all the top leadership positions that were left vacant by the purged ZIPRA 
cadres (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). The merit-based criterion for promotions was 
discarded in favour of a politically-based criterion. Many ZIPRA cadres could not qualify for 
promotions in the latter criterion (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). These developments 
removed many ZIPRA ex-combatants from formal and paid employment and made their 
economic reintegration a challenge. 
The case of Mazinyane and Dube illustrate the above situation clearly. Mazinyane was 
integrated into the ZNA in 1980 as a Captain. He was demoted to a lower rank during the period 
of friction between ZIPRA and ZANLA in the early 1980s, only to be re-promoted later but 
slowly after 1987. Mazinyane retired with the rank of Brigadier General whilst some ZANLA 
ex-combatants who were integrated into the ZNA with ranks below his had risen to ranks above 
Brigadier Generals by the time of his retirement (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017).  
As for Dube, his rank at the time of integration was that of Major. However, when he retired 
from the ZNA in 2001, he had risen to a rank of Lieutenant Colonel. This meant that throughout 
a period of 21 years of service in the army, he maintained one rank and was only promoted 
once on the eve of his retirement (Interview with Dube, 2017). Dube has argued that the 
scenario that prevailed in the ZNA was interesting yet ridiculous in terms of promotions. He 
noted that some of the ZANLA cadres whom they re-trained after independence ended up 
commanding most senior ZIPRA cadres.  
The consequence of the prevalence of ethnically-skewed promotions in the army that favoured 
ZANLA over ZIPRA caused the frustrations of many ZIPRA cadres who left the army before 




he or she lost all the benefits and went home empty-handed.  More ZIPRA senior cadres 
continued to be dismissed from the ZNA under dubious charges. Examples of ex-ZIPRA 
fighters who were unfairly dismissed from the army included Charles Grey, Kindness Ndlovu, 
Tshili Nleya, Eddie Sigoge among others. These were dismissed, arrested and detained in 1985 
on allegations that they were planning a coup against ZANU-PF (Alexander, et al, 2000). Once 
arrested and removed from the army, one not only lost his benefits, but also became vulnerable 
to unbridled physical harassment. To some extent, the harassment of former ZIPRA cadres 
within the ZNA could be regulated as opposed to that which took place outside. Due to fear, 
many ZIPRA ex-combatants left the army and went into hiding only to resurface after the Unity 
Accord in 1987. Whilst in hiding, they could not carryout any meaningful socio-political and 
economic activities which could facilitate their reintegration. 
The strategy of arresting well experienced and senior ZIPRA ex-combatants seemed to be well 
calculated to diminish their influence within the ZNA and to pave way for ZANLA ex-
combatants to assume leadership positions of the army. Except for Dabengwa, Masuku and a 
few others who were arrested and detained together with them, the other ZIPRA ex-combatants 
who were arrested in the mid-1980s were never brought before the courts to prove their 
innocence or guilt. That act proved that ZANU-PF knew that the accused ZIPRA cadres had 
no case to answer but were only targeted for victimisation as a strategy of removing them from 
the national army, especially senior ones.  
It is not true that all ZIPRA ex-combatants were not promoted within the ZNA. Some of them 
were promoted. However, what was common in those few promotions is that the majority of 
the ZIPRA ex-combatants never went beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (Interview with 
Dube, 2017). Many ZIPRA cadres who held very senior positions during the liberation struggle 
like Eddie Sigoge, Swazini Ndlovu and Stanley Gagisa Nleya amongst others were dismissed 




the strategy of not promoting ZIPRA ex-combatants beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel 
was deliberate as ZANU-PF did not want them to be full Colonels. The rank of full Colonel 
goes along with quite a number of benefits that are given by the state (Interview, 2017). By 
1977, Sigoge and Gagisa were camp commanders and chief of staff respectively at the ZIPRA 
CGT camp in Zambia, and if it were not for the partisan promotions, they could have risen to 
the top echelons of the ZNA after independence (Sunday News, 16-22 July 2017). 
One problem noted by Kriger (2003) pertaining to the status of the few ZIPRA officers within 
the ZNA between 1982 and 1987 is that these officers had no real power over junior ZANLA 
officers as they refused to recognise ZIPRA promotions. Sigoge revealed his disappointment 
over his harassment by ZANU-PF when he preferred to be cremated rather than buried in any 
of the heroes’ acres as is the norm when ex-combatants die. Sigoge died on 25 June 2017, and 
as per his wish, he was cremated on 3 July 2017 and his remains were thrown into the Zambezi 
River (Sunday News, 2-8 July 2017). Sigoge’s case shows the level of frustration in some of 
ZIPRA ex-combatants over a partisan DDR process in Zimbabwe. What happened within the 
army directly affected demobilisation and reintegration. Whilst outside the army, some ZIPRA 
former guerrillas lived as outcasts for the better part of the 1980s, only to resurface after the 
Unity Accord of 1987. Socially and economically, they were unable to reintegrate. 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) posit that it is prudent to give ex-combatants a stake in the 
post-conflict political and military structures so that they can feel respected and honoured. This 
could be achieved through making sure that the integration process incorporates representatives 
of all the armed forces from competing factions into a national army. The second strategy to 
achieve that is to appoint key military officers from all the military factions into strategic 
positions in the national army. However, what Humphreys and Weinstein suggest is difficult 
to achieve where formerly adversarial political and military groups have deeply entrenched 




5.8.2 The Experience of the Ordinary ZIPRA Soldier in the ZNA 
The experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were not on the command structure were almost 
similar, though they differed slightly depending on the unit one was attached to. A few ZIPRA 
ex-combatants who were integrated into specialist units like the Signals department, 
Maintenance, Health, Social Services, Intelligence Corps, Engineering, Pay Corps as well as 
those who became instructors, or were in the armoured cars division among other departments 
of the army fared better than their colleagues who were integrated into the infantry battalions 
dotted all around the country (Interview with Mpande; Ndazi and Sibanda who were in the Pay 
Corps, armoured cars division and training depot respectively, 2017).The administration of the 
Infantry Battalions was different from that of the specialist departments. Infantry Battalions 
accommodated the majority of the soldiers, and in most cases, they are located in the rural areas 
or on the outskirts of urban centres.  
 The level of professionalism and discipline was compromised in most of the Infantry 
Battalions. The reason could have been that the ruling party was meddling in the running of 
military affairs in a bid to create a ‘politically correct’ army. It was even worse for those ZIPRA 
ex-combatants who were posted to 2 Brigade, 3 Brigade, 4 Brigade and 5 Brigade. These 
Brigades are in Mashonaland, Manicaland, Masvingo and Midlands Provinces respectively 
(Interview with Sebata, a ZIPRA ex-combatant who was integrated into 3 Brigade in 
Manicaland, 2017). Sebata reveals that caricatures of Joshua Nkomo were usually found on 
dining hall, toilet, and canteen walls in different army barracks. In retaliation, ZIPRA ex-
combatants also caricatured Robert Mugabe the former commander-in-chief of ZANLA during 
the liberation struggle (Interview, 2017). As a result of such minor issues, fist fights always 
ensued between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants which at times produced nasty results as 




Stories that were told to the researcher by a couple of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were in the 
ZNA between 1982 and 1987 point to the fact that they had horrible experiences. A focus group 
discussion with Bhebhe, Mpofu, Ndebele, Moyo, and Mleya, all of whom were part of the 
integrated infantry battalions outside Matabeleland indicated that the survival of the ordinary 
ZIPRA ex-combatant in the ZNA in the early to mid-1980s was difficult. First, the five 
participants concurred that one of the survival strategies in the ZNA was to quickly learn the 
Shona language as a way of disguising oneself and to also identify with the system that was 
led by a predominantly Shona administration (Focus group discussion, 2017).  
In fact, after the departure of many White instructors from the ZNA in mid-1980 to 1981, the 
Shona language became the ‘official’ medium of instruction in the army. Even after learning 
the Shona language for survival purposes, it is said that many ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
‘sold-out’ by their Ndebele names and surnames which were used to link them to PF-ZAPU 
and ZIPRA (Focus group discussion, 2017). It can be noticed that mistrust and hostility 
continued to prevail between rival ex-combatant groups even within the national army. Due to 
continued victimisation, some ex-ZIPRA cadres deserted the army with their weapons, further 
adding to the stockpile of unofficial weapons that were outside the control of the government. 
In one focus group discussion, Bhebhe articulated that routine roll calls every morning exposed 
ZIPRA ex-combatants to both physical and verbal abuse on a daily basis. ZIPRA ex-
combatants who were Shona-speaking and had Shona names and surnames fared better as they 
were able to successfully disguise themselves as former ZANLA cadres and became exempt 
from physical harassment and from being labelled as ‘dissidents’ or ‘dissident sympathisers.’ 
It became a ‘crime’ for ZIPRA ex-combatants to be seen discussing in groups of about five or 
more within the ZNA (Focus group discussion, 2017). It was alleged that they would be 
discussing about deserting and joining their colleagues who were ‘dissidents.’ Ndebele 




said ‘Iwe mudissident! Huya pano.’ In the English language it means, ‘You dissident! Come 
here.’  
When Ndebele went to him, he was smacked first and asked about Joshua Nkomo and the 
whereabouts of other ‘dissidents’ (Interview, 2017). This could be viewed as one of the 
strategies meant to frustrate ZIPRA ex-combatants so that they could leave the army. What is 
interesting is that although ZIPRA was a multi-ethnic army; the full brunt of verbal and 
physical abuse fell on the shoulders of Ndebele-speaking ZIPRA ex-combatants only. This 
speaks volumes about the negative effects of the politicisation of ethnicity in nation building 
as well in the creation of a national army. The use of Shona language as a medium of 
communication in a multi-ethnic army unambiguously depicted disregard for the ZIPRA ex-
combatants. The majority of ZIPRA ex-combatants were Ndebele speaking.  In fact, the 
winner-loser relationship that was prevalent on the political front cascaded into the army and 
ZIPRA ex-combatants who were viewed as ‘losers’ had to quickly learn the Shona language in 
order to survive in the army. One indicator of successful DDR is the security of ex-combatants, 
both physical and human security. ZIPRA ex-combatants could not be said to have gone 
through successful DDR processes whilst quite a number of them were vulnerable to physical 
persecution. 
The victimisation was not only confined to being accused of being ‘dissidents’ and forced to 
learn the Shona language. ZIPRA ex-combatants who were granted official leave by the army 
faced some daunting challenges on the way to their destinations. Before their departure, names 
and villages of origin were always noted down. When they left the barracks en route to their 
destinations they encountered police roadblocks from all the routes leading out of the barracks. 
They were always searched, tortured, beaten and/or arrested and detained despite having 
official leave passes. Some of them were shot in cold blood during altercations with security 




Bhebhe, the roadblocks were specifically mounted for purposes of dealing with ZIPRA ex-
combatants who were released from the barracks.  
It can be noticed that life for ZIPRA ex-combatants was not only tough within the barracks, 
but also outside as well. Some of those who managed to reach their destinations were always 
followed up using the personal contact details they left behind. They were always accused of 
sympathising with the ‘dissidents’ or of having hidden arms in their houses and homesteads. 
Such accusations usually resulted in severe beatings, torture and even death (Interview with 
Bhebhe and Ndebele, 2017). Due to the security challenges of the period, especially in relation 
to the ZIPRA ex-combatants, those who were injured during the course of beatings and torture 
could not seek treatment in government-run health institutions because government institutions 
would require police reports detailing the circumstances surrounding the injury before 
attending to the patient. Ndebele said that in most cases, the police officers could not write 
reports on the injuries sustained by ZIPRA ex-combatants at the hands of security agents 
because they either worked in cahoots with the system or feared to be labelled as ‘dissident 
sympathisers’ as well (Interview, 2017). 
Most of the injured ZIPRA ex-combatants therefore sought medical attention at Private 
Hospitals where fees were exorbitant (Interview with Ndebele, 2017). ZIPRA ex-combatants 
who were arrested at police roadblocks and then later detained sometimes failed to report back 
for duty on time. When they finally reported for duty, they were accused of having taken 
advantage of their leave days to feed vital security information to the ‘dissidents.’ They were 
also punished for their ‘transgressions.’ Quite a number of ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
physically and verbally abused in the 1980s. Some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants were killed at 
night by their ZANLA counterparts in the barracks. Mleya revealed that he was saved from 
being killed at Connemara barracks by one ex-combatant called Mbedzi, a ZANLA ex-




Mbedzi heard ZANLA ex-combatants plotting to assassinate me at night. Although 
Mbedzi was a ZANLA ex-combatant he sympathised with me since we were both 
Venda from Beitbridge. Mbedzi revealed the plot to me. At night l placed my 
pillow under my blankets to appear as if there was someone sleeping and then l left 
to sleep with a friend. When l checked my room in the morning, l found out that 
my bed was completely burnt from a grenade that had been thrown in through the 
window at night (Interview with Mleya, 2017). 
Mleya’s attempted murder case illustrate that there was physical elimination of ZIPRA ex-
combatants in the ZNA. The fears of ZIPRA ex-combatants were exacerbated by the 
mysterious ‘disappearances’ of some of their colleagues in broad daylight. Mleya pointed out 
that he actually witnessed the ‘disappearance’ of five ZIPRA ex-combatants from Connemara 
barracks. These ex-combatants were called aside during one morning parade, bundled into a 
small vehicle and whisked away after being beaten and accused of being ‘dissidents.’ They 
never came back and Mleya concludes that it is obvious that they were clandestinely killed 
since he personally knew two of them as well as their villages of origin, but have never seen 
them to date (Interview, 2017). Nilsson (2005) states that physical security guarantees to ex-
combatants are essential to prevent them from rearming. Some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants 
who could not bear the brunt of victimisation in the ZNA deserted with their weapons and 
became a security threat to the government. 
 Bhebe (2004b) cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) explains that it was only those who were at 
the periphery of the liberation struggle who misunderstood the post-colonial conflict in 
Zimbabwe because of their failure to grasp and appreciate the level of rivalry between 
ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA. Bhebe’s argument is that it is possible to imagine that even 
if it was PF-ZAPU that could have won the elections and formed the government, it is likely 
that it could have also used its military force to build a solid political power base and would 
have purged its rivals in the process.  
Tensions between ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA elements within the ZNA also ran high during 




are supposed to be apolitical, the origins of both ZIPRA and ZANLA within the political 
context of the liberation struggle made it difficult for them to stay aloof from political contests 
that involved their respective political parties. However, ZIPRA ex-combatants could not 
openly express their support for PF-ZAPU as ZANLA ex-combatants did for ZANU-PF 
(Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). ZIPRA ex-combatants feared to be harassed or killed 
because by 1985, the top leadership of the ZNA was solidly behind ZANU-PF.  
 When ZIPRA ex-combatants in the army told some of their colleagues who had disarmed and 
demobilised some terrifying stories about their victimisation, some of them became frightened 
and went back to their former operational zones and unearthed weapons they had hidden during 
the liberation struggle (Interview with X, 2017). This was done for self-defence but they could 
not go around villages wielding them which meant that they automatically became ‘dissidents’ 
(Interview with SaSidudla, 2017). As long as ZANLA ex-combatants and the government had 
a perception and feeling that all ZIPRA ex-combatants were ‘dissidents’ they could not tolerate 
and work with them smoothly and that mentality affected all DDR programs negatively and 
ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered the most. 
The unfortunate development in Zimbabwe is that critical decisions and powers to do with 
military integration were made by ZANU-PF Central Committee that usurped the authority and 
powers of the JHC after the collapse of the GNU in 1982 (Kriger, 2003). What could be 
expected was nothing less than the politicisation of the integration process at the expense of 
ZIPRA ex-combatants who had no political clout in the post-colonial dispensation.  The case 
of Zimbabwe concerning the military is a spectacular one because, instead of being a safe haven 
for various people with different backgrounds as the army is expected to be an apolitical and 
professional institution, the ZNA was vulnerable to partisan interests that were fuelled by inter-




5.9 The Plight of Demobilised ZIPRA Ex-Combatants 
 Demobilised ZIPRA cadres were not safe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) points out that many of 
the demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants were always picked up, beaten, interrogated, tortured 
or even killed by members of the 5th Brigade. As from 1982, ZIPRA ex-combatants who had 
been formally demobilised were increasingly subjected to arrests and harassment (CCJP, 
1997). Detention camps were specifically set up at St. Paul in Lupane; in Tsholotsho, in 
Plumtree air strip and at Bhalagwe in Kezi where the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) 
interrogated and tortured ZIPRA ex-combatants (CCJP, 1997). If ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-
combatants developed the spirit of brotherhood while they were at APs, they would have 
mitigated the types of antagonisms that characterised their relationships in post-independence. 
The CIO and members of the 5th Brigade used a couple of strategies to identify whether one 
was an ex-combatant or not. According to Ncube, they usually asked men who were about 
twenty years and above where they were between 1976 and 1979. Furthermore, they conducted 
thorough searches in homesteads where paraphernalia like belts, caps, jackets, photos and 
knives which the guerrillas brought from the countries where they trained were found and were 
used as evidence that one was involved in the armed struggle. Besides that, the Post Office 
Savings books which were used to receive demobilisation allowances ‘sold-out’ many ZIPRA 
ex-combatants to the CIO and 5th Brigade (Interview with Ncube who survived in the hands of 
the CIO in Tsholotsho, 2017). Ncube pointed out that once one was identified as a ZIPRA ex-
combatant; he was tortured and, in some cases, finally shot. By shooting ZIPRA ex-combatants, 
the members of the 5th Brigade were saying they wanted to show the civilian population how a 
‘dissident’ was treated (Interview, 2017).  
Mazinyane made it clear that the main targets of the 5th Brigade were demobilised ZIPRA ex-




terrorised. In explaining the predicament of the demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants in the hands 
of the 5th Brigade, Mazinyane (Interview, 2017) said: 
When confronted by the 5th Brigade, PF-ZAPU officials could discard their party 
cards and buy ZANU-PF cards and become ZANU-PF members. The same applied 
to PF-ZAPU supporters in general. They could buy ZANU-PF cards and chant its 
slogans in order to buy their freedom and save their lives. With regards to ZIPRA 
ex-combatants, there was no way they could rub off their ZIPRA status and become 
ZANLA. If one was ZIPRA or ZANLA there was no way that status could be 
changed. 
To make matters worse, ZIPRA ex-combatants who got injured in the hands of the 5th Brigade 
feared to seek medical treatment at government hospitals as they could be identified that they 
were ZIPRA ex-combatants which could have led to even more harassment. Injured ZIPRA 
ex-combatants therefore sought treatment from traditional healers who were not effectively 
equipped to deal with physical injuries (Interview with SaSidudla, 2017). SaSidudla made it 
clear that when he came from the liberation war, he had no physical scars but sustained life-
threatening injuries at home when he was tortured by the 5th Brigade.  
The evidence on the harsh experiences that were endured by the ZIPRA ex-combatants is 
corroborated by Brickhill (1995:166) who writes that: 
ZAPU’s ex-combatants in particular, suffered greatly during the period of inter-
party conflict. They were excluded from many job opportunities within the state 
sector and were singled out in the hunt for ‘dissidents’ during the deployment of 
the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland. Many were killed, several hundred ZAPU ex-
combatants were detained, and many more were harassed during this period. 
Those who could not be caught disguised their liberation war credentials whilst many flocked 
to the safety of the urban areas where the 5th Brigade was not deployed. Quite many eloped to 
neighbouring South Africa and Botswana (Interview with Dumani, 2017). ZANU-PF 
government’s partiality in the implementation of the DDR process made it difficult for 
demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants to report the abuse they endured in the hands of the state 
security agents. The abuse of the demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants continued up to the end 




that the aim of ZANU-PF was to break up the base of PF-ZAPU support and establish a one-
party state. Political leaders could not therefore leave such a situation unattended and think that 
it would resolve itself. They were supposed to adjust their thinking in the light of the prevailing 
or changing circumstances and engage into active consensus, trust, tolerance, and confidence 
building mechanisms to avoid discrimination and fighting between ex-combatants. 
5.10 ZIPRA Ex-Combatants’ Experiences in the Reintegration Programs 
One critical argument raised in chapter one was that it was within the interests of ZANU-PF to 
disarm ZIPRA guerrillas, but it was not in their same interests to ensure that they were 
empowered through viable reintegration programs. However, some of the challenges that 
affected ZIPRA ex-combatants in reintegration programs also affected ZANLA ex-combatants 
but in varying degrees of intensity. Differential reintegration experiences between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA were manifest from the earliest years due to security challenges that mainly inhibited 
the former from smoothly carrying out their day to day activities as free civilians. 
5.10.1 Monetary Benefits 
 It is a fact that the monetary benefits to the ex-combatants that were distributed through the 
Demobilisation Directorate were inadequate to facilitate effective economic reintegration. 
However, security-related challenges compounded the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-
combatants in relation to accessing the demobilisation payments of Z$185 per month over a 
period of two years. Kriger (2005:252) aptly put across the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-
combatants in this way: 
Demobilised ZIPRA cadres often forsook collecting their two-year monthly 
payments from Post Offices rather than risk being identified and victimised. 
There are a number of ZIPRA ex-combatants who ran away to seek sanctuary in South Africa 




demobilisation payments. Mathwasa left Zimbabwe to South Africa at the end of 1981 after a 
short stint in the ZNA and came back into the country after 1987 (Interview with Mathwasa, a 
ZIPRA ex-combatant who left the ZNA and went to South Africa, 2017). Although the small 
amount of the demobilisation stipends negatively affected both ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-
combatants it was better for those ex-combatants who got their money as a lump sum. Those 
who got lump sums of Z$4 440 could at least invest in immovable properties. Sadomba (2011) 
cites the case of a Mr Mhaka who had become a destitute after the liberation struggle but was 
assisted by Mudzingwa who was once a member of the ZIPA High Command to receive his 
lump sum of Z$4 440 at once instead of the monthly Z$185. Michael (2006) supports the idea 
of giving ex-combatants lump sum payments in that lump sums give them the opportunity to 
make investments, which may be difficult to achieve through smaller instalment payments. 
Mhaka was able to buy himself a house in the low-density suburb of Waterfalls in Harare 
(Sadomba, 2011). The situation was different with ZIPRA ex-combatants. They lacked 
influential people in the corridors of political and military institutions who could support and 
help them.   
 Todd (2007) states that in the early to mid-1980s; most of the ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
physically insecure and kept on running away from state security agents. In areas that were 
hard hit by the 5th Brigade like Tsholotsho in Matabeleland North and Kezi in Matabeleland 
South, some ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised in 1981 burnt their Post Office 
Savings Bank books because these books were used by the 5th Brigade to identify former 
ZIPRA fighters. Ndatshi who hails from Kezi says that he destroyed his Savings book together 
with some of his colleagues and forfeited their demobilisation allowances which they used to 
collect from Plumtree town (Interview with Ndatshi, a ZIPRA ex-combatant who demobilised 
in 1981, 2017). Kriger (2003) also mentions that some ZIPRA ex-combatants did not collect 




army deserters to the security forces who were then arrested whilst queueing up for their pay. 
In fact, due to these challenges, three quarters of ZIPRA ex-combatants in the Bango area of 
Kezi in Matabeleland South eloped to South Africa and left all their pension payments behind 
(Kriger, 2003:139). 
After the official termination of the demobilisation allowances at the end of 1983, the other 
monetary benefits which the ex-combatants received were channelled through the WVCF. This 
was mainly in the 1990s. As alluded to earlier, the fund was susceptible to massive looting. As 
a result, it failed to a large extent to benefit those who urgently needed government support. 
What has to be clarified is that since the fund was administered from Harare, even some ZIPRA 
ex-combatants who heard about the fund could not access it. There were varied reasons for 
this. 
 According to I.G, fear of being caught and arrested by ZANU-PF was the major reason why 
ZIPRA ex-combatants could not dare go to Harare to process their compensation (Interview, 
2017). Even those who conquered fear and wished to travel to Harare, there were twin problems 
of lack of bus fares and accommodation. By the early 1990s, many ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
in dire poverty to such an extent that they could not raise adequate bus fares to and from Harare. 
The processing of compensation forms including medical check-ups took several days or even 
weeks. This presented another challenge for many ZIPRA ex-combatants who had neither 
friends nor relatives in Harare. Harare is in the heart of Mashonaland which is around 500-600 
kilometres from Matabeleland where most of the ZIPRA ex-combatants reside. Other ZIPRA 
ex-combatants were very angry against the government to such an extent that they turned their 
backs on anything that was associated with ZANU-PF. That was due to the harassment and 
marginalisation they had endured in the hands of ZANU-PF in the 1980s (Interview, 2017). 
Hardline positions by some ZIPRA ex-combatants who had opportunities to benefit from the 




From the list of people who were identified as the major fraudsters in the WVCF, there is no 
single name of people linked to ZIPRA or PF-ZAPU. All the culprits who siphoned the WVCF 
are linked to the former ZANLA or to ZANU-PF. According to the Anti-corruption Trust of 
Southern Africa (2012), the former Vice President of Zimbabwe, Joyce Mujuru was declared 
55% disabled and was awarded Z$389 474 compensation; the former commander of the air 
force of Zimbabwe, Perence Shiri was declared 50% disabled and was given Z$90 249, 
Augustine Chihuri, the former Commissioner General of the Police had a disability percentage 
of 20% and benefitted Z$138 664 from the WVCF and Edgar Tekere, the former Secretary 
General of ZANU-PF was found with a disability percentage of 90% and siphoned a whopping 
Z$262 162 from the fund. The same kind of corruption undermined DDR in Afghanistan where 
the distribution of DDR support was regionally-biased. Cash handed out to the ex-combatants 
ended in the pockets of their commanders in Afghanistan (Simonetta and Antonio, 2006). 
 All the examples of beneficiaries of the WVCF cited above were in one time or another in 
high positions in ZANU-PF or were in command positions in ZANLA during the liberation 
struggle. The point that is made here is that there were differential experiences between ex-
combatants from ZANLA and ZIPRA sides in terms of access to monetary benefits given by 
the government to cater for their welfare. It does not matter whether the access was through 
legal or fraudulent means. Besides monetary benefits, the other areas which were meant to 
facilitate the ex-combatants’ reintegration were in the government’s prioritisation of their needs 
in the education sector; employment sector, land distribution, and co-operative schemes. 
ZIPRA ex-combatants had a separate project where they bought properties to cater for their 
demobilised as well as disabled cadres. The following section will briefly focus on ZIPRA ex-




5.10.2 Schooling and Educational Opportunities 
As noted earlier, the government encouraged ex-combatants to continue with their education 
after the liberation struggle. The aim was to enhance their opportunities in the job market 
considering the fact that other people remained learning whilst they lost educational 
opportunities whilst in the struggle. However, resources to support the education of the ex-
combatants were always inadequate. Lack of school fees and qualified teachers as well as 
walking long distances to and from rural schools were part of the general problems that 
confronted both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants who decided to go back to school after the 
war (Barnes, 1995). 
Added to the above problems, ZIPRA ex-combatants who went back to school faced another 
challenge that was security-related. ZIPRA ex-combatants who were learning at rural day 
Secondary Schools and Boarding Schools in the countryside were always harassed by the 5th 
Brigade on allegations that they were ‘dissidents.’ It was always a common occurrence in the 
1980s that 5th Brigade members harassed and beat ZIPRA ex-combatants who were learning 
during assembly periods in front of other pupils (Interviews with Berry, I.G, and Leornard, 
2017). As a result of harassment in schools that were situated in the rural areas, many ZIPRA 
ex-combatants ‘chose’ to relocate to expensive boarding schools in and around urban areas as 
these schools provided better security than the rural ones. However, learning at boarding 
schools economically suffocated them because of expensive fees which could not be covered 
by the meagre Z$185 demobilisation allowance they got per month. 
Berry left Matshinke Secondary Schoool in rural Plumtree district and continued his education 
at Tennyson Hlabangana High School in Bulawayo due to security risks that he suffered at the 
hands of both the 5th Brigade and ‘dissidents.’ The 5th Brigade accused him of being a 




government that was victimising them (Interview with Berry, one of the ZIPRA ex-combatants 
who demobilised and decided to go back to school, 2017). Mleya also left schools that he could 
afford in rural Beitbridge district to Solusi High School on the outskirts of Bulawayo due to 
harassment by the 5th Brigade (Interview, 2017). In a separate incident, Leonard Ndlovu was 
taken by members of the 5th Brigade from Manama High School in Gwanda in 1983 to Guyu 
Police Camp where he was beaten and detained for several days (Interview, 2017). ZIPRA ex-
combatants could not effectively concentrate on their studies whilst the threat of physical abuse 
was hovering above their heads. 
Not only was 5th Brigade wrath directed against ZIPRA ex-combatants who were at schools 
learning, but also against the teaching staff that could be linked to ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU. 
Moses Mzila-Ndlovu went to the struggle after acquiring a teaching qualification. He re-joined 
the teaching profession after the war but was forced to leave his profession in Matabeleland 
North in the early 1980s due to harassment by state security agents who accused him of being 
a ‘dissident’ (Interview, 2017). On the contrary, ZANLA ex-combatants who went back to 
school did not meet security risks of being beaten by state security agents. TM who was one of 
Barnes’ participants in his research proves this point. TM dropped from Rimbi Secondary 
School in 1981 due to lack of school fees (Barnes, 1995). 
Besides the issue of physical harassment of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were attending school, 
it was also difficult for them to access most of the government support. Of course, some of 
them benefitted from scholarships that came through the government. However, quite a number 
of them were fearful to come forward and volunteer their personal details because they could 
be traced and harassed using those details. Mleya confided that even though he heard about the 
3 400 scholarships that were availed by the government of Canada, he could not utilise them 
as he feared to come forward and complete the forms because of what had almost happened to 




2017). No doubt, ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants had differential experiences in the 
education sector after independence.  
5.10.3 The Co-operative Scheme 
The co-operative scheme is one of the strategies that ensure that ex-combatants become self-
sustaining by providing them with employment (ILO, 2010). Ex-combatants who are 
productively employed stop to look up to the government for economic support. The general 
performance of the ex-combatants’ co-operatives in Zimbabwe was not pleasing owing to a 
couple of difficulties. These difficulties included insufficient funding, lack of business skills 
amongst ex-combatants as well as drought for those co-operatives with an inclination towards 
agriculture. One problem that was peculiar to co-operatives that were owned by ZIPRA ex-
combatants was meddling by government security agents. The meddling disturbed the 
operations of the co-operatives. The meddling was politically-motivated and contributed partly 
to the folding up of some of the co-operatives. 
According to Musemwa (1994), ZANU-PF alleged that ZIPRA-owned co-operatives were 
used for generating money and caching weapons in order to support the ‘dissidents.’ The 
perception was particularly pronounced after the alleged arms cache ‘discovery’ on ZIPRA-
owned farms. A case of Mbuso and his colleagues is cited by Musemwa (1994) as a clear 
example of how ZANU-PF meddling in the co-operatives owned and operated by ZIPRA ex-
combatants disrupted viable and normal activities thereby leading to their decline.  Mbuso and 
other three ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised established a co-operative venture for 
farming about 20km outside Bulawayo. However, Mbuso and his colleagues were continuously 
harassed, arrested, intimidated and interrogated on allegations that they supported ‘dissidents.’ 




abandoned their co-operative to the safety of urban centres (Musemwa, 1994). Many co-
operatives owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants crumbled under similar circumstances. 
Incidents of harassment and meddling by ZANU-PF agents were prevalent throughout the 
country on co-operatives that were owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants. For example, members 
of the Simukai Collective Farming Co-operative Society in Seke communal lands in 
Mashonaland East were harassed only because they were ZIPRA ex-combatants (Musemwa, 
1994). Even small business ventures by ZIPRA ex-combatants were not spared. Ndlovu and 
his colleagues were forced to abandon their security company, Guard Alert in Bulawayo, in 
1984 because of constant searches and harassment by state security agents who argued that the 
company was used to hide arms and to generate money to support the ‘dissidents’ (Interview 
with Ndlovu, a ZIPRA ex-combatant who was involved in co-operative schemes, 2017). 
 ZIPRA ex-combatants who formed security companies were particularly targeted for 
harassment because it was thought that these companies were used as a conduit for sourcing 
weapons from different suppliers which could then be passed on to the ‘dissidents’ (Interview 
with Ndlovu, 2017). Another co-operative that was affected by PF-ZAPU-ZANU-PF rift was 
the Zenzele co-operative in Bulawayo. It faltered when all its members were locked up on 
accusations that they were ‘dissidents’ and were therefore hiding arms in their premises. Their 
best bus was also destroyed by security agents (Kriger, 2003).  
However, since no arms were ever found on the premises of co-operatives, the only feasible 
explanation for the disruption of the economic activities of ZIPRA ex-combatants could be 
located in their antagonistic relationships with ZANU-PF dating back to the liberation struggle. 
Security-related challenges crippled most ZIPRA-owned co-operatives. The mindset of 
competition and hostility that undermined a couple of mooted political and military unification 




independence era and disturbed effective demobilisation and reintegration, especially among 
ZIPRA ex-combatants. The UNDPKO (1999) proposes that ex-combatants who form co-
operatives should be encouraged and supported. One way of encouraging and supporting them 
is through availing funds to the co-operatives. Furthermore, it is also suggested that these co-
operative schemes be in different zones in order to benefit as many people as possible.  
5.10.4 ZIPRA Ex-Combatants’ Properties 
ZIPRA ex-combatants devised a unique strategy of buying properties to cater for their 
economic reintegration into civil society. This was a form of investment. However, all their 
properties were taken away by the government in 1982 as a retributive strategy for the arms 
cache ‘discovery.’ To date, ZIPRA-owned properties have not been returned to their owners. 
ZIPRA ex-combatants believe that their properties were confiscated under dubious 
circumstances whereby ZANU-PF planted weapons in their properties, especially those in 
Matabeleland in order to ethnicise the issue and have a pretext to eliminate ZIPRA ex-
combatants who were Ndebele speaking. Properties owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants spread 
across the country, but government security agents mainly targeted those in Matabeleland and 
the Midlands and this seems to have been calculated to smear ZIPRA ex-combatants and justify 
the deployment of the 5th Brigade (Interview with Iphithule Maphosa, ZAPU spokesperson, 
2017).  
It would be difficult to know exactly the number of ZIPRA ex-combatants who partook in the 
purchase of properties because PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA records were confiscated by ZANU-PF 
at the height of the hostilities between the two in the early 1980s. However, what is clear is that 
PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA had a viable and long-term plan for its ex-combatants after the war. By 
the time of the compilation of this study, ZIPRA ex-combatants were still making frantic efforts 




 In one of the meetings that l attended at Castle Arms Motel where ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
discussing the issue of their properties, what l could observe was that they were actually 
disappointed over lack of government assistance pertaining to the ‘mystery’ surrounding their 
properties. They talked on top of their voices, appealed for the government to assist them to 
recover their properties whilst others threatened to take law into their hands and grab the 
properties by force since they knew them. They also argued that the government always 
promises to address their problem with regards to the return of their properties on the eve of 
every election since 2000 so as to hoodwink them to support and vote for ZANU-PF back into 
power.  
The second observation also depicted results similar to the first one as the deliberations were 
characterised by anger and frustration (Personal observation of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ 
behaviour, 2017). Even though ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU united to form one party in 1987, it 
seems it was a marriage of convenience between the elite groups of both parties because the 
unity did not significantly help the grassroots, especially ZIPRA ex-combatants who had been 
disadvantaged by a partisan DDR process of 1980-84. 
 Even if the properties were to be returned any time from now, it has to be noted that many of 
the genuine beneficiaries have since died and more so, they died in extreme poverty. 
Furthermore, most of the surviving beneficiaries are now old to such an extent that they cannot 
venture into any meaningful business activities. It is also doubtful that the dependants of those 
who have died could benefit given the fact that there is lack of accurate and up-to-date 
information on who contributed and who did not towards the purchase of the properties. Like 
the WVCF which was looted, it is possible that even if the properties are returned, they can go 




The lack of a lasting solution pertaining to the issue of the properties of ZIPRA ex-combatants 
also point to the challenges of a government led reintegration process when that government is 
in competition with one of the stakeholders to the DDR process. Although arms caches were 
‘discovered’ on two of the ZIPRA-owned farms, the rationale behind the confiscation of the 
properties where arms were not found is questionable. The government did not only confiscate 
farms where arms were reportedly ‘discovered’, but went on to take cattle, pigs, chickens, 
garages and a fleet of vehicles. One is persuaded to agree with Kriger (2003) who concludes 
that the issue of the ZIPRA-owned properties became entangled in the web of the ruling party’s 
(ZANU-PF) political vendetta against PF-ZAPU. 
5.10.5 Employment and Job Opportunities 
The ILO (2010) singles out productive employment of ex-combatants as one of the most crucial 
steps in promoting effective DDR, especially the reintegration process. Having taken 
cognisance of the ex-fighters’ weak educational background, dearth of employable skills and 
inadequate or no start-up capital; the government had a deliberate policy that gave priority to 
the employment of ex-combatants. In some instances, both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants 
faced daunting challenges in securing decent employment due to stiff competition in the job 
market. For example, more than 25 000 ex-combatants were unemployed by 1990 (Kriger, 
2003). This number included both ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants. 
However, just like in other sectors, ZIPRA ex-combatants faced some discrimination in the job 
market that was deliberately caused by certain individuals who thought that ZIPRA ex-
combatants should not enjoy privileges similar to those of ZANLA ex-combatants. To start 
with, the confiscation of ZIPRA-owned properties meant that thousands of ZIPRA ex-
combatants employed in those properties lost their jobs. According to Sibanda (2005:254), 




ex-combatants. NITRAM was a company under which all ZIPRA properties were registered. 
When the government confiscated it in 1982, all employees were laid off.  
This happened simultaneously with loss of employment in the army by many ZIPRA ex-
combatants who were unfairly dismissed. Mpande was unceremoniously dismissed from the 
ZNA in 1984 because he had delayed for duty by only one day due to transport problems from 
Bulawayo to Harare (Interview, 2017). Many ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered the same fate as 
Mpande. Kriger (2003) also adds that many ZIPRA ex-combatants who were illegally 
dismissed sought readmission into the ZNA after the Unity Accord but were unsuccessful. It 
was alleged that they had deserted with sinister motives and then only wanted to take advantage 
of the Unity Accord to get back into the army. 
Further to this, some well-qualified ZIPRA ex-combatants were deliberately denied 
employment. The UNDPKO (1999) notes that it is always easy to reintegrate ex-combatants 
with specialised skills as they are employable in civilian sectors. However, that was not to be 
the case for several ZIPRA ex-combatants who possessed technical skills as they could not get 
employment. Some of the frustrated ZIPRA engineers and pilots went to South Africa where 
they offered their services to the Apartheid regime. However, they disguised their liberation 
war credentials in order to get employed (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017).  
What should be noted about the DDR process in Zimbabwe is that it was the government itself 
that played a central role in disempowering and marginalising ZIPRA ex-combatants, and 
where it was not directly involved, it failed to intervene in solving the omissions and 
commissions of other state agents against ZIPRA ex-combatants. In other countries, for 
example in Sierra Leone and Liberia, it was not the government but ex-combatants and/or other 
military factions that were not aligned to the ruling party that isolated themselves from DDR 




 The case of one ZIPRA ex-combatant who was a qualified journalist from City University in 
London depict that there was discrimination in the employment of ZIPRA ex-combatants. One 
has to hasten to say that the tendency to discriminate against ZIPRA ex-combatants was not 
government policy per se but was just a common practice by mischiveous individuals within 
particular government departments who thought that they should frustrate ZIPRA ex-
combatants. 
The City University trained journalist failed to get a job in the media fraternity in Zimbabwe 
because the recruitment process was carried out through ZANU-PF party structures. According 
to Kriger (2003:179) a Mr Justin Nyoka who was Director of Information is said to have burst 
into laughter when the ZIPRA ex-combatant journalist presented herself to him so that he could 
facilitate her employment. Nyoka sarcastically asked the aspiring journalist the following 
question: ‘Why do you want a job as a journalist? Why don’t you ask Nkomo to buy you a 
farm? He is buying all ZIPRAs farms.’ 
Besides the fact that the job market was heavily skewed in favour of well-educated civilian 
graduates, it is noted that ZIPRA ex-combatants could in some cases face challenges that were 
deliberately imposed by ZANU-PF personnel. Alexander et al (2000) cite some cases of the 
harassment of some ZIPRA ex-combatants who were working for the government as teachers 
and nurses in rural Matabeleland during the time of the 5th Brigade operations. A case in point 
was the killing of several ex-ZIPRA nurses at Nkayi Hospital between 1983 and 1984 
(Alexander et al, 2000). Kriger (2003:141) summed up the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-
combatants in this way: 
ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered the party’s (ZANU-PF) often violent wrath, 
experiencing difficulties in forming and sustaining co-operatives and obtaining 




According to the UNDPKO (1999), the provision of marketable skills to ex-combatants is not 
the panacea in reintegration. The government must create jobs specifically for ex-combatants 
because even if they are armed with marketable skills, they would still face stiff competition 
from other sections of the population. The case of ZIPRA ex-combatants was even worse. As 
seen above, some of them were discriminated against in the job market, and for those who 
acquired their own skills and got employed in the civil service as teachers, nurses and 
Agriculture Extension Officers among other professions, did not escape the wrath of the 5th 
Brigade in rural Matabeleland. Some of them abandoned their professions due to security risks 
whilst the unfortunate ones were killed.  
All in all, the prevailing political environment immediately after independence in Zimbabwe 
was such that the government could not implement nor support impartial reintegration 
programs. Supporting ZIPRA reintegration programs could have meant that the government 
was empowering their rivals, and realistically that was impossible.  
5.11 Second Reintegration Phase, 1997 
The second reintegration program took place at a time when ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
working closely with ZANLA ex-combatants for the betterment of their welfare. This was after 
a period of nearly a decade of acrimonious relationships with the ruling party (Mazarire and 
Rupiya, 2000). The thawing of relations came in 1987, and thereafter, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-
combatants realised that they had been embroiled into a fruitless fight because even though 
ZANLA ex-combatants appeared to be on top of the situation, there was not very much that 
they benefitted material-wise through colluding with ZANU-PF to marginalise ZIPRA ex-
combatants (Sadomba, 2011).  
The major difference in terms of how ex-combatants benefitted from the 1997 gratuities was 




their prior marginalisation in demobilisation and reintegration programs which did not put them 
at the same economic level with their ZANLA counterparts. The second issue is that by the 
time ZIPRA ex-combatants were ‘embraced’ by the government and received similar pay-outs 
like their ZANLA counterparts in 1997, the economy was already on a tail spin.  
Furthermore, not all ZIPRA ex-combatants immediately benefitted from the 1997 pay- outs as 
some of them were outside the country by that time, having run away from state security agents’ 
harassment in the early 1980s. By the time they came to be vetted for purposes of receiving 
compensation, some of them experienced some challenges in getting successfully vetted as 
they failed to get people who could be their witnesses. Furthermore, the economic conditions 
had further deteriorated for those who delayed to come for compensation until the early 2000s. 
By then, the value of the Zimbabwean dollar had tumbled to unprecedented levels (Coltart, 
2016; Interview with Kwete, 2017). 
 Whilst some of the ex-combatants who had experienced near to normal livelihoods in the 
1980s were using their 1997 pay-outs to extend their houses, to buy new furniture and more 
livestock; that was not always the case for some of the ex-ZIPRAs whose livelihoods were 
undermined by the conflictual environment of the early 1980s. The economically vulnerable 
ex-combatants were starting from scratch again in 1997 and as a result, they failed to achieve 
successful economic reintegration. It is for some of the reasons cited above that Mazarire and 
Rupiya (2000) conclude that ‘two wrongs do not make a right’ when they look at the results of 
the two DDR processes on the ex-combatants. The conclusion could be motivated by the fact 
that the first and second reintegration processes failed to create stable and peaceful conditions 
for the ex-combatants and the generality of the population. The argument I maintain though is 
that in both processes, the predicament of the ZIPRA ex-combatants was worse than that of 





A number of developments like partial disarmament, ineffectual demobilisation, clashes at APs 
and within integrated military units as well as incomplete reintegration inter alia were a 
manifestation of unresolved political differences between political parties. Military forces per 
se have no problems if left on their own, but whatever negative developments take place among 
and between them mirror the bigger political problem. It has been noted that the DDR process, 
especially the integration program and the reintegration of the demobilised cadres was skewed 
in favour of ZANLA against ZIPRA.  
The discrimination and marginalisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants was more pronounced in the 
integration and reintegration programs than in the disarmament and demobilisation phase. The 
reason was that disarmament and demobilisation took relatively shorter periods than 
reintegration. Furthermore, during disarmament, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants were in 
different cantonments, though some were juxtaposed and besides this, ZIPRA could not be 
coerced to disarm by ZANLA who had no conventional capacity. They could be persuaded to 
disarm first and then dealt with coercively and unfairly thereafter. Integration and reintegration 
programs were long-term, and in most cases, ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants mingled. The 
way the integration and reintegration programs were done showed the pitfalls of a government 
led DDR process in a context of ethnic-related mistrusts and hostilities. As an interested party 
in the DDR process, the governing party used its former military wing (ZANLA) to build its 







CHAPTER 6: CONSEQUENCES OF ZIPRA EX-COMBATANTS’ DDR 
EXPERIENCES 
6.1 Introduction 
The effects of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences had far-reaching ramifications on the entire 
peace building process in post-independence Zimbabwe. Instead of lessening hitherto known 
PF-ZAPU-ZANU-PF mistrusts and hostilities, the experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants within 
the ZNA and outside the military structures led to the break-up of the GNU, the premature 
suspension of the policy on national reconciliation, the desertion of many ZIPRA ex-
combatants from the ZNA and emergence of the controversial ‘dissidents’ issue. Most parts of 
Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands where the 5th Brigade operated were plunged into 
bloodshed for around five years. ZIPRA ex-combatants, PF-ZAPU party officials and the 
supporters of the party in general as well as the entire Ndebele-speaking population did not 
enjoy either negative or positive peace during the early 1980s because of the effects of partisan 
politics that were prevalent during the DDR process. In short, the consequences of ZIPRA ex-
combatants’ experiences in DDR undermined the entire peace building process in Zimbabwe. 
The nature of the experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants unequivocally demonstrated the 
flaws in a DDR process that is led and owned by a government that is embroiled in ethnic-
based fears and rivalries against another party to the DDR process. The chapter will focus on 
the socio-political and economic implications of an exclusive and partisan DDR process on the 
general peace process in Zimbabwe from the lens of the experiences of the ZIPRA ex-
combatants. Due to a protracted period of marginalisation in the DDR process, ZIPRA ex-
combatants in particular became vulnerable to political manipulation by ZANU-PF after the 
second phase of reintegration because of their economic incapacitation and the legacy of fear 




the consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in DDR processes hardened their 
feelings of hate, exclusion, and marginalisation against ZANU-PF/ZANLA and the Shona 
speaking people in general. 
6.2 Politicisation and Ethnicisation of the ZNA 
The GNU collapsed in February 1982 after the so-called arms cache ‘discovery’ on properties 
owned by ZIPRA ex-combatants. Whether those arms were meant for self-defence or to 
perpetrate political destabilisation was a thing which the government did not fully investigate. 
The issue of arms caches was dealt with in the previous chapter and what can be stated here is 
that ZANU-PF accused PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants for caching arms supposedly for 
toppling the government. That accusation sparked a chain reaction which culminated into the 
elimination of PF-ZAPU representatives from the GNU on 17 February 1982 (Nkomo, 1984).  
The sacking of PF-ZAPU from cabinet was subsequently followed by the arrest of top ZIPRA 
military commanders, chief among them Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku and six 
others on charges of treason. Nkomo (1984:228) has argued that since his dismissal from 
government, ‘the politics of reconciliation gave way to confrontation.’ Nkomo also accepts the 
fact that the incarceration of Dabengwa and Masuku removed from the military domain the 
most prominent personnel on the ZIPRA side who were best able to keep the remaining fearful, 
restless and angry ZIPRA elements under control (1984). 
The sacking of PF-ZAPU President and the arrest of ZIPRA Intelligence Supremo (Dabengwa) 
and ZIPRA commander (Masuku) especially, sparked an exodus of ZIPRA elements from the 
ZNA in solidarity with their commander-in-chief who was being publicly embarrassed. It is 
noteworth that most of ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres were recruited into their respective political 
parties by the Commissariat Department of each party. As such, these former guerrilla fighters 




ZIPRA were political-cum-military forces. Therefore, whatever happened in the political arena 
directly affected the military. Alao (2012) points out that quite a lot of ZIPRA ex-guerrillas 
had remained in the army even after the Entumbane clashes largely because of the respect and 
admiration they had for Nkomo. 
 In his explanation for the causes of the desertion of ZIPRA cadres from the ZNA in fairly large 
numbers from 1982 onwards, Mnangagwa (1989) also observed that some ZIPRA ex-
combatants felt that government treatment of PF-ZAPU leaders as well as ZIPRA military 
commanders was too extreme and unjustified.  Other ZIPRA ex-combatants left the army 
during the same period because they feared that the ‘discovery’ of weapons in and around their 
properties would lead to a witch-hunt in the army by the government.  
Indeed, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) observes that wide sweeping searches for ZIPRA cadres on 
grounds that they were ‘dissidents’ were conducted. The witch-hunts did not spare former 
ZIPRA cadres serving in the national army (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). More terrified ZIPRA 
ex-combatants fled the army into different directions and destinations. Some became 
‘dissidents.’ Tensions in the country ran high amidst accusations and counter-accusations. 
ZANLA accused ZIPRA ex-combatants of planning and engaging in subversive activities, 
whilst ZIPRA accused ZANLA personnel within the ZNA of persecuting them. Levels of 
mistrust between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU ran very high during this period. Not only was 
Nkomo sacked from the GNU, but he was vilified and persecuted on a daily basis until he fled 
into exile in 1983 citing threats on his life (Nkomo, 1984). All these developments made some 
fearful ZIPRA ex-combatants to rearm and that further undermined the disarmament program 
which had been shambolic from the onset. So, developments within the ZNA affected DDR 




When Nkomo was forced into exile, the infuriation of the ZIPRA over ZANU-PF actions was 
heightened and more also left the army. As they were leaving the army, some of them took 
weapons with them and fought against the government through sabotaging its programs and 
projects especially in rural areas of south-western Zimbabwe where they were based. The 
labelling of ZIPRA ex-combatants as ‘dissidents’ in the ZNA was scaled up and that opened 
the way for full-scale antagonistic relationships between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants 
within the army. ‘Disappearances’ of serving ZIPRA cadres became a common occurrence in 
the ZNA (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). As many ZIPRA ex-combatants were leaving the army, 
ZANU-PF leadership took advantage of that and built a partisan and highly politicised and 
ethnicised national army. Jackson (2011:21) states that, the initial 1980-83 ‘White flight’ from 
the ZNA together with the persecution of former ZIPRA cadres created an enabling 
environment for ZANLA to effectively dominate the newly formed ZNA. What was happening 
in the political arena affected events in the military and vice versa. 
The politicisation of the army was accompanied by periodic physical harassment of the ZIPRA 
in the ZNA. It seems the aim was to frustrate them so that they could all leave the army. When 
describing his ordeal in the ZNA after the collapse of the GNU, Tshuma emotionally broke 
down as he continuously shook his head, stared at me for some time without uttering a single 
word, mumbled something to himself and when he continued his story he started by saying, 
‘Eish, that situation’ (Interview with Tshuma who was harassed within the army, 2017). He 
was referring to incidents that were taking place within and outside the ZNA that were making 
life difficult for those who fought for independence under ZIPRA. Strained relationships both 
in the army and in civilian life reinforced the mindset of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and that was not 
good for DDR processes. 
One of the results of the desertions of ZIPRA ex-combatants from the ZNA was the 




new military units which were primarily formed to support ZANU-PF and its leadership and 
they were mainly drawn from the Shona ethnic group. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:23) has 
described the four military elements as ‘politically correct military units’ in the sense that 
eligibility into those units was mainly on the basis of loyalty to ZANU-PF. These were the 
Presidential Guard squad trained by the North Koreans after the assassination attempt on the 
Prime Minister; the Artillery Regiment, the 5th Brigade and the Zimbabwe People’s Militia 
(ZPM) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). The 5th Brigade which was purportedly formed to deal with 
the ‘dissidents’ became a purely Shona-dominated ZANU-PF army that was directly 
answerable to Robert Mugabe and did not operate like other normal ZNA units. The ZPM was 
recruited from ZANU-PF youths (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Coltart, 2016). The purely Shona 
ethnic composition of the 5th Brigade coupled with its heinous tactics against the Ndebele 
population increased negative feelings of the Ndebele against the Shona in general and made 
unity and peaceful co-existence a nullity. 
The ZPM complemented the violent activities of the 5th Brigade as it was deployed to areas 
that were not covered by the Brigade. The violence of the ZPM was pronounced in Ndebele-
speaking areas of Kwekwe and Maboleni in Lower Gweru (Coltart, 2016). The then Minister 
of Defence, Sydney Sekeremayi justified the formation of military units that were loyal and 
answerable only to ZANU-PF on the grounds that the suspected acts of sabotage on strategic 
military installations were ‘inside jobs.’ Being ‘inside jobs’ meant that they were perpetrated 
by former ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA. Sekeramayi is quoted by Rupiya and Chitiyo 
(2005:342) as having defended the creation of the ZPM by saying that it would work as:  
…the eyes and ears of government and people…key installations to be guarded by 
those loyal to the government. The attack on Thornhill air base and the 
disappearance of arms at Cranborne Barracks were all ‘inside jobs.’ 
From a security point of view, ZANU-PF could not take these security challenges lightly given 




1979 and immediately after independence. Any government in any part of the world would 
have reacted by taking precautionary security measures. However, what can be highlighted is 
that the ‘inside jobs’ were only suspected on ZIPRA ex-combatants and not on former 
Rhodesian Security Forces who had caused a lot of bloodshed on both sides of the liberation 
movements through bombing their rear bases. ZANU-PF had developed more trust on its 
former ‘enemies’ at the expense of its former ‘rivals’ (ZIPRA). That attitude spoke more to 
lack of reconciliation between the two former liberation forces. Doran (2017) writes that 
whereas ZANU-PF was able to reconcile with the Whites, there was hostility against other 
fellow Blacks with whom they prosecuted the liberation struggle together. The allegations 
against ZIPRA ex-combatants is similar to what Mbembe (2002:628) describes as the ‘power 
of the false.’ As observed by Mbembe (2002), this is a scenario whereby misinformation, 
misperceptions and utter falsehoods create a ‘Security Dilemma.’ 
The consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in DDR had serious and negative 
effects on peace and stability especially in Matabeleland. As peace was undermined, physical 
violence escalated thereby undermining the whole peace building process. ZANU-PF was able 
to capitalise on the departure of ZIPRA ex-combatants to build its own power base within the 
military because it always saw ZIPRA as a threat to its political hegemony. Gleichmann et al 
(2004) explain that inclusive political arrangements that facilitate the cross-polination of views 
and ideas are crucial in DDR processes as they help to build trust and confidence between 
former warring political parties and their respective armies. Power-sharing arrangements lessen 
polarisation and political friction. They also build trust, tolerance and confidence in each other. 
 Nilsson’s (2005) view is that inclusivity and tolerance can be built if there is a genuinely 
representative national government with all parties to the conflict. This means they can engage 
and manage to control each other and ensure transparency, accountability and impartiality in 




was carried out by ZANU-PF politicians and former ZANLA commanders without the 
participation of PF-ZAPU politicians and former ZIPRA commanders. The result was that the 
process was heavily tilted in favour of ZANLA ex-combatants at the detriment of ZIPRA ex-
combatants. The collapse of the GNU also meant that there was no longer power-sharing within 
the top echelons of the various security sectors in Zimbabwe.  
The most important criterion used to elavate leaders of the security sectors became based on 
ethnic considerations as well as loyalty to ZANU-PF party not on purely meritocratic grounds. 
Since ZANU-PF was organised along Shona ethnic lines, it also wanted the army to be 
organised along the same ethnic lines (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). As the criterion of 
ensuring parity at the top leadership of the ZNA gave way to political and ethnic considerations 
since 1982, there were more Brigadiers and Colonels from the former ZANLA side than from 
ex-ZIPRAs. Of the eight new Brigadiers, ZANLA had five whilst ZIPRA had three and 
ZANLA had eleven out of the seventeen new Colonels (Alao, 2012:40). In Evans’ view, 
ZANU-PF’s growing ethnic domination of the ZNA enabled it to ‘strike at its former ZIPRA 
rivals’ (1991:9). It was able to successfully execute that within and outside the ZNA and that 
exacerbated conflictual relationships and made unity and sustainable peace a pipe dream. 
In all the five key pillars of Zimbabwe’s security sectors, that is the Army, Police, Intelligence 
services, Air Force and Prisons, no single former ZIPRA cadre has ever held the highest 
position in all these sectors serve for Philip Valerio Sibanda who headed the ZNA but under 
the overall leadership of Chiwenga, a former ZANLA cadre who commanded the entire 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces. From a closer observation, it seems that ZANU-PF is not 
comfortable with entrusting former ZIPRA cadres with the top most positions in the security 
sectors. All the directors of the CIO and Prisons; the Commissioners General of the Police, the 
Commanders of the Air Force and Commanders of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces since 




However, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that there were no senior Ndebele officers 
who were former ZIPRA cadres who were at the leadership levels in the army. However, as 
articulated by Evans (1991:10), there were some ZIPRA ex-combatants who held middle level 
positions, but the promotion of Ndebele-speaking former ZIPRA cadres in the ZNA came to 
be determined by the degree of distance between that officer and PF-ZAPU as a party. In other 
words, the advancement of ZIPRA ex-combatants in the army was politically motivated. If one 
distanced himself from PF-ZAPU and the Ndebele people in general, he or she could be 
rewarded with promotions (Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). This shows that the effects of 
the experiences of ZIPRA in DDR processes also affected developments in the army and vice 
versa. Those considered to be ‘politically-incorrect’ could not be fully accommodated in the 
army and the entire DDR process. 
  All the Ministers in charge of Defence and Security Portfolios serve for that of Home Affairs 
have been ZANU-PF politicians. This could not mean that there is lack of talent from the 
former PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA personnel. The most plausible explanation could be the lack of 
trust between the two former liberation movements. The Defence portfolio was first occupied 
by Robert Mugabe who also doubled as the Prime Minister. Enos Nkala took over from 
Mugabe and was followed by Moven Mahachi. Sydney Sekeremayi and Mnangagwa were 
recycled as Defence Ministers at various periods. The Security portfolio has been occupied by 
such personalities as Mnangagwa, Sekeremayi, Goche and Mutasa. What has happened is that 
the same Ministers who have occupied the Ministries of Defence and Security are rotated 
between the two Ministries or serve three or more times in one Ministry at different intervals. 
There has been a glaring lack of ethnic balancing at the apex of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces 
leadership as well as in the Ministries that are in charge of Defence and Security. 
A look at the composition of the top leadership of the army since 1980 until 2017 illustrates 




Figure 3: Top Senior Military Personnel in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017 
    Commanders of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and their Ethnic Groups 
                      Solomon Mujuru (Ex-ZANLA commander)-Zezuru (June 1980-1993)  
  Vitalis Zvinavashe (Ex-ZANLA commander)-Karanga (1994-2003) 
Constantino Chiwenga (Ex-ZANLA commander)-Zezuru (2004-2017) 
Source: Constructed by the Researcher. 
The ethnicisation of the top leadership of the military in favour of the Shona took place against 
a background of a well-documented history of superb discipline and high-quality training that 
ZIPRA forces had. What became clear was that it was unconceivable that ZANU-PF could 
promote former ZIPRA cadres to the top leadership positions of the military during the period 
of open confrontation between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU (1982-1987). However, the 
marginalisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants in leadership positions continued unabated even after 
the 1987 accord which narrowed the political chasm between the two former liberation 
movements. This indicates that it was not mistrust alone based on past history which led to the 
side-lining of ZIPRA ex-combatants from leadership positions in the army, but also ethnic 
differences were a factor. When looking at the challenges of PF-ZAPU in the GNU as well as 
those of ZIPRA within the security sectors, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:30) concludes that the 
GNU suffered from what he terms ‘Shona triumphalism,’ a scenario where Shona-speaking 
people in ZANU-PF thought they should get all the priviledges because they thought they 
contributed the most in liberating Zimbabwe.  
The experiences of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR programs prove true Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s 
argument that the Shona-speaking supporters of ZANU-PF interpreted their party’s electoral 




should rule Zimbabwe (2008). In this regard, it is Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2007) 
veiw that ethnicity still play a fundamental role in determing access to economic resources and 
even national leadership positions to date. This is mainly due to the fact that politicians from 
both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU failed to deal decisively with the issue of the politicisation of 
ethnicity ever since the liberation struggle since it benefitted them in their political power 
struggles. 
6.3 The ‘Dissidents’  
One of the fundamental aims of implementing a DDR process is to ensure that a post-conflict 
society does not slide back into conflict. However, Zimbabwe slid back into violent conflict 
within a period of less than two years from independence date. This time around, the conflict 
was between former Black ‘rivals’ (ZIPRA and ZANLA) in the liberation struggle. Cawthra 
(1993) cited in Mashike (2000) concluded that Zimbabwe’s armed struggle was the bloodiest 
throughout Africa with an estimated death toll of around 50 000 people killed within a period 
of approximately fifteen years of civil war. 
 However, a total of about 20 000 Ndebele speaking people, mainly civilians were killed in 
post-independence Zimbabwe within a period of less than five years (CCJP, 1997). The post-
independence conflict was allegedly caused by government’s efforts at ending the ‘dissident’ 
menace that was caused by some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants who went on a rampage after 
1982. In short, the results of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in DDR produced ‘dissidents’ 
and ultimately the death of thousands of Ndebele civilians in a military crusade to hunt down 
‘dissidents.’ An ineffective DDR process that is led by a partisan government breeds 
‘dissidents.’ The ‘dissidents’ issue heightened mistrust and hostility in the country and 




6.3.1 Who were the ‘Dissidents’? 
This section will commence with a brief operational definition of the terms, dissidents and 
bandits so that readers appreciate the arguments raised in the foregoing discussion. Generally, 
a dissident is a person who strongly disagrees with and criticises a legitimate government in 
his or her country. That person also takes active steps to undermine that government mainly 
through violent means. A bandit is a person who steals and commits acts of violence in a society 
and the concept of banditry revolves around stealing and the engagement in violence by bandits 
with the aim of achieving their objectives. Dissidence has a political motive, and, in most cases, 
it is sponsored by politicians and the ultimate aim is to seize power through unconstitutional 
means.  
The term ‘dissidents’ and to who it referred in Zimbabwe is shrouded in controversy. The term 
was not only used to refer to armed elements that were fighting the government but was loosely 
applied to all ZIPRA ex-combatants, PF-ZAPU officials, and to the Ndebele people in general 
and to Joshua Nkomo who was labelled as the ‘Father of dissidents’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2011:6). In fact, the conflation of almost everyone in Matabeleland into ‘dissidents’ was meant 
to justify a military crusade to annihilate Ndebele speaking people and disrupt PF-ZAPU 
activities (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). Lake and Rothschild (1996:45) call such 
kind of fabrication as ‘information failure.’ Information failure is a situation whereby parties 
fabricate facts for purposes of undermining people they deem ‘others.’ In this regard, Joshua 
Nkomo was linked to the ‘dissidents’ despite lack of evidence that directly connected him to 
them. ZANU-PF’s perceptions on who the ‘dissidents’ were, including their sponsorship made 
it difficult for them to cordially relate with both PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants. As a 
result, there was a problem of blocked communication which made it difficult for the two 




The loose application of the term ‘dissidents’ to refer to even ZIPRA ex-combatants in the 
ZNA meant that ZIPRA ex-combatants who remained in the national army paid heavily for the 
‘sins’ of their colleagues who deserted. It was common practice for ex-combatants to take 
group photos of themselves during the long and idle periods they spent at APs. During the 
period of the height of mistrust between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants in the ZNA, those 
photos were used to identify those who were thought to be linked to the ‘dissidents’ in the 
ZNA. If one or two members in a group photograph deserted, those who remained behind were 
supposed to know their whereabouts. If they professed ignorance, which was always the case, 
they were beaten thoroughly on accusations that they were abetting dissidence (Interview with 
Bhebhe, 2017). Alternatively, if the ‘dissidents’ were caught and killed, photographs in their 
possession were taken away and used to hunt down ‘dissidents’ in the ZNA. 
 Scholars like Alexander et al (2000) have concluded that the labelling of ZIPRA ex-
combatants who deserted the ZNA into the bush in the early to mid-1980s as ‘dissidents’ is a 
misnomer because those particular individuals left the army due to persecution in a ZANLA-
dominated army. Their aim was not to bring down the government. Even though some of them 
could have harboured intentions of toppling the government, lack of political support and 
leadership from PF-ZAPU was a great let down to them. Most of them operated as individuals 
and had no support from the Ndebele population as well as from PF-ZAPU and former ZIPRA 
commanders. Joshua Nkomo (1984) preferred the term bandits over ‘dissidents’ in reference 
to the ex-ZIPRAs who deserted the ZNA and committed crimes in rural Matabeleland because, 
according to him, they were just loose elements who were frustrated over incidencies of 
persecution in the army and then went about committing crimes without any clear political 
motives and support. Due to the lack of support from any angle they could think of, Alexander 




1970s because, ‘the ‘dissidents’ fought without political leadership, without civilian and party 
support, without hope of success, but only of survival.’ 
 It is true that ZIPRA ex-combatants deserted the army. However, what is noteworthy is that 
their desertions were not motivated by political reasons bordering around the widening of the 
political rift between their political party and ZANU-PF or any desire to violently unseat the 
government. Of course, there are some ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserted the ZNA in 
solidarity with Nkomo’s dismissal from the GNU, but most of these cadres did not take up 
arms, but just melted into the civilian population, whilst others left the country altogether 
(Interview with Mazinyane, 2017). According to Alexander (2008), the ‘dissidents’ were a 
development that emanated from harsh treatment within the ZNA which saw the discrimination 
and persecution of the ZIPRA ex-combatants within several Infantry Battalions all over the 
country. One should also point out that given the high levels of mutual mistrust and rivalry 
between the two former liberation parties plus fresh memories of inter-party antagonisms and 
physical clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA during the liberation struggle as well as at APs 
and within integrated military units, ZANU-PF could have had genuine suspicions and fears 
that ‘dissidents’ were sponsored by PF-ZAPU and that they wanted to destabilise the country 
and finally bring down the government. 
It is important to articulate the typology of ‘dissidents’ before delving deeper into the 
discussion. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Sibanda, 2005; Alexander et al, 2000 and Alexander, 2008 
identify roughly six categories of ‘dissidents.’ The first category was made of ZIPRA ex-
combatants who deserted the ZNA due to life threatening circumstances that centred on being 
harassed and unexplained ‘disappearances’ of some of their colleagues. This group constituted 
the majority of the around 400 ‘dissidents’ who were in Zimbabwe and it is the same group of 
the remaning about 115-122 ‘dissidents’ who surrendered themselves to the government in 




1989). The second group consisted of ZIPRA ex-combatants who did not agree with the 
Lancaster House Agreement (Munemo, 2016). They thought that it was a sellout agreement. 
Their numbers were marginally increased by those who did not accept the outcome of the 1980 
elections. Although they could have wanted to fight against the government, lack of anyone to 
coordinate and support their activities made them to engage in criminal activities with no 
direction. 
The other group was made up of demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants that suffered victimisation 
by the 5th Brigade. There are some who were frustrated by the violent and humiliating treatment 
of their wartime commanders and the top leadership of PF-ZAPU by ZANU-PF. In the midst 
of the volatile political situation, some Ndebele youth took advantage of general lawlessness 
to commit acts of banditry (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). The volatile political situation did not 
only motivate Ndebele youth into banditry, but also gave advantage to South Africa to meddle 
in the domestic political affairs of Zimbabwe through creating and sponsoring a group of 
‘dissidents’ which were popurlarly called ‘Super-ZAPU’ (Alexander et al, 2000). The aim of 
creating ‘Super-ZAPU’ was political destabilisation through pushing ZANU-PF further away 
from PF-ZAPU by increasing levels of mistrust. The strategy could also have been aimed at 
incapacitating PF-ZAPU so that it could not manage to continue supporting the UMkhonto 
WeSizwe guerrillas and the liberation struggle in South Africa in general (Sibanda, 2005).  
There were some ‘dissidents’ who were a creation of ZANU-PF. In fact, the 5th Brigade and 
some elements in the ZNA impersonated ‘dissidents’; went around villages in Matabeleland 
asking for support as ‘dissidents’ and came back to the same villagers accusing them of 
supporting the ‘dissidents’ (Interview with Madotshi; a ZIPRA ex-combatant who was a 
teacher in Tsholotsho during the period of ‘dissidents’ and 5th Brigade, 2017). The state-created 
‘dissidents’ were quite vicious to the White tourists and commercial farmers. According to 




were indeed a security threat and had to be eliminated. Secondly, they wanted to build a solid 
justification for violent state action against former ZIPRA cadres, PF-ZAPU and the Ndebele 
people in general.  
Except for ‘Super-ZAPU’ and state created ‘dissidents’, there was no one who was responsible 
for organising the other groups of ‘dissidents.’ One former ‘dissident’ who was interviewed by 
the CCJP (1997:45) actually testified that besides self-defence, they had no other agenda for 
being in the bush. He said: 
We wanted to defend ourselves personally. Our lives were threatened. Apart from 
defending ourselves; there was very little that we wanted to achieve. In the 1980s 
war, no one was recruited; we were forced by the situation. All of us met in the 
bush. Each person left (ZNA) on his own, running from death. 
As noted in the previous chapter, ZIPRA ex-combatants within the ZNA became victims of 
different forms of abuse, some of which were life threatening. In fact, ZIPRA ex-combatants 
who were brutalised deserted the ZNA and retreated to their rural villages, where, out of lack 
of options, they engaged in crimes like stealing from nearby stores, schools, and robbed bus 
operators as well as engaging in acts of sabotage against government projects and programs in 
Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands (CCJP, 1997; Interview with Sebata, 2017). Banholzer 
(2014) notes that without adequate security measures, ex-combatants usually resort to armed 
criminality. All of what the so-called ‘dissidents’ did could be best be described as mere 
criminality because there were no clear indicators that they really wanted to bring down the 
government, serve that they sabotaged some government projects and programs where they 
operated. 
 Alexander (2008) states that there is no evidence that the ‘dissidents’ took up arms to 
overthrow ZANU-PF government. Alexander conducted interviews with a total of twenty 
former ‘dissidents’ and all of them confirmed that they became ‘dissidents’ because they were 




and military leaders, some of whom were in prison. The purging of ZIPRA ex-combatants did 
not only happen within the army but in civilian life as well where ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
followed up in their homesteads (desertees and demobilised ones) and victimised or killed. 
Two of the former ‘dissidents’ that l interviewed also indicated that they engaged in banditry 
because they had been subjected to victimisation as ZIPRA ex-combatants. Tennyson Ndlovu, 
widely known as Thambolenyoka said that he was forced into banditry by the prevailing 
political situation in the 1980s whereby scores of ZIPRA ex-combatants were butchered or 
incarcerated for no apparent reasons between 1982 and 1987 (Interview with Tennyson 
Ndlovu, 2017).  
 Thambolenyoka demobilised in 1982 and worked at National Foods in Bulawayo until 1985. 
He says that the immediate incident that compelled him to be a ‘dissident’ was that he witnessed 
innocent people being brutalised and made to queue outside a bus they were travelling in to 
rural Filabusi by state security agents. He discovered that the sole purpose of the road blocks 
and searches were to identify ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU officials for harassment. 
Using his military experience, Thambolenyoka eluded the security agents and became a 
‘dissident’ (Interview with Thambolenyoka, 2017). Mr X said that he ran away from his 
military unit in Gutu, Masvingo, with his firearm and ended up in his rural home in Tsholotsho 
because he was subjected to physical harassment (Interview with Mr X, 2017). 
The issue of ‘dissidents’ had an ethnic dimension.  ZIPRA had both Shona and Ndebele-
speaking cadres in its ranks although the Ndebele were in the majority. However, there were 
no former ZIPRA ex-combatants who were Shona speaking who partook in dissidence. 
Furthermore, some Shona speaking areas are said to have exhibited a war-like attitude against 
the ‘dissidents’ (Alexander, 2008). For example, the Gokwe area was a ZIPRA operational 
zone during the liberation struggle, but became a ‘no-go’ area for ‘dissidents’ in the 1980s 




The fact that ‘dissidents’ who deserted the ZNA drifted into Matabeleland and the Midlands 
where there were Ndebele speakers instead of going to their former operational zones helped 
to regionalise and ethnicise the problem of ‘dissidents.’ ZANU-PF found it easy to link 
‘dissidents’ with PF-ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo and the Ndebele speaking people in general. The 
‘dissidents’ were also embroiled in ethnic politics. According to Alexander (2008:170), 
‘dissidents’ infiltrated Shona-speaking areas adjacent to Matabeleland like Mberengwa with 
the aim of spreading the effects of the 1980s conflict to the Shona speaking people. Shona 
speaking civilians in Mberengwa were brutalised by the ‘dissidents.’ Alexander (2008) points 
out that the army forewarned villagers in Mberengwa of the escapades of the ‘dissidents’ but 
the situation was different in Matabeleland where civilians were not forewarned, but were 
linked to the ‘dissidents’ and then tortured or even killed. 
 Although ‘dissidents’ were at times involved in ethnic politics, what has become evident is 
that they were directly produced by a partisan integration and DDR process and had very little 
if anything to do with toppling ZANU-PF from power. Cameron (2017) states that ‘dissidents’ 
had legitimate grievances like that they wanted their political and military leaders to be treated 
in a dignified way, the government to respect ZIPRA through returning confiscated properties 
and a return to inter-ethnic tolerance that had briefly prevailed in the ZNA during its early days 
in 1980. However, lack of a platform to articulate these grievances coupled with persecution 
in the army led them to desert, not that they were anti-government. One can argue that the way 
the issue of ‘dissidents’ was handled is not entirely divorced from the way ZANU-PF handled 
the issue of the clashes at APs as well as the arms cache ‘discovery’. The three developments 
were enthusiastically exploited by the militarily insecure ZANU-PF to decisively deal with 
ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU as a party. The fundamental flaw about the DDR process 
in Zimbabwe was the lack of regulatory mechanisms to ensure fairness among all parties to the 




took advantage of their powerful political position to sideline ZIPRA ex-combatants and the 
result has been negative as the country is grappling with challenges brought about by a partisan 
and inadequate DDR process to date. 
ZANU-PF’s strategies of regionalising and ethnicising ‘dissidents’ resulted in what Buttlerfield 
and Herz term a ‘Security Dilemma’ (Buttlerfield and Herz cited in Muchemwa, 2015:85). A 
‘Security Dilemma’ develops when each party in a conflict situation provokes the other in a 
bid to enhance its own security. The counter reaction from the provoked party makes the other 
party insecure as well. The result is usually a cycle of action and reaction which culminate in 
each party’s behaviour and activities being interpreted as a threat or act of provocation. Put 
simply, the accusations and counter accusations between ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants 
and between their respective political parties produced a ‘Security Dilemma’ which finally 
plunged Matabeleland into a bloody conflict that cost many lives. 
Whilst the number of ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserted the ZNA between 1982 and 1985 
are put at 4 000 by Evans (1991), the actual number of those who took up arms and indulged 
in banditry were no more than 400 at their peak (Kriger, 2003). This means that the rest of the 
ZIPRA ex-combatants who deserted the ZNA melted into civilian life whilst some went to the 
neighbouring countries in the region and many other places around the world to seek safety. 
Going to South Africa was not an easy option. It meant going back to work under the oppressive 
White system similar to the one they had fought against in Zimbabwe. There was the risk of 
being caught and surrendered back to the Zimbabwean government since many of the ex-
combatants did not have proper documents and crossed into that country illegally (Alexander, 
2008).  
Part of the 4 000 ZIPRA ex-combatants that deserted the ZNA remained at home and sought 




ZIPRA ex-combatants who decided to go to their rural areas suffered from harassment by both 
the ‘dissidents’ and the 5th Brigade. Members of the 5th Brigade accused them of being 
‘dissidents’ whilst the ‘dissidents’ accused them of selling-out to ZANU-PF and either beat 
them so as to force them to join their ranks or in extreme cases, killed them. 
 Mleya who survived an assassination attempt at Connemara Barracks remembers very well 
the harassment he endured in the hands of Kenang Nare and Doubt Siyoka whom he had known 
since his childhood in Gwanda, Matabeleland South (Interview with Mleya, 2017). The two 
had since turned themselves into ‘dissidents’ by the time he met them at home in 1983. Whilst 
they ran away from victimisation in the ZNA, ZIPRA ex-combatants were also involved in 
victimising civilians and other ZIPRA ex-combatants who they claimed were betraying them. 
 In terms of security, the ‘dissidents’ exacerbated insecurity where they operated. According to 
Ncube (1989:306), ‘dissidents’ murdered people, raped women, committed armed robberies, 
terrorised villagers in general and destroyed property worth millions of dollars. By early 1984, 
vast pieces of farmland lay fallow. For example, about 500 000 acres of lucrative commercial 
farmland could not be utilised in Matabeleland due to security threats posed by ‘dissidents.’ 
Though few in numbers; the ‘dissidents’ sometimes embarked on violent activities that left 
villagers terrified. The CCJP (1997:48) Report has some details on the violent activities of the 
‘dissidents’ in Matabeleland. For example, about 21 civilians were mercilessly clobbered to 
death by suspected ‘dissidents’ in the early 1980s in Nyamandlovu, Matabeleland North.   
As a result of the killings, many farmers sold their farms and relocated to the urban areas. 
Several women and men were raped and murdered respectively by the ‘dissidents.’ On 23 April 
1982, a Cold Storage Commission cattle sale was raided about 50 kilometres South of Kezi. 
Z$40 000 was stolen, one person killed and four others injured from that raid (CCJP, 1997:48). 




as the number of cattle sales were scaled down and completely suspended in some areas. 
Matabeleland is primarily a cattle ranching zone and people’s livelihoods are mainly dependant 
on selling cattle to raise money to buy food and to pay school fees for children. It is important 
to note that problematic integration in the ZNA and the victimisation of demobilised ZIPRA 
ex-combatants was the long-term cause of the security challenges that were witnessed in 
Matabeleland. However, plunder and victimisation were not part and parcel of self-preservation 
strategies by ‘dissidents’ but could have been a result of frustration and loss of direction and 
alternatives. 
There is ample evidence that connects partisan and inadequate DDR processes to the 
emergence of ‘dissidents’ in Matabeleland. The security threat posed by the ‘dissidents’ led the 
government to react violently through the 5th Brigade thereby shattering the promising peace 
and unity that had started during the early years of the GNU. Undoubtedly, ZANU-PF failed 
to manage the DDR process mainly because it was not a neutral implementer of the process 
but wanted to manipulate the process in its power politics against PF-ZAPU. Through painting 
ZIPRA ex-combatants as ‘dissidents’ and thereby justifying their purging in the ZNA and 
civilian life in general, ZANU-PF had successfully imposed its authority over the ZNA by 
1985, and by then, ZANLA had gained undisputed mastery over the national army (Evans, 
1991). In his own words, ‘ZANLA had managed to colonise the army’ (Evans, 1991:86). 
Although that strategy was to the advantage of ZANU-PF politically, it undermined the entire 
peace building process.  
The IDDRS (2006) puts inclusivity at the epicentre of the key requirements that facilitate 
successful DDR programs. It states that such issues as sex, age, religion, nationality, ethnic 
origin and political opinion should not be used to determine who gets what in DDR programs 
if they are to be successful. Ineffectual DDR caused the challenge of ‘dissidents’ in that 




‘dissidents.’ The security challenges emanating from the threat posed by ‘dissidents’ 
undermined ZIPRA reintegration programs like co-operative schemes, employment and 
education endeavours as they were always hunted down as ‘dissidents’ and finally forced into 
hiding. In the final analysis, the issue of ‘dissidents’ was largely a result of partisan government 
activities within DDR processes. The government engineered the issue of ‘dissidents’ as it 
wanted to use it as a political scapegoat to eliminate both ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU 
and then establish unflinching political hegemony in the post-colonial state. 
6.3.2 The 5th Brigade/Gukurahundi and Ethnic Polarisations 
The 5th Brigade was deployed into Matabeleland in early 1983 supposedly to deal with the 
‘dissidents’ menace in the region. Given the small numbers of the ‘dissidents’ who were armed, 
the deployment of a full-strength Brigade seemed unjustifiable. Instead of bringing peace to 
the ‘dissidents’-affected areas, the operations of the 5th Brigade exacerbated the insecurity of 
the civilians as members of the Brigade were complicit in committing heinous crimes against 
civilians. The CCJP Report of 1997 concluded that the atrocities committed by the 5th Brigade 
were tantamount to ethnic cleansing. The Catholic Commissioners who compiled the Report 
suspect that the violence meted against unarmed civilians in the guise of hunting down 
‘dissidents’ smacks of Shona revenge against the Ndebele for what their forefathers are alleged 
to have done to the Shona ancestors some time back. The activities of the 5th Brigade intensified 
negative feelings and relations both in the political and military arena and made successful 
DDR and Ndebele-Shona reconciliation difficult to achieve. 
The 5th Brigade justified its unbridled brutality against Ndebele speaking civilians on the 
grounds that ‘dissidents’ could not survive without the active support of the villagers 
(Alexander et al, 2000). However, what it (5th Brigade) overlooked was that unlike the 




‘dissidents’ used coercive strategies to get whatever they wanted from the masses and there 
were no ways civilians could resist that. One issue makes it possible that the 5th Brigade was 
bent on settling old scores between Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups. The issue is that, even 
though the RSFs were quite aware that ZIPRA guerrillas were fed and supported by Ndebele 
civilians during the liberation struggle; the intensity of their wrath against civilians did not 
match that of the 5th Brigade against unnamed Ndebele civilians who were accused of 
supporting ‘dissidents.’ 
A few selected cases illustrate the ferocious wrath of the 5th Brigade against innocent Ndebele 
civilians and ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised. On 3 February 1983, several people 
were brutalised in Kezi where they were shot at close range, pregnant girls bayoneted and 
foetuses thrown out (CCJP, 1997:45). More brutal and despicable murders swept across several 
wards and districts in Kezi and Tsholotsho in 1983. At Khumbula School in Tsholotsho, a 
whole village was terrorised where people were forced to dig their own graves before they were 
shot dead. In Mkubazi village in Kezi, three ZIPRA ex-combatants were among many who 
were taken to a cattle kraal and shot. Another incident of inhuman murder took place at 
Gulakabili area in Kezi where the whole village was abducted and beaten severely. Terror 
perpetrated against civilians had nothing to do with the clampdown on ‘dissidents’ except if 
the 5th Brigade was following ZANU-PF thinking that everyone in Matabeleland was a 
‘dissident’ or ‘dissident sympathiser.’ The effects of 5th Brigade operations in Matabeleland 
and some parts of the Midlands diminished any prospects of reconciliation between the Shona 
and Ndebele as in the eyes of the victims, the conflict that was associated with the clampdown 
on ‘dissidents’ was ethnically-motivated. 
What started as military antagonism in military barracks spilled into the civilian domain and 
caused total political rapture which had long-lasting negative effects on the peace building 




ethnic in nature, it could not achieve its intended goal of silencing the Ndebele people into 
surbodination. Instead, the 5th Brigade violence intensified what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) calls 
‘Ndebele particularism’, that is, it made the Ndebele to resent the Shona more and to talk about 
their marginalisation, whether real or imagined, more and more. In simple terms, Ndlovu-
Gatsheni’s point is that the results of the violence that originated within the army due to 
problematic integration, demobilisation and reintegration, and later engulfed the whole of 
Matabeleland, exacerbated rather than lessened ethnic divisions, fears and hatred. In other 
words, the antagonism between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants was not confined to DDR 
issues, but it spilled out and intensified inter-ethnic hostilities between the Ndebele and the 
Shona civilians in general. This was possible because ZIPRA and ZANLA had evolved to 
become not only military forces, but also to become political and ethnic forces. 
Muchemwa’s study on attempts to build friendships between Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups 
indicate that there is indeed friction between the two and strategies to promote peaceful co-
existence are needed. Ineffectual DDR processes contributed in a large measure in straining 
their relationships. Although Shona and Ndebele ethnic relations were acrimonious for a long 
time before independence, they were further badly damaged by the inter-ethnic violence of the 
1980s linked to a partisan DDR process. Muchemwa (2015) believes that part of the causes of 
the misunderstandings between the Shona and Ndebele is due to lack of healing and 
reconciliation on wounds inflicted on the Ndebele by the Shona in the post-independence 
period. 
Although there is no evidence that proves that Shona masses supported 5th Brigade violence 
against Ndebele civilians in the 1980s, the general perception of the victims of violence in 
Matabeleland is that they were accomplices (Muchemwa, 2015). What is possible is that the 
Shona masses could have only celebrated the violence given the history of hostility between 




constituted government that was responsible for all their miseries, especially their killings 
(Lindgren, 2002). Many participants in this study expressed perceptions that indicated that they 
thought that the Shona people in general were responsible for their marginalisation and 
victimisation in DDR processes and in the ZNA. It was also clear that they still harbour ill 
feelings against the Shona. One participant in this study said: ‘Those people (Shona) wanted to 
wipe and finish us all. We are in this condition because of them. They do not want to see us 
progressing’ (Interview with Mr X, 2017). 
The bitterness of having lost property, friends, relatives, family members did not dissipate 
among Ndebele civilians with the merger of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU in December 1987. 
Instead, the bitterness has been expressed through the mushrooming of different organisations 
and pressure groups that purpot to speak on behalf of the Ndebele speaking people. These 
organisations are operating from Matabeleland and some from South Africa, and claim to be 
the voice that articulate Ndebele grievances since they argue that it was muzzled (Ndebele 
voice) by the Shona through violence in the 1980s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Evidence abound 
that the nation needs healing and reconciliation. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) gives five examples of these pressure groups. These are Imbovane 
Yamahlabezulu, PF-ZAPU 2000, Mthwakazi Liberation Front, Mthwakazi Action Group on 
Genocide and ethnic cleansing in Matabeleland and Midlands and Mthwakazi People’s 
Congress (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The Mthwakazi Liberation Front in particular advocates 
for the secession of Matabeleland from the rest of Zimbabwe. These pressure groups also view 
the 1987 accord as a useless political pact which did not bring anything tangible to the people 
of Matabeleland. Furthermore, these groups view Ndebele speaking ‘PF-ZAPU’ politicians 
who are in ZANU-PF government through the 1987 agreement as apologists or sell-outs who 
have benefitted as individuls at the expense of the marginalised people of Matabeleland 




rabidly anti-Shona speaking people and advocates for the creation of an independent Ndebele 
state. 
 The anti-Shona feeling amongst the Ndebele was due to the fact that the 5th Brigade fanned 
out their clamp down on the ‘dissidents’ into a general conflict that seemed to be pitting the 
Ndebele against the Shona through their loose definition of a ‘dissident’ to incorporate 
everyone who was Ndebele. ‘Dissidents’ did not also spare Shona civilians whom they found 
in Matabeleland and the same was true to Ndebele civilians whom the ‘dissidents’ saw as un-
cooperative (CCJP, 1997). It is in this light that the ethnic dimension of the conflict cannot be 
overlooked. The 5th Brigade was viewed as representing the Shona masses. 
 Both 5th Brigade and ‘dissidents’ operations and expectations placed civilians in Matabeleland 
in a difficult situation. Civilians were attacked by the 5th Brigade accusing them of supporting 
the ‘dissidents’, whilst ‘dissidents’ also terrorised them for not supporting them. What can be 
noted is that the post-independence peace building endeavours, especially the DDR process 
failed to provide a platform where Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups could unite, share their 
experiences and work together peacefully without competition, fear and suspicion. 
What made the Ndebele to conflate the 5th Brigade with the Shona people in general was that 
it was exclusively constituted of Shona-speaking ex-ZANLAs with a negligible component of 
ex-ZIPRA cadres who were co-opted into the unit because of their knowledge of Ndebele 
language and geography of Matabeleland. From a total of 5 000 Brigade members, only about 
300-400 were Ndebele speaking people (Sibanda, 2005). Their only job was to explain in 
IsiNdebele to the rest of the Brigade members should the need arise (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2003:23). According to one of Alexander’s informants, the commander of the 5th Brigade told 
its members during the Pass out Parade that they should be ready to deal with ‘dissidents’ 




speaking ex-ZIPRA members of the 5th Brigade. That mentality tells us a lot about the levels 
of mistrust between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants. 
However, the then Minister of Defence, Sydney Sekeramayi defended the ethnic composition 
of the 5th Brigade on the grounds that ex-ZIPRA cadres within the ZNA units that were 
deployed to hunt down ‘dissidents’ usually deserted and joined the ‘dissidents.’ For 
Sekeremayi it was as if they were reinforcing the ‘dissidents’ through deploying ZNA units 
some of whom deserted (Dzinesa, 2005). Security-wise, it was logical to put together a loyal 
Brigade that could be trusted by ZANU-PF. However, what was illogical was that the 5th 
Brigade seemed to be directing their entire wrath against Ndebele speaking civilians as well as 
against ZIPRA ex-combatants who were serving in the ZNA and were found in their home 
districts whilst on official leave and those who had demobilised and were found in their homes 
doing civilian work.  Mr X justified the desertions of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were part of 
the ZNA units tasked to clamp down on ‘dissidents’ on the grounds that they could not be 
found to be fighting some of their colleagues whom they knew became ‘dissidents’ due to 
pressing security challenges. They could show sympathy by deserting, not because they were 
supporting violent activities by the ‘dissidents’ but the broader cause (Interview, 2017).   
The focus of the research is not on documenting all activities of the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland 
but only its ramifications as far as the ZIPRA ex-combatants and the general peace building 
process was concerned. Immediately after its deployment into Matabeleland districts in early 
1983, the 5th Brigade imposed dusk-to-dawn curfews; banned the operations of the journalists 
from the curfew affected areas, established roadblocks, tortured and massacred thousands of 
civilians (Coltart, 2016). There was a grave security risk as many people starved and children 
failed to attend school in some of the worst affected zones. Instead of helping in the peace 




positive peace as it made free movement of civilians and people doing business where they 
operated extremely difficult. 
Although quite a lot of civilians were caught up in the inferno, the initial target appears to have 
been ZIPRA ex-combatants. According to Maqhula, the 5th Brigade always stopped and 
searched buses in the country side and the people they were looking for most were ZIPRA ex-
combatants.  ZIPRA ex-combatants who could not hide themselves effectively or who could 
not successfully disguise their military status were usually taken to torture camps in Tsholotsho 
and Kezi where they were finally killed and shoved into mine shafts (Interview with Maqhula, 
a ZIPRA ex-combatant who survived torture by the 5th Brigade, 2017). Since the label of being 
a ‘dissident’ applied to almost every ZIPRA ex-combatant, those who were still serving in the 
ZNA were not spared. 
 The net effect of the harassment of the ZIPRA ex-combatants was that many of those who 
were serving in the army stopped visiting their rural areas and those who still had small 
businesses abandoned them to the safety of the urban areas. With the deployment of the 5th 
Brigade, the persecution of the ZIPRA ex-combatants had become two-pronged. It was within 
the ZNA and outside. The case of Thambolenyoka who became a ‘dissident’ after demobilising 
illustrates the challenges faced by ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised during the 
period of the Gukurahundi. The non-intervention of the government when ZIPRA ex-
combatants were harassed and killed by the 5th Brigade indicates that it was in its interest to 
see to it that ZIPRA was crushed.  So, the issue of ethnic-related tensions could explain the 
harassment of the ZIPRA ex-combatants and Ndebele civilians by the ZANU-PF aligned 5th 
Brigade. The thesis argues that a government that is taking sides in a DDR process cannot 
provide security to all parties to the process. Instead, it fans divisions and abets the persecution 




are not given any security guarantees but are made insecure through partisan and exclusive 
tactics and strategies. 
6.4 Fear and Insecurity 
ZIPRA ex-combatants endured both physical and human insecurity as a consequence of their 
experiences in DDR processes. The insecurity they suffered did not promote peace building 
but undermined it. 
6.4.1 Physical Insecurity 
To date, general fear and physical insecurity haunts most of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were 
once brutalised in the ZNA or in other areas outside the army. From a point of practical 
observation, all the ZIPRA ex-combatants that I interviewed demonstrated that the legacy of 
fear and insecurity surrounding their beatings, torture, arrests and the ‘disappearances’ of some 
of their colleagues from the army and civilian life still linger. When asked about their life 
experiences as demobilised ex-combatants as well as in the ZNA; they first looked side-ways, 
and then looked above their shoulders, pulled their heads towards the interviewer and spoke in 
very low voices. They continuously looked above their shoulders when narrating their 
tribulations as if something dangerous was approaching from behind. Even though participants 
were assured of their security before the commencement of the discussions, they felt unease 
during the discussions. 
In fact, one participant, a SaSidudla kept on asking the following question during the course of 
the discussions: ‘Ndlovu! Ufuna ukungibophisa?’ Translated into the English language, this 
means; ‘Ndlovu! Do you want to get me arrested?’ When asked to explain what he meant and what 
his fears were all about, SaSidudla revealed that he was severely tortured by state security 
agents and finally arrested on allegations that he was a ‘dissident’ and also that he had cached 




said he came from the liberation struggle without a single scar but suffered life threatening 
injuries after independence in the hands of ZANU-PF security forces (Interview, 2017). He 
said he did not want to endure such horrible experiences again. 
Due to the harassment by the both the 5th Brigade and ‘dissidents’; many rural homes were no 
go areas for demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatants as well as ZIPRA cadres that were in the ZNA. 
This meant that they missed out in the land redistribution program of between 1980 and 1984. 
Secondly, it meant that they could not visit their families, relatives and friends in the 
countryside. ZIPRA ex-combatants who had demobilised left their parents and friends in the 
countryside and hid themselves in urban areas during the height of ZANU-PF/ZANLA and PF-
ZAPU/ZIPRA antagonisms. Ndebele who served in the ZNA until the post-2000 period said 
that he could not meet with his father in rural Plumtree for a long period during the early 1980s. 
Ndebele had this to say about his experiences in the 1980s: 
For some of us, we stopped visiting our rural areas in 1982. We resumed going to 
our parents’ homes in 1988 after the signing of the Unity Accord. We did not want 
to risk our lives because the 5th Brigade did not care whether you were in the ZNA 
or not; to them, all ZIPRA ex-combatants and Ndebele speaking people were 
‘dissidents.’ How could you then be expected to marry and found a family under 
those circumstances? Occasionally, our parents met us in cities, especially in 
Bulawayo but this was also difficult due to curfews in the rural areas that made 
travelling risky (Interview with Ndebele, 2017). 
Quite a number of ZIPRA ex-combatants said they still felt unsafe because they are unsure of 
what can happen to them since there was never any apology, healing or reconciliation after the 
state-sponsored violence against them. Some of them even fear to engage in debates on 
contemporary political issues as they do not want to be labelled ‘dissidents’ again (Interview 
with Ndebele, 2017). Politically, some of them have not yet reintegrated since they fear to 
participate in political debates which affect the country. Nilsson (2005) posits that ex-
combatants should not be politically marginalised after the conflict as doing so might cause 




The insecurity of most of the ZIPRA ex-combatants partly contributed to their non-
participation in the WVCF as they thought that if they set foot in Harare where the processing 
of the payments was made, they would be arrested and detained. An interview with Kwete who 
is the Secretary for Legal Affairs in the ZNLWVA in Bulawayo Metropolitan Province and is 
also involved in the vetting of ex-combatants who did not receive their gratuities in 1997 
revealed that most of the ex-combatants who currently come forward to be vetted are mainly 
ex-ZIPRA. The reasons for their delay in getting vetted in 1997 are many but chief among them 
is that some of them did not take the vetting exercise seriously in 1997. They thought that it 
was gimmick by ZANU-PF to get them into the country so that they could be arrested 
(Interview with Mathwasa, 2017). Others did not get the information about vetting as official 
communication was not sent by the government to the neighbouring countries about the 
exercise. In general, physical insecurity led to human insecurity as many ZIPRA ex-combatants 
could not freely participate in economic activities that could empower them due to fear of being 
harassed. 
6.4.2 Human Insecurity 
The challenges of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in the DDR processes were not only confined to 
physical insecurity. They also suffered from lack of human security. Although the generality 
of the ex-combatants across the divide could not successfully reintegrate economically, the 
predicament of the ZIPRA ex-combatants in economic terms was worse. Testimony to the fact 
that DDR processes were generally unfriendly for both ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants 
was given by joint demonstrations by the two groups of former liberation fighters in the mid-
1990s against the government for support. Besides the fact that the DDR process was 




obsessed with its own security. Muggah (2010) divides security into two categories. These are 
the minimalist and the maximalist perspectives.  
The minimalist perspective focuses on physical security whilst the maximalist perspective 
gives priority to the fulfilment of the needs of the people socially, economically and politically. 
Put differently, many ZIPRA ex-combatants experienced structural violence as their social and 
economic needs were not met. According to Cockell (2010), it is not only bombs and bullets 
that kill and maim people. Structural violence that is embedded into the structure of political, 
social and economic systems of society have equally harmful effects as direct violence. Many 
ZIPRA ex-combatants suffered physical and structural violence at the hands of the government 
which decided not to pay special attention to their physical and human security needs. 
With regard to ex-combatants, if the government focuses on both the minimalist and 
maximalist perspectives of security, it means that they can be assured of both physical and 
human security. In the same vein, the UNDPKO (1999) noted that reintegration support 
increases the potential for former fighters and their dependants to sustain themselves 
economically and socially and avoid violent activities. Examples of assistance that can be given 
to the ex-combatants include cash pay-outs that can be invested in productive sectors or 
agricultural inputs which can help to generate income for ex-combatants. In most of the cases, 
ZIPRA ex-combatants were not assisted to effectively reintegrate into civil society. Instead, 
their economic projects were sabotaged by the government during the period of heightened 
inter-party tensions and clashes in the early to mid-1980s. Furthermore, the environment was 
not conducive for doing business in Matabeleland before the 1987 peace accord due to stringent 
security issues linked to the issue of ‘dissidents’ which led to the introduction of curfews that 




In the light of the above developments, Mazarire and Rupiya (2000:72) argue that through 
meddling in the operations of co-operative schemes run by ZIPRA ex-combatants as well as 
confiscating all their properties, the government, almost without realising it, was undermining 
one of its own policies, that of demobilising combatants with a severance package. As if this 
was not enough, some of the ZIPRA ex-combatants forsook collecting their demobilisation 
stipends due to security fears. When looking at the War Veterans community, Lamb (2013) 
divides it into two categories. That is the empowered and disempowered War Veterans. 
According to Lamb (2013), the former group is predominantly made up of ZANLA ex-
combatants who lived near to normal lives, experiencing minimal physical insecurities in the 
early 1980s if any. They were able to use whatever little benefits they received from the 
government to upgrade themselves in life. The second group consisted of ZIPRA ex-
combatants who experienced security challenges during the first DDR process and were in 
deplorable socio-economic conditions. 
For example, ZANU-PF was able to create avenues for the advancement of ZANLA ex-
combatants in different sectors of the economy. As a result, powerful committees were 
established in the work place which benefitted ex-ZANLA cadres (Lamb, 2013). ZIPRA ex-
combatants could not easily penetrate the job market as much as the ZANLA ex-combatants 
could because they were perceived as ‘dissidents’ and were not getting political support in their 
endeavour to get employment. 
 There was general lack of positive peace among many ex-combatants (ZIPRA), especially 
those who demobilised in the early 1980s and failed to secure employment. Many of them 
became economically vulnerable and lived in abject poverty. In Bulawayo, ZIPRA ex-
combatants became well-known for pushing and pulling carts, selling vegetables, while some 
became sculptors, cobblers, garden ‘boys’ and did all sorts of menial jobs not befitting the 




scavenging as he could not find employment and afford decent living. Sibanda relocated from 
Bulawayo urban to Ngozi Mine dumpsite on the outskirts of the city (Interview with Sibanda, 
2017). 
One thing that has to be made clear is that ZIPRA had the largest number of cadres who 
‘demobilised’ in the 1980s due to security challenges noted earlier. This meant that in economic 
terms, ZIPRA had more of its cadres in deplorable economic conditions than ZANLA. 
According to Ndebele, an ex-combatant who did not serve in the ZNA or left before reaching 
his or her pensionable age currently earns a pension of $206 bond notes per month. An ex-
combatant who served in the army and retired after reaching a pensionable age receives $206 
bond notes for partipating in the liberation struggle plus about minus or plus $300 bond notes 
pension depending on one’s rank for serving in the ZNA which gives him a total of about $500 
bond notes (Interview, 2017). For those ex-combatants who benefitted from the WVCF, the 
effects of their benefits have a bearing on their current total monthly earnings. WVCF 
beneficiaries earn a much higher monthly pension because the disability compensation is paid 
to date irrespective of whether the claims were real or fabricated (Interview with Tshuma and 
Vodloza, two amongst a few ZIPRA ex-combatants who benefitted from the WVCF, 2017). 
The disbursement of the lump sum gratuities in 1997 found the empowered and disempowered 
ex-combatants in general at different economic levels. The empowered ones were able to invest 
their money and get returns. However, many poverty-stricken ex-combatants had to start from 
scratch: building homes, buying houses, a few livestock and founding families. Due to their 
economic vulnerability, many poor ex-combatants fell victim to manipulation by the ruling 
ZANU-PF party in political campaign activities during election periods. The collusion between 
ZANU-PF and some ZIPRA ex-combatants tarnished their images and alienated them from 




accepted back and tolerated by receiving communities (IDDRS, 2006). Many ZIPRA ex-
combatants have had challenges with regard to social reintegration.  
 From the perspectives of the civilians in Matabeleland, ZIPRA ex-combatants are seen to be 
embodying a mercenary attitude as they started to support ZANU-PF despite the fact that it had 
victimised and disempowered them in the 1980s. Civilians thought that the change of attitudes 
by some ZIPRA ex-combatants was due to financial and material rewards they were receiving 
from ZANU-PF as well as the fear of losing those benefits  when a different party wins in the 
elections. For the first time since independence, some ZIPRA ex-combatants openly 
demonstrated their support for ZANU-PF and its Presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe in the 
June 2000 Parliamentary elections that pitted the MDC against ZANU-PF (Coltart, 2016). The 
politicisation of the second reintegration program of 1997 by ZANU-PF perpetuated the feeling 
of insecurity among economically-weak ex-combatants. Ex-ZIPRA cadres in particular were 
the hardest hit by this feeling of insecurity, especially those who had languished in economic 
oblivion for the whole decade of the 1980s. This was mainly because reintegration support 
given to ex-combatants in 1997 and thereafter was deliberately presented as government favour 
to them that could be withdrawn at any time if they ‘misbehaved.’ ‘Misbehaving’ meant 
supporting any political party other than ZANU-PF. 
Through its propaganda machinery, ZANU-PF usually tells ex-combatants that if they fail to 
campaign for it to ensure that it wins elections; the MDC would terminate their monthly 
pensions and evict them from the farms if it comes into power. Alexander and McGregor (2004) 
notes that whilst the majority of the people in Matabeleland punished ZANU-PF by not voting 
for it in elections from 2000 onwards, ZIPRA ex-combatants together with their ZANLA 
counterparts worked together in campaigning for ZANU-PF, in land occupations, company and 
state offices seizures and in terrorising suspected and known opposition supporters. A wedge 




of being puppets of ZANU-PF whilst some ZIPRA ex-combatants accuse civilians in general 
and those from Matabeleland in particular of selling-out by voting for the political opposition 
MDC. 
The people of Matabeleland were and are still expecting the ZIPRA ex-combatants to speak 
openly and condemn the 5th Brigade atrocities and issues pertaining to the marginalisation of 
the Matabeleland region in general and seek redress, but instead, they witness some ZIPRA ex-
combatants going on an overdrive in praising ZANU-PF and defending its policies (Alexander 
and McGregor, 2004). So, strategies used by some ex-ZIPRA cadres in coercing the people of 
Matabeleland into ‘supporting’ and voting for ZANU-PF since 2000 produced negative 
feelings about ZIPRA ex-combatants from the civilian population of Matabeleland. What has 
to be noted is that the sudden ‘positive attitude’ of some ZIPRA ex-combatants towards ZANU-
PF since 2000 was an indication of the weaknesses of both the first DDR and second 
reintegration processes. Due to their deplorable economic conditions, many ZIPRA ex-
combatants ‘support’ and vote for ZANU-PF out of lack of choice since it threatens them by 
telling them that if it loses political power, they would also lose their newly acquired status as 
War Veterans and their meagre economic benefits. 
The collusion between ZANU-PF and ZIPRA ex-combatants specifically made them 
unpopular with the civilians they were supposed to reintegrate in (Interview with Moses Mzila 
Ndlovu, 2017). The reintegration of ZIPRA ex-combatants has remained problematic to date. 
First, they could not effectively reintegrate socially in the 1980s because they could not freely 
go to their villages as they were continuously hunted down as ‘dissidents.’ Secondly, they 
became resented by most of the civilians in Matabeleland in the post-2000 period as they are 
viewed as traitors who supported the same ZANU-PF that had victimised and marginalised 




The people of Matabeleland who had suffered together with the ZIPRA ex-combatants in the 
hands of the 5th Brigade thought that ZIPRA ex-combatants abandoned them in favour of 
ZANU-PF because of material benefits. Mashingaidze (2005) has suggested that some form of 
community-based reintegration support to the people of Matabeleland could have been 
implemented after the Unity Accord so that benefits trickle down to the civilian population as 
well to compensate them for the losses they incurred in the early 1980s and to alleviate their 
resentment of the ex-combatants over what they view as preferential treatment. It is true that 
civilians in Matabeleland lost freedom, some died, whilst others lost properties, friends and 
relatives during the period of the ‘dissidents’ and 5th Brigade operations in the region. 
Therefore, compensating ZIPRA ex-combatants only has generated resentment and negative 
feelings about the whole reintegration program of 1997. 
 The other effect of the physical and human insecurity on ZIPRA ex-combatants is general 
frustration. The case of Sigoge who preferred to be cremated and his remains thrown into the 
Zambezi River clearly illustrate this point. Other ZIPRA ex-combatants expressed their 
frustration to ZANU-PF over its implementation of a partisan DDR process through abstaining 
from the national electoral processes. Jack Mpofu, Hadebe and Mpande confided to me that 
they only voted in the first elections that ushered in independence in 1980, and they have not 
voted since then because they are disappointed and frustrated due to unpleasant experiences 
within and without the ZNA (Interview, 2017). Since civilians are also disgruntled over the 
incomplete and partisan DDR process, an inclusive and participatory multi-stakeholder process 
could help to stabilise the situation and bring about national healing, unity, and reconciliation.  
6.4.3 Political Capitulation 
Sustained attacks on the ZIPRA ex-combatants, PF-ZAPU officials and the Ndebele speaking 




finally broke ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU’s will to continue resisting ZANU-PF’s 
onslaught. As a result, they succumbed to a ‘peace agreement’ (Unity Accord, 1987) on ZANU-
PF terms. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:181) describes the Unity Accord as a ‘surrender pact’ or as 
an agreement where ‘elites accommodated each other.’ Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s view about the 
Unity Accord carries some weight given the fact that there was nothing mentioned along the 
lines of trauma healing, compensation or reconciliation between the parties to the conflict of 
the 1980s, especially between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants who were physically 
fighting. The victims of violence were left with physical and emotional scars which have not 
completely healed to date. 
It is correct that political elites managed to accommodate each because PF-ZAPU politicians 
who were thrown into political oblivion in February 1982 (after the collapse of GNU) were 
brought back into the political limelight through the Unity Accord. Joshua Nkomo became 
second in command as the Second Vice-President of Zimbabwe and the united ZANU-PF party 
whilst some of his colleagues also occupied some few prominent cabinet posts (Ncube, 1989). 
However, the spirit of unity did not cascade down to the grassroots in Matabeleland. The 
opposition MDC became very popular in Matabeleland as it came in at the right time to fill the 
political void that had been left by PF-ZAPU which had vanished from the political scene 
(Masunungure, 2004). The MDC was formed in September 1999 and that was immediately 
after the death of Joshua Nkomo in July 1999. Joshua Nkomo had helped rally the people of 
Matabeleland towards ZANU-PF due to his great political status and the respect the people of 
Matabeleland had for him. 
The enthusiasm with which the people of Matabeleland welcomed the MDC illustrated the 
point that the Unity Accord had not addressed the critical challenges of people of Matabeleland 
which were mainly a result of an ineffectual DDR process and the resultant atrocities 




combatants resumed after 1987; the previous anomalies at the command levels which had been 
a result of the purging and arrest of senior former ZIPRA military personnel in the early 1980s 
was not addressed (Kriger, 2003). Furthermore, as the cases of Mazinyane and Dube have 
shown, the promotion of ex-ZIPRA cadres was slow even after 1987. 
 In the absence of senior former ZIPRA commanders, ZANLA ex-combatants utilised the 
situation to the fullest and took an unassailable lead in terms of occupying senior positions in 
the army and other security sectors. The fact that there was no impartial body to look into issues 
of past imbalances and unfairness in DDR processes meant that the marginalisation of ZIPRA 
ex-combatants in the army and other sectors of society continued unabated even after the Unity 
Accord. It was impossible for competing parties to effectively sort out their DDR challenges, 
reconcile and embrace each other without the assistance of an impartial third party.  
No single clause in the Unity Accord agreement referred to problematic DDR issues. Many 
ZIPRA personnel had been dislodged from the ZNA illegally in the early 1980s, some were 
arrested and detained on trumped up charges, whilst thousands were marginalised in 
demobilisation and reintegration processes, with their properties confiscated and co-operatives 
schemes undermined. Whereas in the 1980s, ZIPRA ex-combatants had grudgingly accepted 
their junior status in the army, after the Unity Accord, despair concerning ever getting redress 
on their grievances made those who remained in the army to accept their ‘inferior status’ to 
ZANLA ex-combatants and to take abnormal things as normal.  In fact, PF-ZAPU leadership 
was coerced into accepting that it was them together with ZIPRA ex-combatants who were 
responsible for insecurity and violence in Matabeleland (Chiwewe, 1989:283). Clause Number 
8 of the Unity Accord read: 
The present leadership of PF-ZAPU shall take immediate vigorous steps to 





The implication of the clause was simple. ZANU-PF shifted all the blame for the violence in 
Matabeleland after independence to PF-ZAPU. All that happened to ZIPRA ex-combatants in 
the ZNA in terms of physical persecution as well as the harsh experiences of those of them 
who demobilised in the hands of the 5th Brigade and the ‘dissidents’ was just swept under carpet 
and forgotten. The strategy of systematic purging of both PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants 
made it possible for them to accept unity on ZANU-PF terms (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The 
will of ZANU-PF prevailed both politically and militarily. However, the revival of ZAPU on 
the 8th November 2008 and the formation of the ZWVA in May 2016 to articulate specific 
grievances that affect ZIPRA ex-combatants indicate that some (ZIPRA ex-combatants and 
former PF-ZAPU officials) still have the will to see to it that past injustices brought by an 
ineffectual DDR process and related acts of violence are dealt with. 
Although the senior leadership of the former PF-ZAPU capitulated to the political wishes of 
ZANU-PF through agreeing to a one-sided Unity Accord, some ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
adamant to accept the Accord since it did not address critical issues which troubled them. For 
example, one of their grievances is lack of truth on what led them to leave the army in the 
1980s. They want the findings of the Simplicius Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry to be 
released. The Commission was set up by the government to investigate the causes of their 
(ZIPRA ex-combatants) desertions from the ZNA, but to date, its findings have not been made 
public (Msipa, 2015).  
Some of ZIPRA ex-combatants who were aware of the loopholes of the Unity Accord took 
advantage of the formation of the MDC to challenge ZANU-PF as they took up leadership 
positions in the fledging opposition party and contested as Members of Parliament (MPs). 
Examples of ZIPRA ex-combatants who challenged ZANU-PF as MPs on an MDC ticket in 
elections since 2000 are Moses Mzila Ndlovu, Paul Themba Nyathi, Paulos Matjaka, and 




to challenge ZANU-PF coupled with the overwhelming Ndebele vote for the MDC was a clear 
indication of their bitterness over their marginalisation by ZANU-PF. There is no evidence that 
Shona speaking ZIPRA ex-combatants ever joined the opposition MDC and this could also 
indicate the ethnic dimension of the DDR process. It is apparent that to date, the scars opened 
by a partisan DDR have not healed. Through supporting and voting for the MDC, it can be 
argued, the people of Matabeleland in general and a few ZIPRA ex-combatants are trying to 
put across a message that they are not happy over what they perceive as deliberate 
marginalisation by the government and its failure to deal with effects of acts of injustice, 
violence, and discrimination that took place in the past and affected them adversely, especially 
in DDR programs. 
6.5 Heroes and Hero Statuses for ZIPRA Ex-Combatants 
The conflict that pitted ZANU-PF/ZANLA against PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA after independence was 
fought in different battle zones. In all the battle zones, PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA ex-combatants 
emerged losers. Their antagonistic relationships which were aimed at undermining each other 
also disadvantaged former ZIPRA forces in hero and heroine status conferment. Since PF-
ZAPU politicians were accused of sponsoring ‘dissidents’, they were not considered for hero 
status during the period of the inter-party animosities between 1982 and 1987. The same 
applied to former ZIPRA commanders and other luminaries of the liberation struggle linked to 
PF-ZAPU. 
Zimbabwe came up with a national program of honouring its heroes and heroines through 
burying them at Heroes Acres. These shrines are divided into National, Provincial and District 
Heroes Acres. One is buried in any one of the three in accordance with what is deemed to be 
his or her contribution(s) towards the liberation of Zimbabwe as well as commitment to the 




a ‘dissident’ contradicted that of being a hero. Thus, many ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
marginalised in the conferment of hero and heroine status because of the loose application of 
the term ‘dissident’ to all ZIPRA ex-combatants.  
What compounded the challenges of ZIPRA ex-combatants with regards to hero and heroine 
statuses was the fact that the conferment of hero and heroine status especially at the national 
level is decided by the ZANU-PF Politiburo (its highest decision-making body outside 
Congress) (Kriger, 1995). It became obvious that ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU 
politicians who did not and are continuing refusing to tow the political line of ZANU-PF lose 
out in the process of selecting heroes. Many ZIPRA ex-combatants were bitter that their 
liberation war contributions were undermined. It is interesting to note that there are even some 
few ZANLA ex-combatants and ZANU-PF politicians who have suffered like ZIPRA ex-
combatants and former PF-ZAPU politicians with regards to being denied heroe and/or heroine 
statuses because of being deemed to have crossed the path of ZANU-PF or that of its President. 
PF-ZAPU challenged the partisan way in which the heroes and heroines were identified, but 
was not successful since it was out of power between 1982 and 1987, and even if it was co-
opted into government after 1987, it came in as a defeated party with no significant political 
powers. For example, PF-ZAPU felt that Ruth Nyamurowa, who was commander of Victory 
Camp in Zambia during the liberation struggle, qualified to be a national heroine. However, 
she was not declared a national heroine and the reason was that the Prime Minister was outside 
the country during the time of her death (Kriger, 1995).  
Another luminary of the liberation struggle, Lookout Masuku, was not honoured with a national 
hero status. This was because he was suspected of having tried to dethrone ZANU-PF in 1982 
through encouraging ZIPRA ex-combatants to cache arms. He was arrested and detained in 




alongside civilians at Lady Stanley Cemetery in Bulawayo. Besides the verdict of the ZANU-
PF Politiburo on one’s hero status, the final decision on who should and should not be declared 
a national hero or heroine rested and continues to rest with the President of ZANU-PF. Many 
genuine heroes and heroines not known to him or whom he did not personally want to recognise 
as heroes and heroines lost out. 
The process leading to the declaration of a person as a national hero starts from a request by 
his or her home Province for such a status. Mazinyane notes one major challenge in this 
arrangement. The challenge is that former PF-ZAPU politicians who joined ZANU-PF after 
1987 feared and continue to fear to genuinely represent the interests of former PF-ZAPU 
politicians and ZIPRA ex-combatants (Interview, 2017). What they want is to benefit 
economically and politically as individuals and therefore do not want to antagonise their 
superiors through discussing some issues which could turn out to be controversial and 
unwelcome in ZANU-PF (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). 
 Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) cited in Munemo (2016) aptly describes the behaviour of these former 
PF-ZAPU leaders who are in ZANU-PF government today as similar to those of colonial 
constables. They think that their brief in government is to represent Mugabe and later 
Mnangagwa after the ouster of the former and to also defend ZANU-PF policies in 
Matabeleland rather than articulating the challenges faced by their former party PF-ZAPU, 
ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR processes, and the people of Matabeleland in general.   
Coupled with the fact that the ascendancy of a ZIPRA cadre within the ranks of the army was 
mainly based on the distance between that cadre and PF-ZAPU and the Ndebele people in 
general, these former ZIPRA officers either did not know some senior ZIPRA ex-combatants 
who deserved national hero status, or if they knew them, feared to jeopardise their positions 




behaviour of both former ZIPRA cadres and former PF-ZAPU politicians within the united 
ZANU-PF party was and is still tantamount to selling-out. Even members of the former ZIPRA 
who occupied very high positions in the ZNLWVA did not use their positions and influence to 
specifically articulate the grievances of ZIPRA ex-combatants within the national association. 
For example, Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzvi and Jabulani Sibanda, both former ZIPRA combatants, 
were once in different times national chairpersons of the ZNLWVA. However, they never 
utilised their positions to speak out on the marginalisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR 
programs.  
 However, for someone who understands their previous negative experiences within DDR 
programs and in the political sphere generally would appreciate that their actions were 
motivated more by the fear to be found on the wrong side of the popular political discourse. 
ZANU-PF did not hesitate to intervene in the leadership of the ZNLWVA if it thought that it 
was ‘losing direction’ by not propagating party policies and programs. Another point to note is 
that since the request for hero status emanated from the home Provinces of the deceased person, 
many PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA personnel were so frustrated by unfair treatment so much so that 
they do not bother anymore to actively involve themselves in national issues and politics. In 
this respect, some of the former PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA leaders have declined through their relatives 
to be laid to rest at the National Heroes shrine even if they would have been declared national 
heroes and heroines by ZANU-PF, their argument being that they could not accept to be 
honoured in a special way at death whilst they were demonised and hunted down as ‘dissidents’ 
during their lifetime. Welshman Mabhena, former PF-ZAPU Secretary General is one example 
of an individual who told his family that they should not allow ZANU-PF to bury him at the 
National Heroes Acre even it so wished (Interview with Dabengwa, 2017). Dabengwa is the 
latest high profile ZIPRA ex-combatant to be declared a national heroe but buried in his home 




Even though there is no harm in someone choosing his resting place after death, however, the 
high number of high profile ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU politicians who refuse 
(through their surviving relatives) after being declared national heroes to be buried at the 
National Heroes Acre compared to that of ZANLA ex-combatants and politicians from the 
original ZANU-PF of before 1987 speaks volumes about the nature of relationships between 
the two former liberation movements and their former military wings. Speeches that are usually 
uttered during burials of ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU politicians who refuse to be 
buried at the National Heroes Acre by their surviving friends and relatives indicate that true 
unity and reconciliation are yet to be achieved in Zimbabwe. The speeches indicate anger over 
past victimisation and neglect of ZIPRA ex-combatants and PF-ZAPU politicians by a ZANU-
PF government. 
The consequences of a partisan and discriminatory DDR processes pervaded almost every facet 
of life and undermined peace building as the common experience of most ZIPRA ex-
combatants, PF-ZAPU officials, and their supporters was that of persecution, violence, 
humiliation, and marginalisation. Competition for power, influence, recognition, and 
legitimacy was notable in almost every sphere of life where the two former liberation parties 
and their former military wings had interests. The consequences of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ 
experiences in DDR indicate that true unity, sustainable peace, and reconciliation were 
undermined by conflictual and strained relationships that were brought about by compromised 
and partisan DDR programs. 
6.6 Conclusion 
 ZIPRA ex-combatants’ experiences in DDR processes revealed that a compromised DDR 
process that is implemented by a partisan government undermines peace building. There is the 
creation of a ‘Security Dilemma’, ‘dissidents’, and disempowerment of a group of ex-




country was undermined. Fear, ethnic mistrust and hostilities were accentuated as the DDR 
process was implemented along political and ethnic lines which to a large extent marginalised 
ZIPRA ex-combatants as their physical and human security was compromised. Through 
violence and political manipulation, the government was able to successfully create a ‘ZANU-
nised’ national army which dabbled in national politics at will.  
The coup that was staged by the army in November 2017, leading to the ouster of former 
President, Robert Mugabe, could be partly attributed to the politicisation of the army and 
allowing it to dabble in national politics willy-nilly. The chapter illustrated the glaring need for 
interactive inter-party workshops targeted at inculcating a mindset of nation building and 
reconciliation so that antagonistic parties could learn to tolerate and co-operate in nation 
building and peace building processes like DDR.  The consequences of perpetual fear, mistrust 
and bitterness amongst ZIPRA ex-combatants and the people of Matabeleland in general is that 
quite a significant group of people feel marginalised and do not fully participate in nation 














CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The chapter concludes the thesis and draws the main arguments together. It highlights the major 
findings and proffers recommendations on how best a DDR process can be implemented by a 
government in the context of ethnic based political and military formations that are embroiled 
in mutual mistrusts, fears, rivalries and sometimes open clashes. 
7.2 Major Findings 
The thesis demonstrated that in a context of competing and ethnic-based political and military 
formations, the government that designs and implements the DDR programs discriminates 
against the rival military formation in DDR processes and also works hard to decimate the 
power base of its rival political party. Deep-rooted political differences between political 
parties negatively affect relationships, perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, and feelings between 
different ex-combatant factions, making it difficult to implement impartial and effective DDR 
programs. The government’s lack of political will and commitment to cultivate and entrench a 
spirit of mutual respect, tolerance, trust, understanding, empathy, unity, and peace among 
parties to the DDR process stifles genuine reconciliation and confidence between critical 
stakeholders to the DDR process. This contributes significantly to military cleavages and 
clashes. A ‘Security Dilemma’ created by the political leadership is usually passed down to 
‘political armies.’ Clashes at APs between ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants were a 
manifestation of rivalries between political parties. It is clear that a partisan DDR process does 
not restore broken relations between feuding political parties and between ex-combatants. To 
date, ralations between the ruling ZANU-PF government and ZIPRA ex-combatants are 
strained though at different intervals they forge political ‘alliances’ as a result of the 





 It was established that it is difficult for a government to implement impartial and effective 
DDR programs in a context like Zimbabwe. The context under which the DDR process was 
designed and implemented in Zimbabwe was laden with competition, mutual suspicion, 
mistrust, fear, and outright hostility in many cases between the key stakeholders to the process. 
South Africa was able to successfully design and implement its DDR programs amidst 
divisions between political and military formations and without the assistance of a third party 
because the government was non-partisan and fully committed towards genuine reconciliation. 
As a result, ex-combatants respected and trusted each other in South Africa even though they 
had operated under different and at times hostile political formations during the fight against 
the Apartheid system.  
In Zimbabwe, there was a ‘Security Dilemma’ which undermined the effectiveness of the 
process. Using its political muscle, the government manipulated the process at the expense of 
ZIPRA ex-combatants. The entire peace building process was thus negatively affected. The 
major challenge was that the government that designed and implemented the DDR process 
evolved directly from one of the parties embroiled in ethnic-based competitions and hostilities. 
In that way, the government tends to support one military faction against the other and this is 
done to promote its selfish political interests. The persecution and marginalisation of the 
‘Other’ is caused by the fact that both political and military formations compete for resources, 
political power, positions, legitimacy and general recognition. If not regulated by a third party 
and if there are no vigorous programs meant to change the mindset of the competing parties, 
such competitions explode into violent clashes between opposite armed military factions. 
 It became clear from the findings that the agenda of the rival party in government would be to 
weaken and finally subjugate its rival(s), politically, militarily and economically. In a bid to 
underline the importance of the ethnic factor in the victimisation and marginalisation of the 




led government which was entirely made up of Shona speaking politicians after 1982, Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2011:23) had this to say: 
ZANUPF’s agenda was to dominate South-Western Zimbabwe and silence PF-
ZAPU and the Ndebeles. In order to fulfil their agenda, PF-ZAPU was deliberately 
viewed as a party that sponsored ‘dissidents’; Joshua Nkomo was labelled as father 
of ‘dissidents’, every young Ndebele man was a potential ‘dissident’, all ex-ZIPRA 
including those serving in the ZNA were ‘dissidents’, and the entire population of 
Matabeleland constituted a ‘dissident’ community. 
 The agenda of discriminating against political and military rivals is not only pursued within 
the military and political spheres, but within the socio-economic systems of the state as well 
and the target is to totally weaken and destroy the rival party and its supporting military wing 
if possible, by denying it access to vital resources. 
 The first strategy used by a government that is in competition with other parties, but is in 
charge of DDR programs is to break the military backbone of the political rivals. In the process 
of breaking the military power of the rival party, the government implements a partisan and 
discriminatory integration of the armed forces that is usually at the detriment of the armed 
forces of the political party without political power. In pursuit of the agenda of the   governing 
party to achieve political hegemony, the national army is usually politicised and ethnicised and 
is let to dabble in national politics at will as long as it helps to push the agenda of the ruling 
elite.  
The relationships between the members of the national army that originate from an 
environment of ethnic rivalries between political formations exhibit a loser-winner mentality. 
It became clear from the findings that it is always difficult for former antagonistic military 
forces to reconcile on their own even if they work together in one national army and in joint 
reintegration programs. It is possible that they could reconcile if reconciliation and strong 




the creation of inclusive political, social and economic programs across political and military 
formations at the national level.  
In that difficult process of reconciliation, parties have to be assisted by a neutral third party to 
lower tensions, iron out differences, and develop a common approach to national and DDR 
issues and finally learn to treat each other as partners rather than competitors and enemies. In 
that way, the transmission of political misunderstandings and rivalries into military circles and 
the creation of a ‘Security Dilemma’ could be minimised or avoided. Once at APs, no ex-
combatant was left with any military equipment in Uganda. Demobilisation reduced force size 
whilst the VAP catered for the special needs of ex-combatants and the receiving communities 
throughout rural Uganda. That process promoted unity and reconciliation around villages hence 
Uganda’s DDR process is an example of a success story (Lewis et al, 2010). 
In line with the third objective of the study which sought to establish the nature of ZIPRA ex-
combatants’ experiences in the DDR processes, it was established that they had torrid 
experiences within the security establishments as well as in civilian life as demobilised cadres. 
The disarmament and demobilisation processes were not impartial and as a result, 
disadvantaged ZIPRA ex-combatants although their discrimination was not as glaring as in the 
ZNA and in reintegration programs. Their experiences in DDR programs denied them both 
negative and positive peace. Lack of negative peace forced a few ZIPRA ex-combatants into 
becoming ‘dissidents’ whilst lack of positive peace led them to be vulnerable to political 
manipulation by ZANU-PF after the second reintegration program of 1997. 
The study exposed that a DDR process that is led by the government amidst contestations for 
power between political factions is inclined to be partisan and undermines other critical 
elements of the peace building process. Ethnic-related rivalries and hostilities have adverse 




experiences in the DDR process was that they undermined peace building efforts. Four distinct 
but interrelated processes were rolled out simultaneously with the DDR process in Zimbabwe. 
These were the national elections to choose the government of the state, the GNU, the policy 
on national reconciliation and socio-economic development programs. All these peace building 
processes were negatively affected by a partisan and ineffectual DDR process. 
Elections that are carried out in the context of ethnic-related political and military rivalries 
exacerbate inter-party tensions. There were allegations by PF-ZAPU of electoral meddling by 
ZANLA ex-combatants in favour of ZANU-PF in the 1980 elections. As a result, PF-ZAPU 
believed that without the involvement of ZANLA cadres in intimidating its supporters, it could 
have fared much better. So, the questions that were raised regarding the credibility of the 1980 
elections cast doubts on the legitimacy of the government. Further to this, the GNU could not 
hold beyond 1982 due to military-related security challenges linked to the arms cache 
‘discovery’ and the issue of ‘dissidents’ that were all directly blamed on ZIPRA ex-combatants. 
In the midst of the two challenges, the policy on reconciliation crumbled as the conflict that 
had been White on Black during the liberation struggle turned out to be Black on Black after 
independence. Hostile and competing military formations cannot successfully integrate 
themselves, neither can they reconcile easily if there is no political will from the governing 
party to design and implement impartial and inclusive DDR programs. It can be noted that 
political challenges easily spill over into the military arena as the case of the inadequate DDR 
process in Zimbabwe has shown. 
 The results of an ineffectual DDR process affect socio-economic programs and political 
dynamics and relationships for a long time. Due to the lingering residual effects of their 
challenges in the first DDR process (1980-1984), some ZIPRA ex-combatants were 
hoodwinked by ZANU-PF to be its storm troopers who became involved in the terrorisation of 




onwards. In the first process there was violence on ZIPRA ex-combatants, but in the second 
one (1997 and the period afterwards), there was violence by some ZIPRA ex-combatants on 
civilians. All these developments undermined the peace building process as fear, violence, and 
uncertainty dominated. In all, the experiences of ZIPRA in DDR programs were to a large 
extent negative. Developmental programs and projects were adversely affected in 
Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands during the period of overt violence (1982-1987). 
The thesis explored the phenomenon of dissidence and established that there was a strong nexus 
between ‘dissidents’ and the experiences of ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR processes. It 
became clear that ineffective, partisan and discriminatory DDR processes produce ‘dissidents.’ 
The victimisation of ZIPRA ex-combatants within and outside the ZNA by government agents 
produced ‘dissidents.’ In the context of mutually hostile ethnic based military formations, the 
problem of ‘dissidents’ is usually ethnicised, regionalised and politicised by the ruling 
party/government in order to have a pretext to eliminate its rivals. 
 All in all, it became clear that the issue of arms caches, their ‘discovery’ as well as the 
phenomenon of ‘dissidents’ especially after 1982 were to a large extent fabrication by the 
government that was yearning to legitimise its violent strategies of subduing both ZIPRA ex-
combatants and PF-ZAPU. Testimony to this argument is given by the fact that the alleged 
chief architects of the arms cache issue and the purported masterminds behind the ‘dissidents,’ 
Masuku and Dabengwa, were once arrested, detained, acquitted by the courts but later re-
arrested and kept under unlawful detention for half a decade until 1986. Later on, the two were 
declared national heroes, though for Masuku it was done posthumously and moreso, long after 
his death. The argument is that they could not have been declared national heroes by ZANU-






In the light of a plethora of challenges that undermine peace building efforts if a DDR process 
is led by the government in an environment where political and military formations are 
competing against each other based on politicised ethnic differences, the thesis recommends 
that there has to be open and frank dialogue predicated on truth telling, acknowledgement of 
wrongs done in the past, and if possible, compensatory justice to heal the wounds of victims of 
unfair DDR programs and foster sustainable peace, unity and reconciliation.The purpose of 
dialogue is to narrow and finally eradicate differences between political and military 
formations through facilitating  mindset transformation and positive engagement. Common 
nation building approaches should replace narrow and partisan approaches to nation and peace 
building predicated on intolerance, suspicion, rivalry, refusal to co-operate and a quest to 
outcompete each other. 
Although the first DDR process in Zimbabwe took place over thirty years ago, the formation 
and operationalization of a NDDRC could still help in the present moment to deal holistically 
and in a transparent way with challenges that beset ZIPRA ex-combatants due to the design 
and implementation of a defective DDR process. This could include among other things, the 
return of ZIPRA properties or compensation of some kind, affirmative economic action and 
psycho-social counselling to cater for victims of economic marginalisation as well mental and 
physical victimisation. The recommendations of this study go along with AUC (2014) 
proposals. It suggests that a NDDRC with a broad group of critical stakeholders be established 
to spearhead and cater for the facilitation of successful DDR programs. The NDDRC would 
take a lead in consultation with various stakeholders to ensure that those who need and deserve 
support in DDR processes are taken care of. The NDDRC can also coordinate with some 
international organisations like the AU and the UN as well as with funding partners to deal 




manipulation or abuse of the DDR process by any of the parties, including the government. In 
other words, the government should not be left alone to design and implement DDR programs 
in a context like Zimbabwe. 
Even in the context of ethnic based political and military formations, it is recommended that 
government lead the DDR process but with the assistance of a well-constituted NDDRC that 
would provide the much needed political and strategic oversight on the whole DDR process. 
Drawing from the AUC (2014) propositions on DDR programs in the context of the continent 
of Africa, inclusivity and impartiality should be made top priorities in the context of competing 
and sometimes contradictory interests of parties to the DDR process. In order to achieve this, 
the NDDRC should co-ordinate with relevant government Ministries and non-governmental 
organisations. 
Inclusive and participatory programs and activities that can transform conflictual, exclusive, 
competitive, selfish and divisive mindsets in a context of a government led DDR process with 
ethnic and regionally-based competing political and military formations into those of mutual 
trust, confidence, empathy, inclusivity and tolerance towards each other can help build peace, 
unity and reconciliation. The key issue is that the DDR process should be as inclusive and 
participatory as possible to make sure that there is building of collaborative problem-solving 
mechanisms between competing military and political factions that help to reduce negative and 
divisive feelings, attitudes, perceptions, and relationships. This approach would help counter 
the spirit of trying to weaken and subjugate one of the parties to the DDR process and develop 
that of learning from each other’s experiences to implement an effective and impartial DDR 
process.  
The aim of undertaking inclusive and participatory activities in the political and military 




of the parties to the DDR process. ZIPRA ex-combatants were viewed as ‘dissidents’ and anti-
establishment by the government. As a result of this stereotype, they were isolated in 
reintegration programs and persecuted in military and civilian circles. If the government was 
not overwhelmed by the desire to entrench itself politically and to get rid of its competitors and 
‘enemies’, it could have found it easy to establish common ground and mindset between ZIPRA 
and ZANLA ex-combatants because they shared the same ideology from the liberation 
struggle. 
The national government, external and internal implementing partners as well as the NDDRC 
should promote collaborative, inclusive inter-political and inter-military processes and 
activities to create a conducive platform for an effective DDR process. If PF-ZAPU politicians 
were not dismissed from the GNU, if senior ZIPRA military personnel were not purged from 
the ZNA, and if sensitive security ministries were co-shared between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU 
politicians; then that could have made it possible and easy for them to work collaboratively 
with their counterparts from ZANU-PF and ZANLA to decisively and impartially find durable 
solutions to challenges that affected ZIPRA ex-combatants in DDR processes. 
 Key among the processes and actions that could help inculcate an inclusive and collaborative 
mindset is the holding of reconciliation, peace building and nation building workshops, first at 
APs before disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and integration programs; and then 
later, within integrated security sectors, among demobilised ex-combatants, within and across 
political parties in order to help transform the mindset of violence, fear, mistrust, suspicion, 
bitterness, and competition  to that of mutual trust, tolerance, co-operation and peaceful co-
existence. Holding reconciliation, peace building, and nation building workshops at APs or 
cantonment sites would be specifically targeted at assuring ex-combatants of their future so 
that they could agree to disarm and demobilise. As indicated in chapter four, competing 




back some of their military personnel as well as caching some of their weapons during the 
disarmament process. The disarmament process was shambolic due to mutual mistrust and fear. 
Secondly, inclusive and collaborative activities like reconciliation, nation and peace building 
workshops would be aimed at transforming negative and exclusive mindsets so that different 
military factions learn to tolerate each other during military integration into a single army and 
also develop enough mutual trust and confidence that would enable them to work together in 
joint reintegration programs without friction. Operation SEED, a joint reintegration program 
between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants crumbled partly because they could not 
accommodate each other and work together. They started to fight each other during the course 
of the program (Rupiya and Chitiyo, 2005). This was partly caused by the fact that national 
reconciliation was only pronounced but not effectively practised. It was more theoretical than 
practical and left fundamental issues that divided ZANU-PF/ZANLA and PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA 
unadressed. 
 If ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres were taught to hate, despise and fight each other by their 
respective political leaders and Commissariat Departments during the liberation struggle and 
thereafter, it is possible that they could be taught again to change that mindset by the same 
political leadership, working together with the NDDRC through open and frank dialogue and 
workshops for them to be tolerant, empathetic, respectful, and loving towards each other for 
the benefit of effective DDR processes, peace, unity and stability. In the case of political-cum-
military forces, it is recommended that these workshops be targeted at depoliticising the ex-
combatants so as to diminish entrenched hardline political positions and develop a common 
and shared national vision. 
 For example, one hardline political position which ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants held 




expected nothing less than victory for their respective political parties in the 1980 and 1985 
general elections. ZIPRA ex-combatants were badly haunted by the loss of PF-ZAPU in both 
elections, and to make matters worse, ZANLA ex-combatants capitalised on that electoral loss 
in their relationships with them and that disturbed DDR programs.  Political and military 
inclusivity can play a critical role in bringing together adversaries in DDR programs and help 
the government to succeed in the implementation of DDR programs. It is possible that ex-
combatants with a depoliticised mindset are not easily affected by what happens between their 
respective political parties. 
Where possible, there should be compensation for damages and losses incurred through 
omission or commission by any of the parties to the DDR process to facilitate genuine 
reconciliation that would enable former adversaries to leave the past behind, focus into the 
future and be willing to work together without any challenges. Ex-combatants should be 
actively involved in defining the type of justice that they prefer in order to bring finality to their 
challenges. Engagement in those workshops should be frank and be facilitated by a NDDRC 
to help parties find each other peacefully and to lessen tensions. Third parties should facilitate 
the process of engagement, reconciliation, offer advice and recommendations but should not 
dictate what should be done. This ensures local ownership of the process, hence its 
sustainability.  
Moving forward, the NDDRC if it is formed, together with the National Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) which is currently seized with issues of past injustices, 
peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe, should, among other things, specifically target ZIPRA 
ex-combatants who experienced abuse, disempowerment, and unfairness in the DDR process, 
and come up with positive and viable strategies of dealing with those challenges. With regard 
to Matabeleland regions, the NPRC is currently dealing generally with the issue of 




experienced challenges in DDR processes with the view of addressing them. In that context, 
the NPRC could possibly help in addressing the contentious issue of ZIPRA ex-combatants’ 
properties and other issues where ZIPRA ex-combatants felt disadvantaged and marginalised. 
Focus should be on building a national army not a party army. Songs and slogans should 
promote nation building not the interests of a single party. Ex-combatants should be made 
aware that they fought for national interests not partisan party interests. It is suggested that the 
administration of key and sensitive security ministries be co-shared between political parties at 
first up until enough trust and confidence is built so as to cultivate a spirit of stakeholdership 
in the government among all ex-combatants. In that way, incidences of inter-faction clashes 
could be minimised. If representatives of all military factions are incorporated into the 
leadership structures of the army, police, intelligence, and airforce, issues pertaining to 
discrimination of some elements could be effectively attended to.  
Again, all ex-combatants would feel represented in the security sector and in this way, they are 
bound to co-operate in peace building efforts. The case of the removal of ZIPRA military 
leaders from the army illustrates this point. After the removal of Dumiso Dabengwa and 
Lookout Masuku from the ZNA as well other senior ZIPRA commanders from 1982 onwards, 
the victimisation of ex-ZIPRA cadres in the ZNA escalated leading to their desertions and 
‘demobilisation’ en masse. Their desertions presented a ‘Security Dilemma’ as ZANU-
PF/ZANLA felt vulnerable. The feeling of vulnerability led to the creation of the 5th Brigade 
which diminished the security of PF-ZAPU/ZIPRA. 
Other intervention measures that could be recommended to facilitate effective government 
implementation of DDR processes include the recognition of war or battle songs/music of all 
the military factions and playing them on national television, radio and during the 




museum that keeps the war history of all political and military formations and the formation of 
a neutral all-stakeholders committee to look into the heroe and heroine status of all ex-
combatants, politicians and other deserving civilians. By doing that, all politicians and military 
personnel would feel recognised and honoured and would participate positively in peace 
building processes like DDR. When enough trust and confidence has been built between rival 
political and military formations, then, new and inclusive songs/music could be developed 
reflecting the inclusive nature and character of the government and its security establishments. 
Tensions between ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants after independence were exacerbated by 
the state radio and television which was consistent in praising ZANLA whilst at the same time 
discrediting ZIPRA and PF-ZAPU (Doran, 2017). 
 Political processes that generate acute competition like winner-takes-all electoral systems to 
be discarded or minimised in favour of inclusive processes where parties do not vigorously 
compete and undermine each other. It is not only in Zimbabwe where competitive elections 
caused further divisions and heightened emotions between political parties and pushed them to 
incite their military wings to fight, and in the process, undermine DDR processes. Angola is a 
case in point. After its defeat in the 1992 elections, the UNITA rebel movement of Jonas 
Savimbi refused to concede defeat and re-ignited the civil war. In the case of Zimbabwe, some 
of the political and military challenges could have been averted had it been that the 1980 
elections were contested by the PF as one political entity. Campaigning for the February and 
August 1980 general and local government elections respectively heightened inter-party 
competition and tensions. 
Although liberal peace building theorists argue that the holding of elections is one of the 
fundamental elements of peace building, in a context of hostile and competing political and 
military formations, elections tend to accentuate divisions and incite violence and should be 




political parties to govern. Competitive elections are divisive and conflictual and usually cause 
instability in many societies. This is worse in a multi-ethnic community where campaigning 
and voting are usually done along ethnic and regional lines. 
In a conflict situation, political parties and leaders are the ones that mobilise, politicise and 
deploy soldiers to achieve particular objectives. In the same vein, in a post-conflict 
environment, political parties and leaders have the potential and power to depoliticise ex-
combatants and develop in them a positive nation building and peace building mindset that can 
help to achieve successful implementation of DDR. Clashes at APs, as well as within integrated 
military units and government infringement on ZIPRA reintegration programs was a 
manifestation of challenges in the political arena, not the other way. It is recommended that 
reconciliation, nation building, peace building and mindset change workshops and efforts also 
target politicians within political parties to enable them to accommodate each other and speak 
with one voice pertaining to issues to do with DDR. Soldiers always follow and emulate the 
mindset of politicians not vice versa.  
The mindset of viewing all ZIPRA ex-combatants as ‘dissidents’ emanated from ZANU-PF as 
a governing party and cascaded down to the ZANLA ex-combatants. For effective DDR, that 
attitude and perception needed to be transformed to enable the ex-combatants to work together 
harmoniously. To illustrate the point that attitudes, feelings, perceptions, and relationships can 
be positively transformed to some extent, one has to look into the case of ZANU-PF-PF-ZAPU 
unity agreement of 1987. When the two parties united and stopped treating each other as 
enemies, it did not take a long time for ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants to embrace and 
work with each other positively through the ZNLWVA.  The signing of the Unity Accord 
changed ZANLA feelings and perceptions that all ZIPRA ex-combatants were ‘dissidents.’  It 





The purpose of the NDDRC is to coordinate with other players and design a DDR policy that 
speaks directly and effectively to all the critical players in the DDR process, especially the 
competing ex-combatants and their political parties. The framework of the NDDRC should be 
provided for in the peace agreement, but the finer policy details should be left to the 
government and the NDDRC itself. All key and relevant Ministries to the DDR process should 
be consulted to ensure that the reintegration of the ex-combatants is carried out in tandem with 
their needs and the general developmental trajectory of the state, and all other contextual 
factors, especially the nature of relationships between political and military formations 
involved in DDR processes.  It was noted in chapter two that one of the determinants of 
successful DDR is political will and trust from the political parties and military formations. It 
is assumed that the participation of all critical stakeholders to a DDR process in a NDDRC 
would help to generate the much-needed political will and trust in the entire DDR process. It 
is envisaged that if parties work together through a NDDRC in DDR programs, then they would 
gain trust and confidence in each other and avoid a ‘Security Dilemma.’ 
The inclusion of external implementing partners can assist in securing adequate funding to 
cater for the needs and challenges of the competing factions. External implementing partners 
could be the AU, UN. EU, the World Bank among others. The implementing partners could 
also be guarantors of the DDR process to check on breaches and sanction the culprit(s) if 
necessary. The suggested DDR approach is built on the general AUC (2014) DDR proposals 
for the African continent and these are supported by the logic of TOC which seeks to facilitate 
inclusivity in all projects and programs. Inclusive implementation of programs can facilitate 
positive behavioural and attitudinal changes among and between key stakeholders to the DDR 
process.   
The AUC (2014) suggests that national governments together with implementing partners 




developed by the NDDRC. The technical implementation and management body should act as 
the secretariat of the NDDRC, making sure that all decisions and plans are followed through. 
As seen in chapter two, national ownership and leadership of the DDR process is not an option, 
but that ownership and leadership should be exercised in an enabling environment which does 
not allow for the manipulation of DDR programs by one rival party at the expense of another 
or other parties.  
Overall, DDR processes and programs should be context-specific and change-oriented. General 
guidelines could be drawn from the policy pronouncements from the international community, 
but at country level, there should be a NDDRC that drafts a DDR policy in line with 
contextually-relevant factors. There is no one-size-fits-all DDR conceptual framework that can 
be universally superimposed on different contextual backgrounds. Context-specific DDR 
approaches that speak directly to background issues like the relations between the former 
warring parties, economic conditions, needs, challenges and aspirations of ex-combatants and 
socio-cultural issues among others are recommended in a post-conflict environment in order to 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
Name Category  Place Date 










Jack Mpofu Former ZIPRA High 
Command member 
(arrested in early 
1980s) 
Bulawayo 19.02.17 
I.G Ex-ZIPRA cadre Bulawayo 28.07.17 







Ndebele Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Integrated into ZNA 
until early 2000s) 
Bulawayo 15.03.17 
Bhebhe Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Integrated into ZNA 
until early 2000s) 
Bulawayo 14.03.17 




Ngxongo Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Failed to get a place 
in the ZNA) 
Bulawayo 14.10.17 
Duze Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Retired from the 





Rtd. Sgt. Sibanda Rtd ZNA member 
(Ex-ZIPRA) 
Bulawayo 05.03.17 
Nyathi Former RSF member Bulawayo 11.03.17 
Leornard Ndlovu Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(fled victimisation 
from the ZNA) 
Bulawayo  05.02.17 
Lot Ex-ZIPRA cadre 








Cecil Banda Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Logistician during 
the armed struggle) 
Bulawayo 04.04.17 
A Mpofu Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Was involved in 
caching arms) 
Bulawayo 12.04.17 
Mpande Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Was in specialist 
units in the ZNA) 
Bulawayo 12.03.17 
Ndazi Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Was in specialist 
units in the ZNA) 
Bulawayo 15.03.17 
Sebata Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Ordinary ZIPRA 
soldier in the ZNA) 
Bulawayo 30.04.17 
Mleya Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Ordinary ZIPRA 
soldier in the ZNA) 
Bulawayo 16.03.17 




Mathwasa Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Demobilised and 









Mzila-Ndlovu Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Demobilised and 
joined teaching but 
left due to 
harassment) 
Bulawayo 22.03.17 
Ndlovu Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Demobilised in  
1983, formed a 





(Retired from the 
ZNA in early 2000) 
Bulawayo 12.09.17 
Madotshi Ex-ZIPRA cadre 
(Demobilised in 
early 1980s and 
joined teaching) 
Bulawayo 12.05.17 
Thambolenyoka Former ‘Dissident’ Bulawayo 19.03.17 
Mr X. Former ‘Dissident’ Bulawayo 13.03.17 
Maqhula Ex-ZIPRA cadre Bulawayo 14.07.17 
Kwete Vetting Officer Bulawayo 17.06.17 
Noel Sibanda Ex-ZIPRA cadre Bulawayo 22.08.17 
Hadebe Ex-ZIPRA cadre Bulawayo 13.02.17 
Iphithule Maphosa ZAPU Spokesperson Bulawayo 22.02.17 









Appendix 2: Sample of questions for semi-structured interviews 
1. What did you hope to achieve after the liberation struggle? 
2. Were your aspirations fulfilled? If the answer is no, explain why and how? 
3. What are your views and comments on the following? 
a) Disamament and demobilisation processes 
b) Clashes between ZIPRA and ZANLA at APs and within the ZNA 
c) Arms caches and their ‘discovery’ 
d) The ‘dissidents’ 
e) The 5th Brigade/Gukurahundi 
4. What were you experiences in the ZNA? 
5. What were your experiences as a demobilised cadre? 
6. What is the nature of your relationship with ZANU-PF? What influences that relationship? 
7. What is the nature of your relationship with the civilian population in Matabeleland? 
8. What perceptions do civilians have about ex-combatants and ZIPRA ex-combatants in 
particular? 
9. Do you think ZIPRA and ZANLA ex-combatants experienced DDR processes differently? 
Why?  
10) What can you say about the government-led DDR process in Zimbabwe? Was it successful 
or not? Explain your answer. 
11) If it was not successful, what were the major impedements? In your opinion, how could it 
have been implemented to achieve positive results? 
 
 
 
